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This thesis modifies the basic neoclassical DSGE model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) by
introducing a government which levies distortionary taxes on wages and dividends, consumes
general output, issues money, and holds privately-issued equity. The thesis answers two
questions – Can discretionary policy relieve the effects of liquidity constraints that limit
investment, and thereby stimulate economic activity in normal times? Can discretionary
policy ameliorate the effects of an exogenous liquidity shock?
Including distortionary taxes is a unique modification within a branch of literature that
extends the work of KM and studies liquidity shocks. The thesis belongs to a branch of this
literature which modifies KM’s basic model, but none of these papers have distortionary
taxes and none examine fiscal policy. The thesis extends the literature with a novel variant
of the basic KM model and with a novel set of policies against a liquidity shock.
The results are as follows. Firstly, if money supply is constant and government spend-
ing varies to always balance the fiscal budget, then across-the-board tax cuts persistently
stimulate the economy and a cut in the rate of tax on dividends ameliorates a liquidity
shock without additional distortions. These responses are robust to the model’s calibration.
Secondly, an increase in government spending, financed by more taxes or selling equity
holdings, persistently worsens economic activity and exacerbates a liquidity shock; financ-
ing the policies is what brings adverse results. Thirdly, the direct effects of a government
equity purchase programme are short-lived – investment rises and new equity is added to
the market which partially offsets the government’s purchase. Financing the programme
with spending cuts do less harm than raising taxes. Adding monetary expansion to the
policy mix improves aggregate supply but reduces aggregate demand. When used against
a liquidity shock, the programme makes a positive but short-lived difference.
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1.1 Objective and scope
This thesis modifies the basic model of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) (henceforth, KM) by
introducing a government which levies distortionary taxes on wages and dividends, consumes
the economy’s general output, exclusively issues a non-depreciating perfectly-liquid asset
(money), and holds a stock of a depreciable privately-issued partially-liquid asset (equity).
The economy is populated by two groups of private agents – workers and entrepreneurs.
Asset returns are too low to encourage workers to save, so they consume all their net
wages in each period. Entrepreneurs produce and consume, and in each period a fraction
of them invest while the rest save. Entrepreneurs sell their stocks of equity and issue new
equity to raise liquid funds for investment, but both financing activities are constrained by
exogenous frictions (or “liquidity constraints”). The thesis aims to answer two questions
about this economy – Can discretionary policy relieve the effects of liquidity constraints that
limit investment, and thereby stimulate economic activity in normal times, that is, when
there are no other exogenous shocks? Can discretionary policy ameliorate the effects of an
exogenous tightening of the liquidity constraints (a “liquidity shock”)?
The research questions are answered by three exogenous and temporary policies – cuts in
tax rates, an increase in government spending, and a government purchase of equity. There
is no debt in the model, and discretionary policies are completely and contemporaneously
financed by endogenous variations in one or more of the other policy variables (that is, from
among tax rates, government spending, money supply, and government equity holdings).
The model is calibrated; discretionary policies are simulated as exogenous stochastic shocks
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to tax rates, government spending, and government equity holdings; and results are captured
and analysed by impulse responses. The thesis therefore theoretically investigates a variety
of fiscal policy and fiscal financing scenarios in the KM model.
1.2 Related literature and contribution
The thesis belongs to a set of related works (a “KM-related literature”) which all feature
KM’s liquidity constraints and study liquidity shocks. In particular, the thesis belongs to
a strand of the KM-related literature which modifies the basic neoclassical DSGE model
of KM. None of the surveyed papers include distortionary taxes, and none of them quan-
titatively examine fiscal policy. The closest is Driffill and Miller (2013) who algebraically
illustrate balanced budget fiscal expansion with lump-sum taxes, and who hypothesise about
the inter-temporal complexity of adding distortionary taxes. The thesis is motivated by the
gaps in the literature, and it expands existing knowledge on liquidity shocks from a neo-
classical perspective.
There is another set of related works within the KM-related literature which introduces
KM’s liquidity constraints to fairly standard New Keynesian DSGE models. The New Key-
nesian framework is particularly appealing because it readily accommodates modifications
which allow KM’s policy of equity purchases to avoid the irrelevance proposition of Wallace
(1981). The thesis is related in various ways to members of this group. The closest relative
is Kara and Sin (2014), who perform the only other dedicated study of fiscal policy in the
KM-related literature. Kara and Sin focus on increasing government spending, both in nor-
mal times and against a negative liquidity shock. Such spending is financed by new issues
of government bonds, which is an asset that does not exactly resemble money or equity
from this model. Moreover, there are structural differences between models which lead to
qualitative differences in results.
These structural differences with Kara and Sin (2014) and other related works help iden-
tify limitations of the thesis, and help formulate extensions with which to build a programme
of future work. The thesis is merely a first step towards understanding fiscal policy in KM’s
liquidity constrained economy. At the end, a future research programme is proposed which




The intuition which motivates the introduction of distortionary taxes to the KM model is
appealing. KM propose that a government should compensate for an unexpected loss of
private liquidity with a purchase of partially-liquid assets and a sale of liquid assets. This
can be thought of as a direct injection of liquidity. By contrast, tax cuts boost net incomes,
and are thus an indirect way of providing liquidity. Adding distortionary taxes not only
puts the KM model one step closer to reality, but it opens up the model to exploring an
alternative to asset purchases as policy against a liquidity shock.
The experiments of the thesis begin with cutting taxes. The model is uniquely adapted
for this work by assumptions of constant money supply and a balanced fiscal budget in which
government spending varies according to tax revenue. Across-the-board tax cuts stimulate
the economy for a prolonged period of time, and a cut in the rate of tax on dividends is
sufficient to ameliorate a liquidity shock without additional distortions, whether positive or
negative. A sensitivity analysis concludes that these responses are robust to the model’s
calibration of structural parameters and the persistence of shocks to tax rates.
The thesis then considers an increase in government spending. Two experiments are
successfully simulated, in which the government finances it spending by more taxes and
by selling part of its stock of equity. Because government spending is unproductive and
does not influence private agents’ utility, it merely crowds out private spending and leaves
output and employment unchanged. Financing such spending brings adverse and persistent
consequences. These discretionary spending policies exacerbate a negative liquidity shock,
and the adverse consequences are again the result of their financing.
Finally, the thesis returns to the equity purchase policy of KM that is widely studied in
the related literature. Equity purchases are contemporaneously financed by fiscal austerity
measures. On its own, the government’s purchase raises asset prices and thus improves
entrepreneurs’ net worth and stimulates investment. However, more investment creates new
equity which eventually compensates for the quantity purchased by the government. The
direct effects of the equity purchase programme are therefore short-lived. Austerity measures
that finance the equity purchase then produce additional effects. Austerity by spending cuts
do less harm than by raising taxes. Adding monetary expansion to the policy mix is not a
Pareto improvement – the supply-side of the economy benefits but the demand-side suffers.
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When used against a liquidity shock, the equity purchase programme makes a positive but
short-lived difference. This is a consistent finding in the KM-related literature, but for
somewhat different reasons.
1.4 Organisation
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 defines the novelty of the thesis by surveying the
KM-related literature and describing the structure of existing models and their approaches
to policy against liquidity shocks. Chapter 3 gives a full description of the model that is
used throughout the thesis. The government’s behaviour is where the model differs from
KM. Chapter 4 describes and justifies the procedures that are involved in calibrating the
model, simulating exogenous shocks, and representing the results.
The next three chapters are the substantial chapters of the thesis in which policy vari-
ables are shocked, the macroeconomic consequences of such shocks are analysed, and ex-
ogenous variations in policy variables are evaluated as measures against a negative liquidity
shock. Chapter 5 simulates cuts in tax rates in a variant of the model in which the gov-
ernment maintains a constant money supply and varies its spending to balance the fiscal
budget in each period. Tax rates are cut simultaneously and then individually in separate
experiments. The two tax rates affect different sides of the economy, and simulating sepa-
rate shocks to them helps devise an appropriate policy against a liquidity shock. Chapter 6
repeatedly simulates an increase in government spending in variants of the model that differ
by the way in which such spending is financed. Three methods of financing are attempted
– varying tax rates, selling stocks of entrepreneur-issued equity, and issuing money. Chap-
ter 7 repeatedly simulates a government purchase of equity in variants of the model that
differ by the way in which the asset purchase is financed. Five financing arrangements
are attempted – issuing money, cutting government spending, issuing money and cutting
government spending, raising taxes, and issuing money and raising taxes.
Chapter 8 analyses the sensitivity of the quantitative results of simultaneous tax cuts
in Chapter 5 to the calibration of the model’s structural parameters and persistence of
shocks to tax rates. Chapter 9 summarises the main findings of the thesis, evaluates the
experiments, and identifies extensions and opportunities for future research.
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Chapter 2
The KM-related literature: a
survey
2.1 Introduction
This chapter surveys a set of related works which are directly derived from Kiyotaki and
Moore (2012). The thesis calls this set the “KM-related literature”. Papers that belong
to the group have two common ingredients – they feature KM’s liquidity constraints in a
DSGE model, and they study liquidity shocks. The chapter describes the current state of
the KM-related literature, with particular emphasis on the structure of existing models and
the approaches to policy against liquidity shocks. In doing this, the chapter defines the
novelty of the thesis.
The KM-related literature can be divided into two groups, based on the structure of
the underlying DSGE model – there are papers that modify the KM model, and there are
papers that introduce KM’s liquidity constraints to other fairly standard models. Papers
that modify the KM model all do so modestly, and thereby present neoclassical models
which resemble the standard Real Business Cycle framework; Bigio (2010, 2012), Nezafat
and Slav´ık (2012), Shi (2012), and Driffill and Miller (2013) make up this group. Papers
that introduce KM’s liquidity constraints all do so in fairly standard New Keynesian DSGE
models. Del Negro et al. (2011) is the earliest of such work, and from which Kara and Sin
(2013, 2014) and Molteni (2014) develop extensions and further modifications. Ajello (2012)
is another member of this group, but he develops his own unique framework by translating
KM’s liquidity constraints into an empirically observable financial friction.
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The thesis contributes to the former group with a unique modification of the basic KM
model. None of the papers in this group introduce distortionary taxes on wages and income.
KM include lump-sum taxes in their “full” model, Shi (2012) also includes lump-sum taxes,
and Driffill and Miller (2013) speculate about adding distortionary taxes, while Nezafat and
Slav´ık (2012) do not have a government. Moreover, in the New Keynesian group, Del Negro
et al. (2011), Kara and Sin (2013, 2014), and Molteni (2014) have lump-sum taxes; Ajello
(2012) has distortionary taxes, but the structure of his model and the objectives of his paper
are significantly different from this thesis.
Alternatively, the KM-related literature can be divided by the interest in liquidity shocks.
One group – comprising Bigio (2010, 2012), Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), Shi (2012), and
Ajello (2012) – examines how the shock’s transmission and amplification are influenced by
the presence of real and financial frictions. The rest of the KM-related literature evaluates
policy against the shock. Del Negro et al. (2011), Driffill and Miller (2013), Kara and
Sin (2013), and Molteni (2014) follow KM and implement the policy of Holmstro¨m and
Tirole (1998) (or what is now commonly known as “quantitative easing”) in which the
government buys a partially liquid privately-issued asset in exchange for a perfectly-liquid
government-issued asset. Kara and Sin (2014) apply fiscal policy via government spending.
This thesis extends the work of the latter group with a new set of policies, that is, it gives
a more comprehensive treatment of fiscal policy, and studies equity purchase programmes
that are different from quantitative easing and which are accompanied by fiscal austerity
measures.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows – Section 2.2 briefly describes Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012); Section 2.3 surveys papers in the KM-related literature that introduce
KM’s liquidity constraints to New Keynesian DSGE models; and Section 2.4 surveys the
papers that modify the KM model; and Section 2.5 summarises the chapter.
2.2 Kiyotaki and Moore (2012)
KM is a member of a vast literature on DSGE models with financial frictions.1 This lit-
erature examines how real shocks are amplified and more persistent with the presence of
financial frictions, and studies the effects of exogenous shocks to these frictions (or “financial
1Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Brunnermeier et al. (2012) provide recent and comprehensive surveys
of this literature.
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shocks”). KM expand knowledge of these issues from a unique and theoretical perspective.
They propose a neoclassical DSGE model with a novel feature of two simultaneously binding
financial frictions.2 These frictions (or “liquidity constraints”) limit entrepreneurs’ abilities
to internally and externally raise funds for investment. To self-insure against falling short of
liquid funds when an opportunity to invest comes along, entrepreneurs endogenously hold a
perfectly liquid government-issued asset (that is, money) alongside another partially liquid
privately-issued asset which earns dividends (that is, equity). KM therefore introduce an
endogenous demand for money.
KM calibrate their model and qualitatively examine a negative shock to one of the
frictions (or a “liquidity shock”) which reduces the value of liquid funds that are available
to entrepreneurs and thus lowers investment. The liquidity shock resembles a key event of
the 2008 crisis, that is, the freezing of second-hand asset markets and widespread emergence
of liquidity shortages (Brunnermeier (2009), Moore (2009), Del Negro et al. (2011)). KM
demonstrate the effectiveness of a particular policy against a liquidity shock, one that is
proposed by Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) and is now commonly known as “quantitative
easing”, whereby the government buys large quantities of equity from private agents in
exchange for new issues of money. KM’s frictions introduce asset heterogeneity, which
allows such equity purchases to escape the irrelevance proposition of Wallace (1981). This
type of policy is prominently featured in the response to the 2008 crisis. The US Federal
Reserve, for instance, purchased privately-held assets and expanded its balance sheet, after
which Bernanke (2009) coined the term “credit easing” to refer to such policy.3
The KM-related literature is based on an earlier (2008) version of the KM paper which
features only the basic model. This thesis is also based on the basic KM model. In the most
recent (2012 NBER) version of their paper, KM design a “full” model to address criticism
from the KM-related literature. The basic model produces small responses to a liquidity
shock, because of a negative co-movement between investment and consumption. The shock
2The frictions themselves are not unique. One friction originates from Hart and Moore (1994).
3A distinction among the concepts “large-scale asset purchases”, “unconventional monetary policy”, and
“credit easing” is worth mentioning here. Chapter 7 expands this note, and Buiter (2008), Bernanke (2009),
Klyuev et al. (2009), and Lyonnet and Werner (2011) give further lessons on the nomenclature. “Uncon-
ventional monetary policy ” and “large-scale asset purchases” are equivalent but generic names for a set of
slightly different policy measures. Table 7.1 lists and compares these measures. KM themselves call their
asset purchase programme “open market operations”, while Del Negro et al. (2011) call it “non-standard
open market operations” and Driffill and Miller (2013) call it “quantitative easing”. The meanings of these
terms have been reassigned since those papers were written, and now they do not refer to the equity purchase
programme that is in KM. Instead, KM’s programme describes what policymakers now call “credit easing”.
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reduces investment, which decreases equity’s supply and raises asset prices via a portfolio
balance effect. KM’s full model includes a storage technology, which introduces endogenous
price stickiness for money by being a perfect substitute for the asset. Without storage, asset
prices would rise, entrepreneurs’ net worth would improve, and investment would increase
in a feedback effect which offsets the initial decline after the liquidity shock. With storage,
the feedback effect is suppressed and the fall in investment is greater.
2.3 New Keynesian DSGE models with liquidity constraints
2.3.1 Del Negro et al. (2011)
Del Negro et al. (2011) (henceforth, DEFK) is a pioneering work which introduces KM’s
liquidity constraints to a standard New Keynesian DSGE model along the lines of Christiano
et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). Their objective is to quantitatively evaluate the
effectiveness of the Federal Reserve’s credit easing policy in the 2008 crisis. DEFK calibrate
their model to match observations of the US economy during the crisis. They simulate
the crisis as a negative liquidity shock, to represent the observed freezing of second-hand
asset markets and to artificially replicate the Great Recession. Via policy rules, the shock
triggers a conventional lowering of the nominal interest rate to its zero lower bound and an
unconventional policy response of credit easing.
Kara and Sin (2013) show that if DEFK had not installed KM’s liquidity constraints
then credit easing in the New Keynesian DSGE model would have had no impact. This is
an extension of conclusions by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2011) who show that the irrelevance proposition of Wallace (1981) applies to open market
operations in a standard New Keynesian DSGE model and one augmented with nominal
frictions. A large-scale asset purchase programme affects the aggregate economy primarily
by altering relative asset prices, that is, via a portfolio balance effect of Tobin (1961, 1963,
1969), Brunner and Meltzer (1973), and Friedman (1978).4 In a frictionless model, the port-
folio balance effect is offset by private agents taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities.
KM’s liquidity constraints make assets sufficiently heterogeneous that the asset purchase
programme has its desired impact.5 This is the motivation behind DEFK’s modification
of the standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Consequently, DEFK’s liquidity shock sig-
4See the consensus on this idea from literature surveys by Gagnon et al. (2011) and Joyce et al. (2011b)).
5See Andre´s et al. (2004) for support on this idea.
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nificantly reduces output, investment, and consumption by magnitudes that resemble those
actually seen in the US from the third quarter of 2008. By counterfactual experiments,
DEFK show that the Great Recession in the US would have been much more severe had it
not been for policy intervention by the Fed.
DEFK’s main result – that credit easing policy is effective at ameliorating a negative
liquidity shock – is shared by Chapter 7 of this thesis, as well as by other papers in the KM-
related literature which examine policy. Besides the structural differences and the inclusion
of nominal and real frictions, DEFK’s model is different from the model in Chapter 7 by
featuring only lump-sum taxes.
2.3.2 Kara and Sin (2013, 2014)
Kara and Sin (2013, 2014) add government spending to DEFK. Kara and Sin (2013) closely
follow DEFK and examine the effectiveness of a large-scale asset purchase programme
against a negative liquidity shock. Their aim is to formulate optimal monetary policy
in the tradition of Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari et al. (1991). They show that the
asset purchase programme makes a significant impact in ameliorating a liquidity shock.
Kara and Sin (2013) otherwise provide two useful insights. First, they extend the canonical
Wallace-irrelevance result of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) to large-scale asset purchases
in the standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Second, they show that Wallace-irrelevance
is overturned in the model by adding KM’s liquidity constraints.
Kara and Sin (2014) (henceforth, KS) is the first quantitative and dedicated study of
fiscal policy in the KM-related literature. They simulate an exogenous increase in govern-
ment spending, first on its own and then contemporaneously against a negative liquidity
shock. Chapter 6 performs the same set of experiments, but in its own unique framework,
and therefore complements KS with a new perspective of government spendings shocks.
Chapter 6 and KS are different in many ways. First, the models are structurally different.
Government purchases of equity in Chapter 6 bid up asset prices, which improve private net
worth, investment, and consumption. With sticky prices, KS suppress asset price variations,
and their responses to government spending shocks are short-lived. One conclusion that
can be drawn from this comparison is that asset price fluctuations are essential to the
transmission of demand shocks. The presence of nominal rigidities is why New Keynesian
models find it difficult to obtain significant aggregate fluctuations, and leaves them to search
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for additional frictions to enhance shock responses.
Second, DEFK state that their model aims to avoid heterogeneity in private consump-
tion, and so there are no non-Ricardian agents in KS. Workers in KS save by buying bonds
and entrepreneur-issued equity. When asset prices rise, workers supply more labour to
maintain saving levels, and output rises as a consequence. In this model, workers do not
save and are therefore unaffected by asset price changes. Policies which target asset prices,
such as the equity purchase programme, have no immediate impact on output in this or any
flexible-price model, but they do in KS and other New Keynesian models.
Third, the government in KS collects only lump-sum taxes. Changes in the fiscal balance
in KS are much less distorting to private behaviour than they are in Chapter 6 in which
tax rates vary. While an increase in government spending improves the economy in KS, it
worsens economic activity in all the experiments of Chapter 6 because of higher taxes that
are required for financing.
Fourth, the government in KS issues bonds to finance its spending. Bonds are risk-free
and perfectly liquid, which are features that are shared by money in this model. The
difference between the assets is that the bond yields are determined by a policy rule which
depends on output, whereas money’s yield (via price appreciations) is determined by the
asset’s market. One experiment in Chapter 6 assumes an increase in government spending
is financed by monetary expansion; this is the closest the thesis comes to KS.
Fifth, liquidity shocks are simulated differently. In Chapter 6, after equity’s re-saleability
initially falls, it then asymptotically returns to steady state from the next period. In KS,
equity’s re-saleability falls and stays at that level for three years, after which it immediately
and completely returns to steady state.
Finally, KS assume a lower degree of persistence of shocks to government spending, with
the persistence parameter set to 0.8, compared to 0.95 in this thesis. The thesis uses the
same calibration settings as KS for all except two structural parameters, namely, capital’s
share of output (0.36 in KS and 0.4 here) and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
(1.92 in KS and 1.0 here). KS calibrate the liquidity constraint parameters according to
DEFK, but they calibrate all other structural parameters differently, according to estimates
by Smets andWouters (2007). Chapter 8 shows, albeit for a tax cut experiment in Chapter 5,
that the model is sensitive to large changes in the persistence parameter and the calibration
of capital’s share of output.
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2.3.3 Molteni (2014)
Molteni (2014) modifies DEFK by defining equity as a perfectly illiquid asset and adding
two types of government bonds – a perfectly liquid short-term type and a partially liquid
long-term type. In other words, Molteni proposes a variant of DEFK with three assets of
varying liquidity. He examines the economy’s response to a negative liquidity shock and the
effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy in the form of government issues of short-
term bonds. He assumes the most relaxed re-saleability constraint among the KM-related
literature (with an agent being able to liquidate 75% of its holdings in any given period),
and does this in order to replicate an observed pre-crisis haircut of 25% on 10-year bonds
that are issued by the governments of Portugal and Ireland. He disentangles the calibra-
tions of the liquidity constraints and maintains DEFK’s value for the borrowing constraint.
Ceteris paribus, a negative liquidity shock in his model reduces output, consumption, and
investment, and causes a delayed decline in employment. He shows that policy intervention
significantly ameliorates these responses and gives employment a long-term increase with a
hump-shaped trajectory.
2.3.4 Ajello (2012)
Ajello (2012) is the only model in the KM-related literature which has distortionary taxes.
His model is otherwise very different from that of this thesis – it includes sticky prices and
wages, a stylised banking system, and other structural features of the New Keynesian DSGE
paradigm. His focus is on the literature’s classic problem of how well financial shocks explain
business cycle fluctuations in aggregate variables. Ajello’s model is the only one among the
KM-related literature that is estimated, and he uses Bayesian methods in the tradition of
Smets and Wouters (2007) and An and Schorfheide (2007). Ajello distinguishes his work
from DEFK by using a larger sample of observations, one that spans 20 years (1989 – 2010),
whereas DEFK concentrate on the period around the 2008 crisis. Ajello’s paper is motivated
by, and aims to address, two empirical pitfalls of KM.
First, simulating a liquidity shock is not straight-forward because, given their abstract
nature, liquidity constraints are difficult to represent by empirically observed variables.
DEFK are the first to calibrate the liquidity constraint parameters, and thus initiates quan-
titative work on the KM model. DEFK follow a theoretical assumption of KM that the
tightness of borrowing and re-saleability constraints are the same in steady state. All the
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papers in the KM-related literature except Shi (2012) and Molteni (2014) also make this
assumption. Then the task simplifies to estimating just one parameter. DEFK estimate
the re-saleability constraint based on a ratio of US government liabilities to private capital,
and their solution is what most of the KM-related literature use for calibration. The only
exception is Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012), who estimate the borrowing constraint as a ratio
of external corporate finance to investment. Ajello is wary about exogenously shocking a
parameter that is estimated with considerable uncertainty. He proposes a solution that uses
an empirically observed variable. He installs banks to intermediate the transfer of equity
between saving and investing entrepreneurs. Banks charge an intermediation fee for this ser-
vice, in the tradition of Chari et al. (1995), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), and Cu´rdia
and Woodford (2010). The fee is charged as a fraction of the price that investors (that
is, the borrowers in his model) pay for equity. Ajello’s intermediation fee is motivated by
Kurlat (2013), who shows that adverse selection with heterogenous assets creates a financial
market friction that amplifies aggregate shocks, just like KM’s liquidity constraints. The
intermediation fee is exogenously determined and varies stochastically. Ajello proxies the fee
by an interest rate spread, a variable for which data is readily available. He then simulates
a “financial shock” as an exogenous increase in the fee.
The second pitfall of KM is a negative co-movement between investment and consump-
tion following a liquidity shock. KM address this problem with endogenous price stability in
their full model, and the rest of the New Keynesian KM-related literature, as well as Driffill
and Miller (2013), assume nominal rigidities. Ajello shows that sticky wages contribute sig-
nificantly to the explanatory power of financial shocks – his financial shock with (without,
respectively) sticky wages explains 35% (9.5%, respectively) and 60% (49%, respectively)
of the variance of output and investment, respectively. The financial shock discourages in-
vestment by making it more expensive for investors to borrow. In other words, investors
reduce their demand for equity, which depresses the asset’s price; this is in contrast to the
liquidity shock’s rise in equity’s price in the basic KM model, a response which also hap-
pens in this thesis. Moreover, Ajello’s equity price decline discourages savers from selling
the asset to banks, and thereby encourages consumption, hence the positive co-movement
with investment.
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2.4 Modifications of the KM model
2.4.1 Shi (2012)
Shi (2012) points out another flaw in KM – while a liquidity shock raises asset prices and
lowers output, such a countercyclical asset price response is hardly observed in recessions.
This remark justifies the use of New Keynesian models to simulate recessions from liquidity
shocks. Shi rationalises KM’s asset price responses to the liquidity shock. He re-designs
the basic KM model into a representative household setup and adds government bonds and
lump-sum taxes. His model is calibrated slightly differently from most of the KM-related
literature. Most notably, he assumes a more relaxed re-saleability constraint (with an agent
being able to liquidate 27.3% of its holdings in any given period) than the rest of the
KM-related literature except Bigio (2012) and Molteni (2014). Shi finds that asset price
increases are robust to the introduction of New Keynesian frictions, namely sticky wages,
habit persistence in consumption, and capital adjustment costs. Then he discovers that
asset prices are pro-cyclical only to shocks that have an immediate impact on aggregate
productivity. He concludes that liquidity shocks alone cannot explain asset price declines in
recessions. This thesis somewhat supports Shi’s conclusion. Here, exogenous shocks to tax
rates, government spending, and government equity holdings are simulated, none of which
affect aggregate productivity, and yet asset prices respond counter-cyclically.
2.4.2 Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012)
Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012) propose a variant of KM in which the re-saleability constraint is
shut down and the borrowing constraint is modelled as a time-varying stochastic variable.
Their liquidity shock is an exogenous decline in the borrowing constraint. They proxy
the borrowing constraint as a ratio of aggregate corporate funds raised in the markets to
aggregate investment. Their paper is in the tradition of Gomes et al. (2003) and Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) in a literature that searches for financial frictions that amplify asset
price changes following real shocks, and with the aim of matching simulated volatility with
empirically observed volatility. Nezafat and Slav´ık calibrate their model to achieve this
objective. The novelty of their paper is that they simulate a productivity shock alongside a
liquidity shock.
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2.4.3 Bigio (2010, 2012)
Bigio (2010) quantitatively evaluates the liquidity shock in the KM model. He keeps the
KM framework intact, calibrates the model, and finds that the shock produces very small
output responses. The author cites the explanation of Barro and King (1984) – the shock
negatively impacts investment, but this has a minor consequence for the capital stock; the
most the capital stock can fall is by the full amount of depreciation (that is, if the shock
brings investment down to zero); the shock has no immediate impact on labour; accordingly,
with factors of production mostly unchanged, the output response is small. Bigio concludes
that business cycle fluctuations cannot be achieved from a liquidity shock in a neoclassical
model. He proposes that the shock is amplified if the model has frictions that transmit the
effects to the labour market. To support his hypothesis, he augments the KM model with
variable capital utilisation, as in Greenwood et al. (1988). He finds that responses to the
liquidity shock are magnified tenfold with the friction compared to without.
Bigio (2012) continues his search for frictions with which liquidity shocks are able to
generate significant responses. His paper shares the same objective and finds the same result
as Ajello (2012). Bigio takes a simpler approach than Ajello by modifying KM’s model. In
particular, Bigio adds two real frictions to the KM model. First, there is limited enforcement
of labour contracts, in the spirit of Hart and Moore (1994), which leaves entrepreneurs to
use part of their productive asset (that is, capital) as collateral for loans, as in Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997). Second, there is asymmetric information on the quality of capital, as in
Kurlat (2013). Bigio simulates an exogenous dispersion of capital’s quality, which produces
an endogenous drop in liquidity. The frictions imply a decline in employment, and the
economy experiences substantial declines in output, consumption, and investment. Bigio
therefore solves the negative co-movement problem of the basic KM model. Moreover, all of
his shock responses closely match observations from US data in the early stage of the 2008
crisis.
2.4.4 Driffill and Miller (2013)
Driffill and Miller (2013) (henceforth, DM) closely follow DEFK and aim to simulate the
Great Recession from a liquidity shock and then evaluate the effectiveness of a policy of asset
purchases. But unlike DEFK, DM’s core environment is the basic KM model. Bigio (2010)
already gives one reason why the KM model cannot produce a deep recession. Another
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reason is that the liquidity shock reduces investment on impact, but this is partially offset
by a contemporaneous feedback effect – equity’s supply falls, asset prices rise, entrepreneurs’
net worth improves, and investment rises. DM cut off this feedback effect by assuming sticky
prices. Compared to the KM model, a liquidity shock in DM’s sticky-price variant produces
a greater fall in investment and substantial declines in employment and output that closely
match observations in the US during the 2008 crisis. DM’s results are consistent with Ajello
(2012) and Bigio (2012), despite differences in models and calibrations, respectively.
DM then evaluate the effectiveness of KM’s asset purchase programme in ameliorating
the liquidity shock. DM calibrate their model according to DEFK, which therefore means
the asset purchase programme represents the Federal Reserve’s credit easing policy during
the 2008 crisis. DM find that the policy is highly effective. This is the same result of
DEFK, but achieved without a New Keynesian framework. Chapter 7 of this thesis shares
the policy evaluation objective with KM, DEFK, and DM. Unlike DM and DEFK, but as
in KM, Chapter 7 uses a flexible price model.
Finally, DM theoretically explore the fiscal implications of KM’s asset purchase pro-
gramme. They suggest that, in the aftermath of the programme, if the government must
return the economy to its pre-shock state then any dividends earned from holding equity
must either be spent or give rise to a reduction in taxes. DM augment their sticky price
model with lump-sum taxes on entrepreneurs, and algebraically show that a balanced budget
increase in government spending leads to more employment and output but has no change
in investment and capital. To limit the scope of their paper, DM avoid an analysis with
distortionary taxes, arguing that such an inclusion adds a significant degree of complexity
through agents contemporaneously revising their behaviour to changes in expectations of
future taxes. That problem is avoided here because the government does not issue debt,
and instead balances its flow of funds in each period.
2.5 Chapter summary
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) contribute to the literature on DSGE models with financial
frictions by proposing a neoclassical framework with two simultaneously binding frictions.
A set of related works extend from KM, in which either the basic KM model is modified or
the pair of frictions are introduced to New Keynesian DSGE models. This thesis joins the
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former group and adds a government that levies distortionary taxes. This chapter surveys
the related literature and shows that such a modification is unique.
Papers in the KM-related literature share a common interest in liquidity shocks. They
either look at the shock’s transmission or evaluate policy against it. This thesis develops the
second line of research in two directions – with a comprehensive treatment of fiscal policy,
and with an asset purchase programme that is accompanied by fiscal austerity. Chapter 5
examines tax cuts with a balanced budget rule; Driffill and Miller (2013) is the closest
to that chapter because they preserve much of the KM model and theoretically examine
expansionary fiscal policy with a balanced budget, albeit with sticky prices and lump-sum
taxes. Chapter 6 examines an increase in government spending; Kara and Sin (2014) is
the New Keynesian equivalent of that chapter, with both works sharing the same objective
and approach, although with structural and other differences between the models. And
Chapter 7 examines credit easing policy; KM, Del Negro et al. (2011), Kara and Sin (2013),
and Driffill and Miller (2013) are close relatives, with the same objective and approach, but
with varying degrees of structural differences among the models.
The survey reveals structural features of the model which help explain differences in re-
sults from the rest of the literature and from actual observations. One way that Chapter 6
is different from Kara and Sin (2014) is in the flexibility of asset prices. With perfectly
flexible prices, Chapter 6 generates large and persistent responses to shocks to liquidity and
government spending; with sticky prices, Kara and Sin (2014) obtain short-lived responses.
Variations in asset prices therefore appear essential for the propagation of shocks – they
lead to changes in entrepreneurs’s worth, and therefore changes in investment and long-
term output. Another way that Chapter 6 is different from Kara and Sin (2014) is on the
behaviour of workers. Kara and Sin (2014) assume workers save, and therefore any change
in asset prices causes immediate changes in labour supply, employment, and output. On
the other hand, workers are non-Ricardian in Chapter 6, and are therefore unaffected by
asset price changes. Shocks and policy which target asset prices, such as the equity pur-






This chapter describes the model that is used throughout the thesis. The model is a modifi-
cation of the basic framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). In particular, this framework
adds a government which levies distortionary taxes on wages and dividends, consumes gen-
eral output, issues money, and holds privately-issued equity. These variables which define
the government’s behaviour are known as “policy variables”. Each experiment in the thesis
makes its own assumptions about which policy variables are exogenously determined and
which are endogenously determined. An endogenously determined policy variable evolves
according to a policy rule. Such rules are different from the ones found in KM’s full model,
which has a government.1 Beyond the differences in government’s behaviour among exper-
iments, the rest of the model is the same throughout the thesis.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model by describing
its environment. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 define the behaviour of entrepreneurs and workers,
respectively; these sections also derive those agents’ dynamic optimising behaviour. Sec-
tion 3.5 defines the government’s behaviour and a menu of assumptions for policy variables;
this section is the modification the thesis makes to the basic KM model. Finally, Section 3.6
aggregates the economy and derives dynamic equilibrium conditions for equity, labour, and
general output markets. The chapter’s appendices contain detailed algebra associated with
derivations, simplifications, and proofs.
1The full KM model has two policy rules. The first is a fiscal rule that restricts discretionary government
spending by limiting it to the deviation of net government asset holdings from steady state. The second is a
monetary rule that restricts discretionary open market operations by limiting the ratio of current to steady
state government equity holdings to a weighted sum of productivity and liquidity impulse responses.
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3.2 The environment
The economy exists over an infinite horizon of discrete time periods. It is populated by a
unit-mass continuum of ex ante identical entrepreneurs, a unit-mass continuum of identical
workers, and a government. The population does not grow or decline, and the economy
is closed to the rest of the world. There are no financial intermediaries or formal credit
markets. All agents consume a perishable general output, which is produced exclusively by
entrepreneurs and is the economy’s numeraire. All agents can own and exchange two assets
– money and equity. Money is perfectly liquid, does not depreciate, and is exclusively issued
by the government; equity is not perfectly liquid, not perfectly re-saleable, depreciates each
period, earns dividends, and is exclusively issued by entrepreneurs. Money and equity are
traded in competitive markets at perfectly flexible prices, pt and qt, respectively, which are
both expressed in terms of general output.2
3.3 Entrepreneurs
3.3.1 Production
Entrepreneurs are the exclusive owners of capital and a homogeneous Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology that produces general output with guaranteed success. At the beginning of period t
the representative entrepreneur owns kt units of capital. The entrepreneur employs lt hours






where At is a common level of total factor productivity and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital elasticity
of output. The market for general output is perfectly competitive; then, according to Cobb
and Douglas (1928), the production function (3.1) exhibits constant returns to scale and γ
is also the share of output accruing to capital. At evolves according to a stationary AR(1)
process,
At = (1− ρA)A+ ρAAt−1 + uAt (3.2)
2In other words, pt and qt units of general output are exchanged for 1 unit of money and equity, re-
spectively. These are “real” prices. “Nominal” prices are the prices of a unit of general output and equity
expressed in terms of money, that is, 1/pt and pt/qt, respectively.
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where A is the steady state level of productivity, ρA ∈ (0, 1) parameterises the degree of per-
sistency of a stochastic productivity shock, and uAt ∼i.i.d.N (0, σ2uA) where σ2uA is exogenously
determined.
The entrepreneur pays workers wt units of general output for each labour-hour employed.
The rest of the period’s general output is the gross profit, or dividends, to the capital used
in production,
rtkt = yt − wtlt (3.3)
where rt is the real rate of return, or dividends, per unit of capital.
3.3.2 Investment
Capital depreciates during the production process, and a fraction, δ, of its stock survives at
the end of the period when production is complete. Some time soon after the start of the
period, a fraction, pi, of entrepreneurs gain access to a homogenous investment technology
that converts a unit of general output into a unit of capital with guaranteed success. The
production and installation of new capital takes an entire period. Therefore, an entrepreneur
who invests it units of general output in period t has
kt+1 = δkt + it
units of capital at the end of period t.
Entrepreneurs are identical ex ante to when investment opportunities are revealed. pi
is independently and identically distributed across time and entrepreneurs. Who gets an
opportunity to invest is exogenously determined. Those without investment opportunities
carry on with what they have been doing since the start of the period, that is, producing,
consuming, and saving (by purchasing assets); they are the period’s “savers”. Those with
investment opportunities change their behaviour when such opportunities are received; they
are the period’s “investors”. The investment technology has unlimited capacity to produce
capital, but any opportunity to use it expires at the end of the period. At the end of the
period, investors and savers revert to being ex ante identical entrepreneurs until the next
period’s investment opportunities are revealed.
In an attempt to acquire each unit of general output for the investment technology, an
investor publicly issues a new unit of equity. However, the investor simultaneously faces
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two constraints that make such external financing incomplete. Once an investment project
is underway, the entrepreneur’s human resource is needed for the entire period to ensure
the full amount of new capital is produced. The investor acquires knowledge and skills
that are specific to his investment project and cannot be costlessly replicated or replaced.
The entrepreneur, however, cannot pre-commit to being involved with the project until its
end. Instead, he can guarantee that he will remain with the project for no more than an
exogenously determined fraction, θ, of its duration. This implies that he can guarantee a
maximum of θ of an investment’s new capital will be produced, which further implies that
he can guarantee a maximum of θ of new output in the next period when the new capital
enters production technologies. Consequently, the investing entrepreneur can credibly raise
no more than θ of his investment cost from equity financing. This limitation is called the
“borrowing constraint”, which is an exogenous feature of the model that has its origins in
Hart and Moore (1994) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).3
The representative entrepreneur holds nt units of equity at the beginning of the period.
The investor cannot sell all of his equity before an investment opportunity expires. Instead,
he can liquidate up to a fraction, φt, of his holdings in period t. This limitation is called the
“re-saleability constraint”, and is an exogenously determined intrinsic feature of equity.4 φt
evolves according to a stationary AR(1) process,
φt = (1− ρφ)φ+ ρφφt−1 + uφt (3.4)
where φ is the steady state value of φt, ρφ ∈ (0, 1) parameterises the degree of persistency
of a stochastic liquidity shock, and uφt∼i.i.d.N (0, σ2uφ) where σ2uφ is exogenously determined.
Borrowing and re-saleability constraints simultaneously bind, and are together called
“liquidity constraints”. Beyond these limits, the investor completes his investment financ-
3An alternative interpretation of θ that is based on moral hazard is proposed by Lorenzoni and Walentin
(2007) and repeated by Bigio (2010) – the entrepreneur can run away with a fraction, (1− θ), of the value of
his capital at any time, simply because capital is always under his complete control. In models with formal
credit markets, unlike this one, θ appears as a credit market friction – due to a limited ability by lenders
to enforce loan contracts, borrowers are required to put up collateral, and they can borrow a fraction, θ,
of the value of collateralised assets. If the collateralised assets are risky then (1 − θ) is a haircut. The
credit market friction is the most popular representation of θ, owing to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who
show its macroeconomic significance, and to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and
Bernanke et al. (1999) who introduce it into dynamic macroeconomic models. Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009) gives the constraint an alternative name of “funding liquidity”.
4The re-saleability constraint arises endogenously out of adverse selection in asset markets in Kiyotaki
and Moore (2003), Eisfeldt (2004), Bigio (2012), and Kurlat (2013). With no change in interpretation,
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) call the re-saleability constraint “market liquidity”.
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ing by exchanging money for general output at the market price, pt. The representative
entrepreneur holds mt units of money at the beginning of the period. The entrepreneur
cannot lend money or use it as collateral, and therefore holds
mt+1 ≥ 0 (3.5)
units at the end of the period. The entrepreneur’s demand for money is motivated by a
precaution against falling short of liquidity when financing investment opportunities.5
To invest it units of general output, the investor issues it units of equity. He sells
θit units of this new equity on the market and receives θitqt units of general output in
exchange; this amount represents the investment’s external finance. The remainder of the
investment cost is internally financed – the investor liquidates his money and re-saleable
equity to obtain (it − θitqt) units of general output, and he buys (1− θ)it units of his own
new equity. (it − θitqt) is the value of the investor’s equity stake in his own investment, or
what KM call the investor’s “downpayment” on his investment. Put differently, for every
unit of investment, the entrepreneur pays himself (1−θqt) units of general output to acquire
(1 − θ) units of his own new equity issue. Or equivalently, for every unit of his own new




is called the “effective price of inside equity” and varies negatively with the value of θ (see
Appendix 3.A).
The non-re-saleable part of his own new equity issue that the investor retains is called
his “inside” equity. An entrepreneur’s stock of equity that is issued by other entrepreneurs is
called his “outside” equity. Inside and outside equity are assumed to be perfect substitutes,
that is, they have the same re-saleability constraint and provide the same rate of return.
Inside and outside equity are therefore collectively referred to as “equity”.
For an investment of it units of general output, at the end of the period the investor
buys at least (1− θ)it new units of inside equity and remains with at least (1−φt)δnt units
5The demand for money is inversely related to the tightness of liquidity constraints, that is, the values
of θ and φt. The tighter the liquidity constraints bind, that is, the smaller the values of θ and φt, then the
greater the need to internally finance investments, and the greater the desire to hold money balances; and
conversely.
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of non-re-saleable equity. The investor therefore holds
nit+1 ≥ (1− θ)it + (1− φt)δnt (3.7)
units of equity at the end of the period.
Assumption 1. An entrepreneur with an investment opportunity borrows and liquidates
the maximum quantities of equity that liquidity constraints allow.
Assumption 1 is consistent with inter-temporal utility maximisation. More investment
in period t means more capital in period t + 1, and therefore more profits/dividends and
more consumption.
With assumption 1, Equation (3.7) becomes binding with equality,
nit+1 = (1− θ)it + (1− φt)δnt (3.8)












3.3.3 Consumption and saving
Since capital is created only from investment, then each unit of equity in the economy is
backed by a unit of capital. Equity therefore depreciates in tandem with capital. Further-
more, the gross profits that accrue to capital represent dividends to the holders of equity.
Then each unit of equity earns rt units of general output in dividends after period t’s pro-
duction is complete. The entrepreneur pays the government a tax on dividend income at a
rate of τ rnt . His net dividend income is then allocated to consumption and saving, and to
investment if the opportunity exists.
An investor in period t consumes cit units of general output, invests it units, and saves
by accumulating (nit+1 − it − δnt) and (mit+1 −mt) units of equity and money, respectively,
at their market prices. The investor thus faces a budget constraint for period t,
cit + it + qt(n
i
t+1 − it − δnt) + pt(mit+1 −mt) = (1− τ rnt )rtnt (3.10)
The investor’s budget constraint (3.10) is simplified by substituting Equation (3.9) to
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t+1 = (1− τ rnt )rtnt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δnt + pt(mt −mit+1) (3.11)
The RHS of Equation (3.11) is the investor’s net worth – his net dividends from equity
holdings, the value of depreciated equity (where a re-saleable fraction, φt, is valued at the
market price and the non-re-saleable fraction is valued at qRt ), and net sales of money. The
LHS expresses what he does with his net worth.
Alternatively, substituting Equation (3.8) into Equation (3.10) gives the investor’s re-
source constraint (see Appendix 3.B),
cit + (1− θqt)it = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + φtqtδnt + pt(mt −mit+1) (3.12)
The RHS of Equation (3.12) is the total liquid resources available to the investor in period t
– net dividends from equity, a re-saleable portion of equity holdings, and net sales of money.
The LHS says how he uses these resources – for consumption and financing that portion of
his investment for which he cannot borrow.
A saver in period t consumes cst units of general output and saves the rest of his net
income by accumulating (nst+1−δnt) and (mst+1−mt) units of equity and money, respectively,
at their market prices. The saver’s budget constraint for period t is
cst + qt(n
s
t+1 − δnt) + pt(mst+1 −mt) = (1− τ rnt )rtnt (3.13)
3.3.4 Optimising behaviour
When investment opportunities are revealed in period t, the representative investor and
saver make optimal choices on {cit, it, nit+1,mit+1} and {cst , nst+1,mst+1}, respectively. These





 = Ue(ct) + Et[βUe(ct+1) + β2Ue(ct+2) + . . . ] (3.14)
subject to the respective budget constraints, (3.11) and (3.13), where Et[ · ] is the expecta-
tion that is conditional on information available in period t, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective
discount factor or the inverse rate of time preference. The representative entrepreneur’s
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current utility is assumed to be a natural logarithm of current consumption,
Ue(ct) ≡ ln ct
Optimal choices are made with uncertainty about investment opportunities in the future.




















t+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)
)]
(3.15)
Once an entrepreneur makes his optimal choices for period t, the Euler equation (3.15)
describes the expectation that 1/qt additional units of equity and 1/pt additional units
of money will provide the same marginal utility from consumption in period t + 1. The
expression on the RHS of (3.15) is the expected marginal benefit of holding 1/pt additional
units of money in period t + 1. The expression on the LHS of (3.15) is the expected
marginal benefit of holding 1/qt additional units of equity in period t + 1. Each unit of
equity is expected to earn (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1 net dividends, and then it depreciates in value. If
there is an investment opportunity then a re-saleable portion of depreciated equity, δφt+1,
will be valued at the market price, qt+1, while the non-re-saleable portion, δ(1− φt+1), will
be valued at its replacement cost, qRt+1. If there is no investment opportunity then the
depreciated value of a unit of equity will be δqt+1.
Claim 1. qt 6= 1 ⇐⇒ mit+1 = 0
Proof of Claim 1. See Appendix 3.E.
The market price of equity is critical for economic activity. An investor needs at least 1
unit of general output in exchange for every unit of equity issued. If qt < 1 then the investor
does not raise enough funds in the market to fulfil his ambition of investing it, in which case
the investor abandons his opportunity, and then all entrepreneurs become savers. If qt > 1
then the investor materialises his opportunity and sells as much equity as he can within
budget and liquidity constraints. To restrict attention to the case where there is investment
in the economy, the following assumption is made.
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Assumption 2. qt > 1
By Claim 1 and Assumption 2, an investor will not have any money left at the end of a
period of investment, that is, mit+1 = 0. He exhausts all of his money in the pursuit of an
investment opportunity. In the next period, up to when new investment opportunities are
revealed, the current period’s investors will be able to replenish their money stocks.
The entrepreneur’s logarithmic utility function provides a standard feature that his
consumption in each period is a stable fraction, (1 − β), of his net worth in that period.
From Equations (3.11) and (3.13), Claim 1, and Assumption 2, a representative investor
and saver consume, respectively,
cit = (1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtnt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δnt + ptmt) (3.16)
cst = (1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtnt + qtδnt + ptmt) (3.17)
The difference in consumption between the two types of entrepreneurs is given by
cst − cit = (qt − qRt )(1− φt)δnt






Assumption 2 implies cst > c
i
t. As an entrepreneur liquidates equity and money for invest-
ment financing, he inter-temporally substitutes consumption away from an investing period
and towards a saving period. During a period of saving he accumulates equity and money,
and does so in an optimal inter-temporal fashion according to the Euler equation (3.15).
Assumption 2 also implies (see Appendix 3.F)
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqRt+1
qt
<
[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
(3.19)
that is, an investor’s equity portfolio generates a lower rate of return than a saver’s equity
portfolio. This is because of the limited re-saleability of equity for an investor, which
forces him to own inside equity that is valued negatively to the market price of equity.
Hence, the return on equity is correlated with consumption. This correlation, along with
the re-saleability constraint, is what makes equity risky. Money, on the other hand, is free
from these risks. Its return does not depend on having an investment opportunity, and
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it is perfectly liquid; these are two reasons why entrepreneurs hold money. Additionally,
savers accumulate money in preparation for when they receive investment opportunities and
expect to face liquidity constraints.

























[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1nt+1 + qt+1δnt+1 + pt+1mt+1
 (3.20)
Equation (3.20) reflects the portfolio balance theory of Tobin (1958, 1969) and demonstrates
substitution between assets when their relative price changes. If qt rises, for example,
then equity’s expected return falls, and the entrepreneur substitutes towards money. The
substitution represents an increase in demand for money, which in aggregate, ceteris paribus,
raises pt. Substitution moves back and forth until expected portfolio returns between having
and not having an investment opportunity are equal. The LHS of Equation (3.20) expresses
an expected excess return on money over equity if the entrepreneur becomes an investor.
The RHS expresses an expected excess return on equity over money if he becomes a saver.
The portfolio balance equation says that the ex ante identical entrepreneur equates the
expected marginal benefits of receiving and not receiving an investment opportunity. He
does this by varying how many units of equity and money he holds.
3.4 Workers
Workers are the exclusive owners of labour. They do not own capital or have investment
opportunities. In period t the representative worker supplies lwt hours of labour to en-
trepreneurs in exchange for a perfectly flexible gross hourly wage of wt units of general
output. The worker pays the government a tax on wage income at a rate of τwlt .
The worker holds nwt units of entrepreneur-issued equity and m
w
t units of government-
issued fiat money at the beginning of period t. The worker’s human resource is non-
transferable across time, so he cannot borrow or have negative net worth. His equity and
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money holdings are therefore always non-negative, that is, for all t,
nwt ≥ 0 and mwt ≥ 0 (3.21)
The worker pays the government a tax on dividend income at a rate of τ rnt .
The worker consumes cwt units of general output. The rest of his net income is saved
by accumulating (nwt+1 − δnwt ) and (mwt+1 −mwt ) units of equity and money, respectively, at
their prevailing market prices. His budget constraint for period t is given by
cwt + qt(n
w
t+1 − δnwt ) + pt(mwt+1 −mwt ) = (1− τwlt )wtlwt + (1− τ rnt )rtnwt (3.22)








 = Uw(cwt , lwt )+Et[βUw(cwt+1, lwt+1)+β2Uw(cwt+2, lwt+2)+ . . . ] (3.23)
The worker’s utility is assumed to be additively separable in consumption and leisure,
Uw(c
w, lw) = cw − ω
1 + ν
(lw)1+ν
where ω is the relative weight of labour in utility and ν is the inverse Frisch elasticity of
labour supply.6
3.4.1 Optimising behaviour







his expected discounted utility, subject to his budget constraint (3.22). The worker optimally
supplies labour until the marginal disutility of work (or equivalently, the marginal utility of









6The specification for Uw(c
w, lw) implies the disutility from work does not directly affect the utility from
consumption. Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012) point out that this utility specification is unusual in the Real
Business Cycle literature, but they show that, quantitatively, their model’s responses to real and financial
shocks are not sensitive to the choice of functional form.
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Claim 2. nwt+j = 0 and m
w
t+j = 0, for j = 0, 1, 2, . . ., that is, the worker will always choose
not to hold equity and money.
Proof of Claim 2. From Equations (3.71), (3.73) and (3.74) in Appendix 3.G, if the worker
decides to hold equity and money, that is, if nwt+1 6= 0 and mwt+1 6= 0 then









Equation (3.25) says that holding equity and money will not provide any superior (expected)
gains above the discounted marginal utility from consumption, 1/β. If the worker has one
more unit of general output, he gains as much by consuming it as he expects to gain by
saving it. Then there is no reason for the worker to save. The worker saves only if there is
a marginal benefit from doing so.
By Claim 2, the worker’s budget constraint (3.22) simplifies to
cwt = (1− τwlt )wtlwt (3.26)
that is, in each period the worker consumes his entire net wages, thus making him non-
Ricardian.7
3.5 Government
The government is both the fiscal and monetary authority. As the fiscal authority, the
government collects Tt in taxes from entrepreneurs and workers according to
Tt = τ
rn
t rtNt + τ
wl
t wtLt (3.27)
7Non-Ricardian behaviour in this model arises endogenously. Elsewhere in the literature, where such
behaviour is assumed to be exogenous (in Gal´ı et al. (2007), for example), it is justified by such things as
lack of access to financial markets, myopia, or fear of saving. Campbell and Mankiw (1989) provide empirical
support for the existence of non-Ricardian behaviour, while Mankiw (2000) reviews microeconomic evidence
that supports such behaviour. The non-Ricardian feature is how this model departs from the standard Real
Business Cycle model and starts to resemble Keynesian IS-LM. Driffill and Miller (2013) algebraically show
that the KM model is fundamentally IS-LM by simplifying it to two equations that resemble IS and LM
functions. If workers are Ricardian, as in the standard RBC model, then a cut in the income tax rate
increases the present value of disposable income, and thus creates a positive wealth effect that induces a rise
in saving and a drop in consumption. But here, a cut in the income tax rate increases workers’ consumption;
this is numerically demonstrated in Chapter 5.
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where Nt is the private sector’s total equity holdings at the beginning of period t and
Lt is the aggregate labour-hours employed in the period’s production. The government
consumes Gt units of general output, which does not directly affect the utility of workers
and entrepreneurs or create any production externalities.8 (Gt − Tt) is the government’s
fiscal balance.
As the monetary authority, the government exclusively and costlessly issues/withdraws
fiat money at period t’s market price, and thereby earns/pays pt(Mt+1−Mt) units of general
output as seignorage, whereMt andMt+1 are the stocks of money in circulation at the start
and end of period t, respectively.
The government owns a non-negative stock of entrepreneur-issued equity. At the start of
period t it holdsNgt units of equity. Over the period the government buys/sells
∣∣Ngt+1 − δNgt ∣∣
units from/to private agents at period t’s market price. These purchases/sales represent
changes in the market supply of equity; Section 3.6.1 elaborates more on this activity when
describing the equity market.
The government does not issue debt, and therefore balances its overall budget in every




t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
The economy is subject to exogenous stochastic shocks to a non-empty set of policy
variables Ωt ⊂ {Gt, Ngt+1,Mt+1, τ rnt , τwlt }. Random disturbances to policy variables can be
thought of as discretionary policy actions by the government. Ωt is defined differently in the
experiments that follow in Chapters 5 to 7. If they are elements of Ωt then policy variables
evolve according to the same stationary AR(1) process,
Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)
Mt+1 = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt + uMt (3.31)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (3.32)
8Canova and Pappa (2011) note that the response by output from a change in government spending is
amplified if such spending affects private agents’ utility (as in Bouakez and Rebei (2007)) and/or creates
production externalities (as in Baxter and King (1993)).
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τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (3.33)
where, for Xt ∈ {Gt, Ngt+1,Mt+1, τ rnt , τwlt }, X is the steady state value of the variable, ρX
parameterises the degree of persistency of a stochastic shock toXt, u
X
t ∼i.i.d.N (0, σ2uX) where




t ] = 0 for Xt 6= Yt ∈ {Gt, Ngt+1,Mt+1, τ rnt , τwlt }.
It is assumed that |ρX | < 1 so that exogenous shocks are temporary events.9
If Gt ∈ Ωt and there are exogenous shocks to government spending, then the government







M˙t+1 = (1− 21t)
∣∣∣Y˙t∣∣∣ (3.35)
where τwl and T are the steady state values of τwlt and Tt, respectively, M˙t+1 and Y˙t are the




1 if the government buys equity in period t
0 if the government sells equity in period t
(3.36)
Rule (3.34) is used when {τ rnt , τwlt } 6⊂ Ωt. This rule implies a linear relationship between
the two tax rates for given quantities and prices of factors of production; see Appendix 3.J
for this linear relationship (that is, Equation (3.75)) and its derivation.
Claim 3. τwlt and τ
rn
t are positively related if and only if






for non-zero gross dividends; the relationship is negative otherwise.
Proof of Claim 3. See Appendix 3.J.
Claim 3 says that if gross wages are below their steady state level, regardless of the
size of the deviation, then rule (3.34) implies that the linear relationship between tax rates
is a positive one. If gross wages are above steady state and if the size of the deviation is
9With an estimated DSGE model, Mertens and Ravn (2011) show that responses are different in magni-
tude, but not in direction, between temporary and permanent fiscal shocks.
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smaller than τ rnrN/τwl then tax rates are positively related. However, if gross wages are
above steady state and the deviation is larger than τ rnrN/τwl then tax rates are negatively
related.
Rule (3.35) is used whenMt /∈ Ωt. If a fiscal deficit (or surplus, respectively) requires the
government to sell (or buy, respectively) some of its equity stock then rule (3.35) produces a
policy reaction of issuing (or withdrawing, respectively) money to also help reduce the fiscal
imbalance. The rule prevents rapid depletion (in a sale) or accumulation (in a purchase)
of government equity holdings. It does this by limiting the financing of equity purchases
via monetary expansion, by equating the percentage deviations of money and output from
steady state.
3.6 The aggregate economy
3.6.1 The equity market
At the beginning of period t, ex ante identical entrepreneurs hold a total stock of Nt units
of equity. When investment opportunities are revealed at the beginning of the period, those
who are savers hold a total of (1− pi)Nt units of equity. Investors sell their equity over the
period in order to finance their investment. Savers are the only agents who buy equity, and
they do so from three sources – investors selling φt of their surviving equity, piδNt, investors
issuing θIt new (outside) equity, and the government selling (or buying) (N
g
t+1 − δNgt ). By
the end of the period, the aggregate stock of equity held by savers is
N st+1 = (1− pi)δNt + φtpiδNt + θIt − (Ngt+1 − δNgt ) (3.37)
which is re-expressed as an equity market clearing condition,
N st+1 − δN st = φtpiδNt + θIt − (Ngt+1 − δNgt ) (3.38)
where the RHS (LHS, respectively) is the aggregate supply (demand, respectively) of equity.
Savers’ accumulation of equity, or aggregate saving, satisfies an aggregate portfolio balance
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[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1N st+1 + qt+1δN st+1 + pt+1Mt+1
 (3.39)
If the government sells equity to the private sector then
Ngt+1 − δNgt < 0
Because of the re-saleability constraint, the government can sell at most φtδN
g
t units, and
therefore ∣∣Ngt+1 − δNgt ∣∣ ≤ φtδNgt
or equivalently, because the expression inside the absolute value brackets is negative,
Ngt+1 − δNgt ≥ −φtδNgt
=⇒ Ngt+1 ≥ (1− φt)δNgt (3.40)
Assumption 3. The government buys or sells the maximum quantity of equity within the
limits of the re-saleability constraint.
Assumption 3 does not hold in a government sale when the size of the requirement
to finance the fiscal account is smaller than the re-saleable value of government’s equity
holdings. If Assumption 3 does hold then by inequality (3.40), when the government sells
equity to private agents, its equity holdings evolve according to
Ngt+1 = (1− φt)δNgt (3.41)
Entrepreneurs’ total equity holdings depreciate each period, and accumulate from invest-
ment financing and government sales. Therefore, when the government sells equity to private
agents, aggregate private equity holdings evolve according to
Nt+1 = δNt + φtδN
g
t + It (3.42)
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If the government buys equity from the private sector then
Ngt+1 − δNgt > 0
Aside from its budget constraint (3.28), the government has a limit on how many units of
equity it can buy – because of the re-saleability constraint, private agents can sell at most
φtδNt units to the government, and therefore
∣∣Ngt+1 − δNgt ∣∣ ≤ φtδNt
or equivalently, because the expression inside the absolute value brackets is positive,
Ngt+1 − δNgt ≤ φtδNt
=⇒ Ngt+1 ≤ δNgt + φtδNt (3.43)
Assumption 3 holds in a government purchase to prevent the authority from unnecessarily
increasing its equity holdings beyond the need to balance its overall budget (3.28). By




t + φtδNt (3.44)
Private agents retain their non-re-saleable equity stock, (1 − φt)δNt, and create new units
from investment financing. Therefore, when the government buys equity, aggregate private
equity holdings evolve according to
Nt+1 = (1− φt)δNt + It (3.45)
From either Equations (3.41) and (3.42) or Equations (3.44) and (3.45), the aggregate




t+1 = δ(Nt +N
g
t ) + It (3.46)
Since every unit of equity produces a unit of capital, then the aggregate capital stock, Kt,
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is matched by the aggregate equity stock,
Kt = Nt +N
g
t (3.47)
and Equation (3.46) then becomes
Kt+1 = δKt + It (3.48)
which is the law of motion for the aggregate capital stock.
3.6.2 The labour market


















− wt = 0






which is a typical entrepreneur’s demand for labour, given his capital stock.
With an aggregate capital stock, Kt, owned entirely by entrepreneurs, it follows that








Appendix 3.H shows that labour demand is wage-elastic. Given the homogeneity and unitary





















The labour market clears when LSt = L
D
t , which gives the equilibrium real wage and















− 1γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
1
γ+ν (3.54)
3.6.3 The general output market








where, from Equations (3.16), (3.17) and (3.20), consumption by investors, savers, and
workers are, respectively,
Cit = pi(1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtNt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δNt + ptMt) (3.56)
Cst = (1− pi)(1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtNt + qtδNt + ptMt) (3.57)
Cwt = (1− τwlt )wtLt (3.58)
From Equation (3.12), aggregate investment is given by
(1− θqt)It = ([1− τ rnt ]rt + φtδqt)piNt + piptMt − Cit (3.59)







From Equation (3.3), aggregate gross profits are
rtKt = Yt − wtLt (3.61)
And the general output market clears when
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (3.62)
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Appendix 3.A How qRt varies with θ
From Equation (3.6),
qRt = (1− θqt)(1− θ)−1
Suppose θ can vary. Then
∂qRt
∂θ
= (1− θ)−1 ∂
∂θ





















< 0 for θ ∈ (0, 1).
Appendix 3.B The investor’s budget and resource constraints




























nit+1 = (1− τ rnt )rtnt +
[
1− φt
1− θ − qt
1− φt




The coefficients of nit+1 and δnt in the above expression are simplified as follows.
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1− θ + qt
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1− θ − qt
1− φt
1− θ + qt =
1− φt







1− θ + qt
[










1− φt − θqt + φtqt
1− θ
=
1− φt − θqt + φtθqt − φtθqt + φtqt
1− θ
=
(1− φt)(1− θqt) + φtqt(1− θ)
1− θ
= (1− φt)1− θqt
1− θ + φtqt
= (1− φt)qRt + φtqt





t+1 = (1− τ rnt )rtnt +
[
φtqt + (1− φt)qRt
]
δnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
Alternatively, substituting Equation (3.8) into Equation (3.10) gives the resource constraint
(3.12),
cit + it + qt[(1− θ)it + (1− φt)δnt − it − δnt] + pt(mit+1 −mt) = (1− τ rnt )rtnt
=⇒ cit + it + qt(1− θ)it + qt(1− φt)δnt − qtit − qtδnt = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
=⇒ cit + it[1 + qt(1− θ)− qt] + [(1− φt)− 1]qtδnt = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
=⇒ cit + it[1− θqt] + [−φt]qtδnt = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
=⇒ cit + (1− θqt)it = (1− τ rnt )rtnt + φtqtδnt + pt(mt −mit+1)
Appendix 3.C The entrepreneur’s first order conditions
From Equations (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14), the investor’s Lagrangian is




















t+2 − (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nit+1 − [φt+1qt+1












t+3 − (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nit+2 − [φt+2qt+2 + (1− φt+2)qRt+2]δnit+2
− pt+2(mit+2 −mit+3)
)}












t+2 − δnst+1) + pt+1(mst+2 −mst+1)













t+3 −mst+2)− (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nst+2
)}
+ . . .
]





t)− λit = 0
=⇒ λit = U ′e(cit) (3.63)
∂Lie
∂cit+1
= piEt[β{U ′e(cit+1)− λit+1}] + (1− pi)Et[β{U ′e(cst+1)− λst+1}] = 0
=⇒ βEt[piU ′e(cit+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)] = βEt[piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1]
=⇒ piU ′e(cit+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1) = piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1 (3.64)
∂Lie
∂nit+1
= −λitqRt + piEt[βλit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)]
+ (1− pi)Et[βλst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)] = 0
=⇒ λitqRt = βpiEt
[









= −λitpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] ≤ 0, mit+1 ≥ 0,
and {−λitpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1]}mit+1 = 0
=⇒ −λitpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] = 0 or mit+1 = 0
=⇒ λitpt = piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] or mit+1 = 0





piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1
)]
or mit+1 = 0 (3.66)
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From Equations (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14), the saver’s Lagrangian is


















t+2 − (1− τ rnt+1)rt+1nit+1 − [φt+1qt+1











t+3 − (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nit+2 − [φt+2qt+2 + (1− φt+2)qRt+2]δnit+2
− pt+2(mit+2 −mit+3)
)}












t+2 − δnst+1) + pt+1(mst+2 −mst+1)













t+3 −mst+2)− (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nst+2
)}
+ . . .
]





t )− λst = 0
=⇒ λst = U ′e(cst ) (3.67)
∂Lse
∂nst+1
= −λstqt + piEt[βλit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)]
+ (1− pi)Et[βλst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)] = 0
=⇒ λstqt = βpiEt[λit+1([1− τ rnt+1]rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + [1− φt+1]δqRt+1)]
+ β(1− pi)Et[λst+1(δqt+1 + [1− τ rnt+1]rt+1)] (3.68)















= −λstpt + piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1] = 0
=⇒ λstpt = piEt[βλit+1pt+1] + (1− pi)Et[βλst+1pt+1]





























piλit+1 + (1− pi)λst+1
)]































t+1) + (1− pi)U ′e(cst+1)
)]
Appendix 3.D The portfolio balance equation
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[1 + τ rnt+1]rt+1nt+1 + qt+1δnt+1 + pt+1mt+1

Appendix 3.E Proof of Claim 1






and from Equations (3.66) and (3.70),
mit+1 6= 0 ⇐⇒ λit = λst
⇐⇒ qRt = qt
⇐⇒ 1− θqt
1− θ = qt
⇐⇒ qt = 1
∴ mit+1 = 0 ⇐⇒ qt 6= 1
Appendix 3.F Implication of Assumption 2 for expected port-
folio returns
qt > 1 =⇒ θqt > θ
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=⇒ 1− θqt < 1− θ
=⇒ 1− θqt
1− θ < 1
i.e. qRt < 1
=⇒ qRt < qt
=⇒ qRt+1 < qt+1
=⇒ (1 + τ
rn
t+1)rt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqRt+1
qt
<
(1 + τ rnt+1)rt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqt+1
qt
=⇒ (1 + τ
rn
t+1)rt+1 + φt+1δqt+1 + (1− φt+1)δqRt+1
qt
<
(1 + τ rnt+1)rt+1 + δqt+1
qt
Appendix 3.G The worker’s first order conditions










t+1 − δnwt ) + pt(mwt+1 −mwt )− (1− τwlt )wtlwt










t+1 − δnwt ) + pt(mwt+1 −mwt )− (1− τwlt )wtlwt



























t+3 − δnwt+2) + pt+2(mwt+3 −mwt+2)
− (1− τwlt+2)wt+2lwt+2 − (1− τ rnt+2)rt+2nwt+2
)]
+ . . .
















+ λwt (1− τwlt )wt = 0




= −λwt qt + βEt[λwt+1(δqt+1 + [1− τwlt+1]rt+1)] ≤ 0, nwt+1 ≥ 0,
and {−λwt qt + βEt[λwt+1(δqt+1 + [1− τwlt+1]rt+1)]}nwt+1 = 0
=⇒ λwt = βEt
[




or nwt+1 = 0 (3.73)
∂Lw
∂mwt+1
= −λwt pt + βEt[λwt+1pt+1] = 0, mwt+1 ≥ 0, and {−λwt pt + βEt[λwt+1pt+1]}mwt+1 = 0






or mwt+1 = 0 (3.74)
Substituting Equation (3.71) into Equation (3.72) gives
ω(lwt )







Appendix 3.H Wage elasticity of labour demand



























































































Given that γ ∈ (0, 1) then labour demand is wage-elastic.
Appendix 3.I Labour market equilibrium

































































































































































− 1γ+ν [(1− τwlt )(1− γ)At]
1
γ+ν
Appendix 3.J Rule (3.34) and the conditional linear relation-
























= τ rnt rtNt (3.75)




















Assuming rtNt 6= 0 then
∂τ rnt
∂τwlt
> 0 ⇐⇒ T
τwl
− wtLt > 0
⇐⇒ T > τwlwtLt
⇐⇒ τwlwL+ τ rnrN > τwlwtLt











“An effort to put reasonable numbers on theoretical relations is harmless and
may even be helpful. But it is still theory.”
– Angrist and Pischke (2010), p. 18.
This thesis makes a theoretical contribution to macroeconomics. First, it proposes a
novel framework with which to study liquidity shocks, fiscal policy, and large-scale asset
purchases. Then, in the tradition of most of the KM-related literature and supported by
the quote above by Angrist and Pischke (2010), the thesis performs quantitative exper-
iments. The model is solved and stochastically simulated by the quantitative technique
of calibration. Most parameter values are taken from the related literature and empirical
microeconomic studies, and the rest are estimated in this chapter. Results are captured
by impulse responses, and are reported and analysed in Chapters 5 to 8. A caveat of the
calibration methodology is that quantitative results are subject to uncertainty, particular
due to uncertainty over the values of the model’s parameters. This implies that any fiscal
multipliers that are generated from the experiments of the thesis cannot reliably be com-
pared to multipliers from the empirical literature. Nevertheless, Chapter 8 evaluates the
robustness of quantitative results by performing a sensitivity analysis of the model to its
calibration.
This chapter describes and justifies the procedures that are involved in calibrating
the model, performing experiments, and representing the results. The thesis focuses on
analysing the results of its experiments, and with this limitation on scope, the chapter does
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not review or discuss the calibration methodology and perturbation techniques, and it does
not pursue an algebraic derivation of the model’s solution.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 establishes values for the
model’s parameters. Table 4.1 summarises various settings for structural parameters; the
“baseline” settings are used in Chapters 5 to 7 and the “sensitivity” settings are used ex-
clusively in Chapter 8 for the sensitivity analysis. Table 4.2 summarises the steady state
values and shock parameters of exogenous variables. Section 4.3 briefly describes the com-
putational procedures that are involved in solving and stochastically simulating the model.
Section 4.4 describes how exogenous stochastic shocks are simulated and how the results are
represented. And the chapter’s appendices contain some additional algebra and the data
used in the calibration exercises.
4.2 Model calibration
4.2.1 Structural parameters
Liquidity constraint parameters, θ and φt
θ and φt are the most difficult structural parameters to calibrate. Del Negro et al. (2011)
and Ajello (2012) emphasise the problem – the parameters are not directly observable and
therefore difficult to estimate from data. KM assume, for simplicity, that θ and φt are
always equal, even when φt varies stochastically. The majority of the KM-related literature
maintains this assumption, and the calibration task is then simplifies to finding an empirical
estimate of either parameter.
DEFK propose that φt is a linear function of the steady state value of a “liquidity
share” variable – a ratio of liquid assets (empirically, US government liabilities) to total
assets (empirically, net claims of private assets). From US data over the period 1952:1 –
2008:4 the authors obtain an average liquidity share of 12.64%. Then, according to their
hypothesised linear relationship, they find that a value of 0.185 for φt is related to a liquidity
share of 13%.
Shi (2012) assumes θ and φt are equal in steady state, but θ remains fixed when φt varies
stochastically. Shi (2012) associates φt with the return on liquid assets. He uses DEFK’s
data on liquid assets, that is, US government liabilities, and estimates a value of 0.273 for
φt in steady state. His idea of a liquidity shock is a fall in φt to 0.221. Bigio (2012) follows
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Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007) and sets θ to match the aggregate moments of coefficients
in a regression by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) of the “great ratio” I/K against the
return on capital and Tobin’s q. Molteni (2014) does not assume θ = φt. He maintains
DEFK’s value for θ but calibrates φ at 0.75, the most relaxed value in the literature, in
order to target an empirically observed haircut of 25% on repos that are collateralised by
government bonds in Portugal and Ireland.
Besides Shi (2012), Bigio (2012), Molteni (2014), and Ajello (2012), the rest of the KM-
related literature, as well as KM, calibrate the liquidity constraints to DEFK’s estimated
value of 0.185. This thesis applies the same calibration.
Sensitivity analysis in Chapter 8 relies on relaxing the constraints by 10% to a higher
value of 0.2035 and symmetrically tightening the constraints by 10% to a lower value of
0.1665. The higher setting is the highest (common) value for θ and φ for which the model
converges to a unique and stable equilibrium.
Subjective discount factor, β
Frederick et al. (2002) provide an extensive review of the literature on empirical and ex-
perimental studies of β, and observe that most arrive at values close to 1, or equivalently,
quarterly rates of time preference close to zero, which implies that agents have almost equal
preferences for the present and future. More recently, Theodoridis et al. (2012) estimate a
time-varying parameter VAR based on the Smets and Wouters (2007) DSGE model, and
find that β does not vary over time and is close to, but less than 1. All these results support
the standard practice in the DSGE literature to fix β very close to 1. The most popular
setting is a quarterly discount factor of 0.99, which means a 1% quarterly rate of time
preference. The thesis selects this value. Amongst the KM-related literature, Nezafat and
Slav´ık (2012) share this setting.
Values above and below, but not far away from, the baseline setting for β are chosen
for sensitivity analysis. A higher β of 0.999 equates agents’ preferences for the present
and future. This setting appears in, for example, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), who also
investigates fiscal shocks in a calibrated DSGE model with financial frictions. A lower β of
0.98 implies agents are more impatient and prefer the present, and therefore discount future
utility by a 2% quarterly rate of time preference.
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Capital’s share in output, γ
Christensen et al. (1980) estimate an average value of 0.40 for γ in the US between 1947
and 1973. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) obtain a measure over an updated period of 1948
– 2005, and not only confirm that this value still holds, but support the Kaldor (1961)
fact that it remains constant over time. The thesis selects this value for the parameter.
Furthermore, the setting implies that labour demand is wage-elastic (see Appendix 3.H).
Sensitivity from γ relies exclusively on a lower value of 0.36. Within the KM-related
literature, this setting appears in Shi (2012) and Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012). Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) also use this value to calibrate a Real Business Cycle model with a borrowing
constraint. Lower values of 0.33 and 0.22 are used by Bigio (2012) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde
(2010), respectively. Values above the baseline setting are uncommon in the literature, and
are therefore omitted in the sensitivity analysis.
Survival rate after depreciation, δ
The quarterly depreciation rate is set to 2.5%, which implies an annual rate of 1 − (1 −
0.025)4 ≈ 10%. This setting is standard in real business cycle studies on the US economy.
Since King et al. (1988), who describe 10% as a “more realistic depreciation rate” (p. 218),
this value has been widely used in calibrating DSGE models.
Like γ, sensitivity analysis with δ relies on just one alternative setting – a higher value of
0.98. Rates above the baseline are not unusual in the literature. Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012),
Shi (2012), and Bigio (2012), for example, use 0.9774, 0.981, and 0.9873, respectively, and
at the extreme end, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) uses 0.99.
Probability of an investment opportunity, pi
pi is empirically related to the fraction of firms that significantly adjust their capital in a
given period. From samples of US manufacturing firms, Doms and Dunne (1998) estimate
this fraction at 20% in any given year, from which DEFK set pi to a quarterly rate of
1− (1− 0.2)0.25 ≈ 5%. The thesis adopts DEFK’s setting.
Cooper et al. (1999) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) perform empirical studies
similar to Doms and Dunne (1998) and estimate that 14% to 25% of firms significantly
adjust their capital in any given year. The difference in estimates between the two sets
of studies are due to what the authors consider to be a “significant adjustment” in the
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capital stock. To Doms and Dunne (1998), a “significant adjustment” means more than
10% of a firm’s capital is repaired or replaced, whereas Cooper et al. (1999) and Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006) define the concept as any rate above 20%.1 The interval estimate
for the fraction of firms that invest in a year provide upper and lower alternative settings
for pi. If 14% of firms are assumed to significantly replace or repair their capital in a
year then the implied value of pi is 1 − (1 − 0.14)0.25 ≈ 3.7%. If 25% of firms invest then
pi = 1− (1− 0.25)0.25 ≈ 6.9%.
Frisch elasticity of labour supply, 1/ν
The value of 1/ν in applied economics is the subject of unresolved debate. On the one
hand, micro-econometric studies usually find small estimates, that is, values below 1 (see a
review of the literature by Contreras and Sinclair (2008)). Early work by MaCurdy (1981)
and Altonji (1986) find a range of estimates from 0 to 0.5 in US data. Most empirical
estimates (at least those whose samples are selected from males) have since fallen within
this range (see Pencavel (1986) and Domeij and Flode´n (2006), for example). On the
other hand, macroeconomics needs much larger elasticities for calibrating models in order
to match observed business cycle fluctuations in aggregate variables, as Prescott (2006)
insists. Peterman (2012), for instance, explains that values between 2 and 4 are required to
replicate empirically observed volatility in aggregate labour hours.
According to Peterman (2012) and Chetty et al. (2012), the wide micro-macro disparity
on the value of 1/ν is mainly due to sample selection – macroeconomic studies consider an
aggregation of all individuals, whereas microeconomic studies rely on narrow samples of the
population. For instance, the results of MaCurdy (1981) are drawn from prime-aged males.
The DSGE literature is fairly consistent in using elastic values. However, there is a subset
of the literature which assumes unitary elasticity. This is done by Christiano et al. (2005),
following elasticity estimates in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), and also by Christiano
et al. (2013) and Cesa-Bianchi and Fernandez-Corugedo (2013) in their DSGE models with
financial frictions. Within the KM-related literature, Nezafat and Slav´ık (2012) calibrate
with unitary Frisch elasticity. The thesis also adopts the setting.
Sensitivity from 1/ν is assessed with both elastic and inelastic values. A higher value
1Alternatively, Gourio and Kashyap (2007) consider a “significant adjustment” as investment which
amounts to 35% or more of beginning-of-period capital.
63
of 2 is used, following the recommendations of macroeconomists; this value is also used in
calibrations by Shi (2012) and Bigio (2012). The upper bound of 0.5 from MaCurdy (1981)
and Altonji (1986) is used as the lower sensitivity setting.
Relative utility weight on labour, ω
The baseline setting is taken from a DSGE model by Villa and Yang (2011) that is similar
in many ways to the model of this thesis. ω is often calibrated in the literature with consid-
eration of ν, since together they form labour’s coefficient in the worker’s utility function. As
Hall (1997) points out, researchers have different ways of representing this coefficient.2 ω is
usually calibrated to match an average or steady state fraction of time spent doing work.
According to Villa and Yang, the common assumption in the literature is that individuals
spend 8 hours a day working, that is, ω = 0.33. Villa and Yang assume a utility function
similar to the one in this model, and they set ω = 4.01. The difference between this model
and theirs is that they include habit persistence in consumption.
Villa and Yang’s model is based on Gertler and Karadi (2011), who calibrate ω to 3.409
based on estimates by Primiceri et al. (2006). This value is used as a lower sensitivity
setting for ω. For a higher sensitivity setting, the value of 8.15 that is set by Nezafat and
Slav´ık (2012) is used. The model in this thesis shares structural similarities with Nezafat
and Slav´ık (2012), including the same utility specification for workers. Their calibration of
ω is done to allow the model to produce empirically-observed asset price volatility following
simultaneous shocks to productivity and liquidity.
4.2.2 Steady state and AR(1) parameters of exogenous variables
An exogenously determined variable Xt ∈ {At, φt, Gt, Ngt+1,Mt+1, τ rnt , τwlt } that follows a
stationary AR(1) process
Xt = (1− ρX)X + ρXXt−1 + uXt
requires calibrated values for its steady state level, X, shock persistence parameter, ρX ,
and standard deviation of innovations, σuX . It can easily be shown that the variable’s own
2Hall (1997), for instance, normalises ω and applies a relative weight to consumption in the worker’s
utility function.
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A is normalised to 1. King and Rebelo (2000) use quarterly US data to estimate an AR(1)
process for At in natural logarithms and without an intercept, and obtain point estimates of
0.979 for the persistence parameter and 0.0072 for the standard deviation of the residuals.





(1− 0.9792)0.00722 = 0.00147
As mentioned earlier in Section 4.2.1, φ is assumed to be equal to θ (that is, 0.185). ρφ
is set to a standard value of 0.95. An annual time series of DEFK’s liquidity share variable
is replicated in the thesis by following the authors’ metadata (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5 in
Appendix 4.B for the data and metadata, respectively). Figure 4.1 illustrates the liquidity
share over time and shows that it is relatively stable for half a decade prior to the recent
2008 global financial crisis. Within this period, the liquidity share has a mean and standard
deviation of 0.1110 and 0.0204, respectively. DEFK propose that the liquidity share is a
linear function of φt,
LSt = φ0 + 15φt















(1− 0.952)× 0.001362 = 0.00042
3From Figure 3 on page 43 in DEFK, the straight line appears to travel from 12.5 to 13.25, or 0.75 units




ρG, ρNg, ρτrn, and ρτwl are all set to a standard value of 0.95; the setting for ρM is explained
below.
Gt is endogenously determined in Chapter 5’s variant of the model. A simulation of
that model yields G = 0.428. This value is assumed for G in all instances where Gt is
exogenously determined. σuG is set to a very small value of 0.0001 to get the variants of
the model in Chapter 6 to converge towards a unique, stable equilibrium after an exogenous
shock to government spending; larger shocks in those models are explosive.
The US government started purchasing corporate equities in the third quarter of 2008 as
part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program. The natural logarithm of this short time series





(1− 0.952)× 0.56712 = 0.1771
Holding privately-issued equity is unconventional behaviour for the government. The govern-
ment has no motive to save, and it is therefore reasonable to make the following assumption
when Ngt+1 is exogenously determined:
Assumption 4. In steady state, the government holds no equity, that is, Ng = 0.
Equation (3.31) is estimated via least squares from quarterly US data over 1987:1 –
2008:1 (that is, 84 observations); Table 4.3 summarises the estimation results. Mt+1 is
taken as the seasonally adjusted, detrended, natural logarithm of the real monetary base
(see Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.B for the data, and the notes therein for a description of how
the series is compiled). ρM is set to the estimated coefficient 0.952 of the lagged dependent
variable in the AR(1) regression. The Dickey-Fuller test on








concludes that |ρM |< 1 andMt+1 is a trend-stationary series. Figure 4.2 gives a histogram of
the residuals of the regression. The Jarque-Bera test statistic, with p-value of 0.45, does not
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provide enough statistical evidence to reject a null hypothesis that the regression residuals
are normally distributed. σuM is set to the standard deviation of the regression residuals,
0.004207. The estimated regression coefficients of Equation (3.31) imply a value of 1.95 for
M .
Individuals in the US pay tax on income from all sources, not on the type of income
earned. Data on dividend and wage taxes is not available from the US. The UK computes
taxes by the type of income, including dividend and wage taxes. Parameters related to
taxation are therefore estimated from quarterly UK data (see Table 4.8 in Appendix 4.B).
Tax rates are computed as ratios of aggregate taxes to aggregate incomes from wages and
dividends. Tax liabilities are used instead of actual tax receipts, to avoid the latter’s prob-
lems with over/underpayments, late payments, etc. Standard deviations στwl = 0.004 and
στrn = 0.0112 are observed from the data. The standard deviations of innovations to tax










(1− 0.952)× 0.01122 = 0.00349
The UK does not have flat rates of tax on wages and dividends. For both types of income
the taxpayer enjoys a taxable allowance, and any excess amount earned during the fiscal
year is subject to tax. The rate of tax applied on this excess depends on the individual’s
income for the fiscal year. τwl and τ rn are set to average ratios, 0.231 and 0.207, of aggregate
tax liabilities to aggregate incomes from wages and dividends, respectively (see Table 4.8 in
Appendix 4.B).4
4These rates are very similar to those computed by Gomme and Rupert (2007) from US data and following
a methodology set out by Mendoza et al. (1994) and Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). Gomme and Rupert
(2007) compute income tax rates of 0.22 on wages and 0.2868 on capital. These values, however, are not
adopted here for two reasons: (i) Gomme and Rupert (2007) use data on actual government tax collections,
which, as mentioned in the text, may be a less accurate description of the tax burden than tax liabilities
data because of errors in tax payments; and (ii) σuτwl and σuτrn are needed here, and to be consistent, tax
rates are obtained from the same dataset. The rates obtained here are also fairly consistent with a dedicated
literature that estimates tax rates; Barro and Sahasakul (1983, 1986), Seater (1985), and Stephenson (1998)
obtain average wage income tax rates between 0.22 and 0.30 from US data between 1954 and 1994; and
Mendoza et al. (1994) obtain average income tax rates between 0.17 and 0.30 for wages and between 0.27
and 0.50 for capital.
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4.3 Model solution and stochastic simulation
Nonlinearities in the equilibrium conditions make the model complex enough to not have an
analytical solution. Instead, an approximate solution is much simpler to obtain, a strategy
first recommended in the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982). Variables are
expressed in their levels, which means a linear approximation of the model is obtained. The
model is approximated by a second order Taylor series expansion around the non-stochastic
steady state, where there are no contemporaneous shocks, but agents give consideration
to future shocks. A second order approximation is chosen for two main benefits that are
highlighted in a review of perturbation methods by Juillard (2011) – (i) the approximation
is usually more accurate at second order than first order; and (ii) certainty equivalence is
avoided in a second order approximation, but not in a first order approximation (which is
essentially a linearisation); avoiding certainty equivalence means that the variance of future
shocks matter to agents.
Solving and simulating the model are handled electronically by the computer software
Dynare.5 The model is first stochastically simulated with a series of random shocks to
exogenous variables {At, φt} ∪ Ωt over 300 periods.6 Random shocks are drawn from i.i.d.
mean-zero Normal distributions. This first stochastic simulation is therefore approximately
the steady state. The stochastic simulation of the model is then replicated, but this time
a policy variable (the one being shocked) is increased (or decreased, if the experiment is
a negative shock) in period 101 by one standard deviation. The deviations of endogenous
variables between the two stochastic simulations are captured. This pair of stochastic sim-
ulations is repeated 50 times, and the average deviation in period t for each endogenous
variable is computed.7 This average deviation is taken as a variable’s impulse response to an
exogenous shock. Time is counted from when the exogenous shock hits, that is, period 101,
which is referred to in the thesis as “quarter 1” or the “immediate period of the shock”.8
5Dynare is a pre-processor for Matlab, that is, it generates Matlab code that solves DSGE models.
Adjemian et al. (2013) describe the software in detail.
6300 periods is the default setting, but it can be adjusted by users.
750 repetitions is another default, but adjustable, setting of Dynare.
8The first 100 periods is known as the “transient state” or “warm-up” period, and it gives the model
enough time to achieve steady state.
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4.4 Exogenous shocks and results
4.4.1 Impulse responses and dynamic impact multipliers
Exogenous shocks are simulated to both tax rates simultaneously (a “tax-shock”) and
individually, to government spending (a “G-shock”), to government equity holdings (an
“Ng-shock”), and to the re-saleability constraint (a “liquidity shock”).
Hypothetical normalised impulse responses are reported for ease of interpretation and
comparison. There are two sets of experiments in which normalised impulse responses are
not produced – the tax-shock and the Ng-shock. In these cases, dynamic impact multipliers
are computed to obtain a normalised response. For all experiments, impulse responses
are reported graphically and numerically. The tax-shock and the Ng-shock report tables
of dynamic impact multipliers as additional results. If an endogenous variable’s impulse
response or impact multiplier in period t is greater than 1 then the response is described as
“large”, otherwise the response is described as “small”.
Since the model is simulated with variables entered in levels, then impulse responses
are deviations from steady state in levels. Impulse responses are not reported as percent-
age deviations from steady state. Percentage deviations depend on the absolute size of the
deviation. Normalisation amplifies the level of the deviation, and then percentage devia-
tions will reflect this amplification and give a misleading indication of responses. In other
words, the percentage deviation from steady state is 100∆Yt/Y without normalisation and
100∆Yt/(Y σX) with normalisation.
When possible, the quarter 1 impulse response of the shocked exogenous variable is
normalised to 1 unit, and impulse responses of endogenous variables are then re-scaled by
the size of the shock. That is, if an exogenous variable Xt is shocked by a one standard
deviation change in its value, σX , and the response of an endogenous variable Yt is ∆Yt,
then the changes in Xt and Yt are represented as 1 unit and ∆Yt/σX units, respectively.
The tax-shock in Chapter 5 comprises a normalised shock to τwlt together with a re-scaled
shock to τ rnt that measures 2.8 units. Tax rate cuts alter tax bases and altogether reduce
aggregate taxes, Tt, by 3.1 units of general output. A variable T
∗
t is constructed to represent
government tax collections with tax bases held constant to their steady state levels, or
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“ceteris paribus changes in taxes”, that is, from Equation (3.27),
T ∗t = τ
rn
t rN + τ
wl
t wL (4.2)
where notations without time subscripts represent steady state values. Dynamic impact tax
multipliers of a real endogenous variable are then computed as
Xt −X
T ∗1 − T
(4.3)
where (Xt −X) is the variable’s impulse response in levels in period t. If Xt is not a real
variable, that is, not measured in units of general output, then its impulse responses are
converted to a real equivalent by being valued at the variable’s steady state real price. By
using T ∗t instead of Tt, tax multipliers disentangle the discretionary change in taxes (that is,
the change in tax rates) from the endogenous component (that is, the changes in tax bases,
wtLt and rtNt).
9
The Ng-shock in Chapter 7 is not in terms of general output, but in units of equity.
The shock itself is converted to a real equivalent by being valued at the steady state equity




As in the tax-shock, if Xt is not a real variable then its impulse responses are valued at the
variable’s steady state real price.
4.4.2 Speed of convergence to steady state
An endogenous variable is “close to” steady state after a shock when the size of its impulse
response in period t ≥ 2 is less than 10% of the size of the immediate impulse response. An
indicator is constructed to describe the speed at which an endogenous variable gets close, or
converges, to steady state after being disturbed by an exogenous shock. This convergence
indicator is the lowest value of t ∈ [2, 201] which satisfies
Xt < c(X1 −X)
9Perotti (2012) highlights the importance of separating discretionary from endogenous changes in taxes
by showing they have different effects on output.
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where t = 201 means convergence happens some time after 200 quarters, and not in the
201st quarter. The convergence parameter, c, is set to 0.1. The convergence indicator is
therefore the time a variable’s impulse response takes to fall within 10% of its immediate
response.
4.4.3 Parameter elasticity of impulse responses
The sensitivity of shock responses to a change in value of one parameter is assessed by a
measure called the “parameter elasticity of impulse responses”. This measure is a ratio of the
percentage change in a variable’s immediate impulse response to the percentage change in
a parameter’s value.10 The measure resembles an elasticity, hence the name. The elasticity
is used in Chapter 8 for a sensitivity analysis of the model to its calibration. A positive
elasticity means that an increase in the parameter’s value amplifies the variable’s impulse
response relative to that of the baseline scenario. A negative elasticity means that an increase
(or decrease, respectively) in the parameter’s value lowers (or increases, respectively) the
variable’s impulse response relative to that of the baseline scenario. A variable is considered
“sensitive” to a parameter if the elasticity is greater than 1 in absolute value. The model is
considered “sensitive” to a parameter if the majority of the variables are sensitive to that
parameter.
10The parameter elasticity resembles the “elementary effects” ratio of Morris (1991).
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, US Flow of Funds Statistics, various issues; 2012
data is obtained from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf and historical data
from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm.
NOTES: The liquidity share is calculated according to Del Negro et al. (2011). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 in Appendix
4.B give the data and metadata, respectively.
Figure 4.2: Histogram of residuals in the estimation of Mt+1 = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt + uMt
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Fraction of investment financed by equity θ 0.185 0.1665 0.2035
Subjective discount factor β 0.99 0.98 0.999
Capital’s share in output γ 0.4 0.36 n.a.
Survival rate after depreciation δ 0.975 n.a. 0.98
Probability of investment opportunity pi 0.05 0.037 0.069
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply ν 1 0.5 2
Relative utility weight on labour ω 4.01 3.409 8.15








Symbol Value Symbol Value Symbol Value
Aggregate productivity A 1 ρA 0.979 σuA 0.00147
Re-saleable fraction of equity φ 0.185 ρφ 0.95 σuφ 0.00042
Government spending G 0.428 ρG 0.95 σuG 0.0001
Government equity Ng 0 ρNg 0.95 σuNg 0.1771
Money supply M 1.95 ρM 0.952 σuM 0.00421
Rate of tax on dividends τ rn 0.207 ρτrn 0.95 σuτrn 0.00349
Rate of tax on wages τwl 0.231 ρτwl 0.95 σuτwl 0.00124
NOTES: These values are used to calibrate the stochastic AR(1) processes (3.2), (3.4), (3.29), (3.30), (3.31),
(3.32) and (3.33) which have the general form Xt = (1− ρX)X + ρXXt−1 + uXt where ρX is the persistence
parameter and uXt are innovations. If a variable does not follow a stochastic AR(1) process then its steady
state value is determined endogenously.
Table 4.3: Estimation of Mt+1 = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt + uMt
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
(1− ρM )M 0.093483 0.019623 4.763995 0.0000
ρM 0.951991 0.010284 92.57203 0.0000
R-squared 0.990407 Mean dependent var 1.909519
Adjusted R-squared 0.990292 S.D. dependent var 0.042950
S.E. of regression 0.004232 Akaike info criterion -8.069100
Sum squared resid 0.001486 Schwarz criterion -8.011626
Log likelihood 344.9367 Hannan-Quinn criter. -8.045982
F-statistic 8569.580 Durbin-Watson stat 0.024005
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
NOTES: This table gives the results of estimating equation (3.31) via least squares with a sample of 84
observations from 1987:1 to 2008:1. Mt+1 is the seasonally adjusted, detrended, natural logarithm of the
real US monetary base. The data is given in Table 4.7 in Appendix 4.B.
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Appendix 4.A Standard deviation of innovations to exoge-
nous variables: derivation of Equation (4.1)
Consider recursive substitutions of the following AR(1) model for Xt:
Xt = (1− ρX)X + ρXXt−1 + uXt
= (1− ρX)X + ρX
[
(1− ρX)X + ρXXt−2 + uXt−1
]
+ uXt
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2XXt−2 + ρXuXt−1 + uXt
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2X
[







= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2X(1− ρX)X + ρ3XXt−3 + ρ2XuXt−2 + ρXuXt−1 + uXt
= . . .
= (1− ρX)X + ρX(1− ρX)X + ρ2X(1− ρX)X + . . .+ uXt + ρXuXt−1 + ρ2XuXt−2 + . . .











uX + . . . =
σ2uX
1− ρ2X






Table 4.4: Liquidity share measure: metadata
Item
Line reference in the
Flow of Funds Statis-
tics
Liabilities of the federal government
T-bills Table L.105, line 21
Treasury securities Table L.105, line 22
Less: Holdings by the monetary authority Table L.108, line 12
Less: Holdings by the budgetary agency Table L.105, line 23
Reserves Table L.108, line 32
Vault cash Table L.108, line 33
Currency Table L.108, line 34
Currency outside banks Table L.108, line 41
Less: Remittances to the federal government Table L.108, line 35
Capital (at market value)
Capital owned by households:
Real estate Table B.100, line 3
Equipment and software of non-profit organisations Table B.100, line 6
Consumer durables Table B.100, line 7
Capital owned by the non-corporate sector:
Real estate Table B.103, line 3
Equipment and software Table B.103, line 6
Inventories Table B.103, line 9
Capital owned by the corporate sector:
Equity outstanding, market value Table B.102, line 35
Liabilities Table B.102, line 21
Less: Financial assets Table B.102, line 6
Less: Government credit market instruments Table F.105c, line 33
Less: Trade receivables Table F.105c, line 43
NOTES: This table follows from the appendix of Del Negro et al. (2011).
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Capital ($b) Liquidity share
1945 262.4 471.0 0.3578
1946 238.4 544.9 0.3044
1947 230.1 635.3 0.2659
1948 222.6 701.2 0.2410
1949 222.3 736.0 0.2320
1950 221.2 830.6 0.2103
1951 222.3 928.2 0.1932
1952 229.1 962.1 0.1923
1953 231.1 992.8 0.1888
1954 232.1 1076.3 0.1774
1955 233.6 1188.9 0.1642
1956 228.8 1281.4 0.1515
1957 228.6 1314.0 0.1482
1958 235.2 1434.0 0.1409
1959 245.3 1516.4 0.1392
1960 242.1 1574.6 0.1333
1961 248.2 1700.8 0.1273
1962 253.7 1748.3 0.1267
1963 258.4 1842.1 0.1230
1964 264.1 1999.5 0.1167
1965 264.8 2166.2 0.1089
1966 268.7 2223.8 0.1078
1967 274.6 2498.9 0.0990
1968 281.4 2822.1 0.0907
1969 285.8 2863.0 0.0908
1970 302.4 3008.0 0.0913
1971 333.3 3344.2 0.0906
1972 349.5 3846.3 0.0833
1973 357.0 4042.8 0.0811
1974 377.8 4028.0 0.0858
1975 476.2 4722.8 0.0916
1976 553.2 5327.2 0.0941
1977 611.9 5856.7 0.0946
1978 673.0 6672.2 0.0916
1979 723.4 7787.0 0.0850
1980 823.6 8982.0 0.0840
1981 923.7 9604.3 0.0877
1982 1101.3 10189.0 0.0975
1983 1290.9 10797.8 0.1068
1984 1501.1 11513.4 0.1153
1985 1744.1 12817.3 0.1198
1986 1971.5 13990.6 0.1235
1987 2109.7 14846.2 0.1244
Continued on next page
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Capital ($b) Liquidity share
1988 2242.7 16078.1 0.1224
1989 2404.1 17644.1 0.1199
1990 2671.6 17957.5 0.1295
1991 2985.2 19099.8 0.1352
1992 3276.6 19871.3 0.1416
1993 3543.3 20763.5 0.1458
1994 3710.8 21282.3 0.1485
1995 3868.4 23449.4 0.1416
1996 4048.2 24326.8 0.1427
1997 4097.7 27323.9 0.1304
1998 4089.8 30781.4 0.1173
1999 4232.4 35528.9 0.1064
2000 3808.8 35541.3 0.0968
2001 3855.5 35844.0 0.0971
2002 4118.6 35308.8 0.1045
2003 4549.1 40199.5 0.1017
2004 4930.0 45337.8 0.0981
2005 5273.5 50847.9 0.0940
2006 5475.2 54131.2 0.0919
2007 5797.3 54116.5 0.0968
2008 8980.9 45001.9 0.1664
2009 9990.4 44224.8 0.1843
2010 11707.4 46010.2 0.2028
2011 12444.2 46217.6 0.2121
Average: 1957 - 2007 0.1110
Standard deviation: 1957 - 2007 0.0204
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, US Flow of Funds Statistics, various issues;
2012 data is obtained online from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf, and
historical data from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm.
NOTES: The liquidity share is calculated according to Del Negro et al. (2011). Table 4.4 gives the metadata.
The liquidity share is illustrated graphically in Figure 4.1.
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Table 4.6: US federal government stocks of corporate equity


















Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, US Flow of Funds Accounts, Table L.105, line 11.
NOTES: This table gives the value of equities that were purchased by the US government from financial
corporations under the Troubled Asset Relief Program. They are valued at market prices.
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Table 4.7: US real monetary base
Period M1 ($b) CPI CPI s.a. Real M1 ln (real M1) ln (real M1), detrended
1987Q1 730.2 111.200 111.4902 6.549456 1.879382 1.794665
1987Q2 743.9 112.700 112.6327 6.604653 1.887774 1.805112
1987Q3 743.0 113.800 113.6317 6.538671 1.877734 1.814580
1987Q4 756.2 115.300 115.1649 6.566237 1.881941 1.823065
1988Q1 756.2 115.700 116.0019 6.518858 1.874699 1.830602
1988Q2 768.1 117.100 117.0301 6.563269 1.881489 1.837261
1988Q3 781.4 118.500 118.3247 6.603862 1.887655 1.843141
1988Q4 783.3 120.200 120.0592 6.524284 1.875531 1.848370
1989Q1 785.7 121.100 121.4160 6.471140 1.867352 1.853101
1989Q2 779.2 123.100 123.0265 6.333595 1.845868 1.857505
1989Q3 777.8 124.400 124.2160 6.261675 1.834448 1.861763
1989Q4 786.6 125.600 125.4528 6.270086 1.835790 1.866049
1990Q1 795.4 127.400 127.7324 6.227079 1.828907 1.870516
1990Q2 806.1 128.900 128.8230 6.257421 1.833768 1.875304
1990Q3 810.1 130.400 130.2071 6.221627 1.828031 1.880521
1990Q4 819.9 133.500 133.3436 6.148778 1.816253 1.886255
1991Q1 827.2 134.600 134.9512 6.129622 1.813133 1.892556
1991Q2 843.1 135.200 135.1193 6.239672 1.830928 1.899433
1991Q3 861.6 136.200 135.9985 6.335363 1.846147 1.906845
1991Q4 878.0 137.400 137.2390 6.397598 1.855923 1.914708
1992Q1 910.4 138.100 138.4604 6.575167 1.883300 1.922900
1992Q2 943.8 139.500 139.4167 6.769633 1.912447 1.931262
1992Q3 963.3 140.500 140.2922 6.866385 1.926638 1.939612
1992Q4 1003.7 141.800 141.6338 7.086583 1.958203 1.947752
1993Q1 1030.4 142.600 142.9721 7.207000 1.975053 1.955481
1993Q2 1047.7 144.000 143.9140 7.280041 1.985136 1.962601
1993Q3 1084.5 144.400 144.1864 7.521514 2.017768 1.968929
1993Q4 1112.9 145.700 145.5293 7.647259 2.034347 1.974292
1994Q1 1131.6 146.200 146.5815 7.719937 2.043806 1.978553
1994Q2 1141.1 147.400 147.3120 7.746144 2.047195 1.981607
1994Q3 1150.6 148.400 148.1805 7.764856 2.049608 1.983394
1994Q4 1150.1 149.500 149.3248 7.702001 2.041480 1.983893
1995Q1 1151.5 150.300 150.6922 7.641404 2.033581 1.983124
1995Q2 1149.2 151.900 151.8093 7.570023 2.024196 1.981144
1995Q3 1145.4 152.500 152.2744 7.521947 2.017825 1.978043
1995Q4 1137.3 153.700 153.5199 7.408160 2.002582 1.973933
1996Q1 1123.5 154.400 154.8029 7.257616 1.982051 1.968957
1996Q2 1124.8 156.300 156.2067 7.200716 1.974180 1.963272
1996Q3 1112.4 157.000 156.7677 7.095847 1.959510 1.957043
1996Q4 1086.3 158.300 158.1145 6.870337 1.927213 1.950445
1997Q1 1081.3 159.100 159.5152 6.778666 1.913780 1.943650
1997Q2 1064.0 160.200 160.1044 6.645666 1.893965 1.936820
1997Q3 1066.3 160.500 160.2626 6.653456 1.895136 1.930096
1997Q4 1065.6 161.600 161.4106 6.601795 1.887342 1.923592
Continued on next page
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Table 4.7: Continued from previous page
Period M1 ($b) CPI CPI s.a. Real M1 ln (real M1) ln (real M1), detrended
1998Q1 1074.2 161.600 162.0217 6.629976 1.891601 1.917401
1998Q2 1076.7 162.500 162.4030 6.629804 1.891575 1.911592
1998Q3 1075.0 163.200 162.9586 6.596768 1.886580 1.906220
1998Q4 1086.1 164.000 163.8078 6.630330 1.891655 1.901327
1999Q1 1097.4 164.300 164.7287 6.661861 1.896399 1.896941
1999Q2 1102.0 166.200 166.1008 6.634527 1.892287 1.893085
1999Q3 1098.5 166.700 166.4534 6.599445 1.886986 1.889782
1999Q4 1102.2 168.200 168.0029 6.560601 1.881082 1.887054
2000Q1 1121.6 168.800 169.2405 6.627256 1.891191 1.884922
2000Q2 1114.6 171.300 171.1977 6.510600 1.873432 1.883403
2000Q3 1102.8 172.800 172.5444 6.391399 1.854953 1.882516
2000Q4 1098.7 174.000 173.7961 6.321775 1.844000 1.882278
2001Q1 1097.1 175.100 175.5569 6.249255 1.832462 1.882684
2001Q2 1116.1 176.900 176.7944 6.312983 1.842608 1.883708
2001Q3 1139.0 177.500 177.2374 6.426408 1.860416 1.885292
2001Q4 1166.2 177.700 177.4918 6.570445 1.882582 1.887352
2002Q1 1191.3 177.100 177.5621 6.709201 1.903480 1.889789
2002Q2 1187.7 179.800 179.6927 6.609619 1.888526 1.892500
2002Q3 1199.8 180.100 179.8336 6.671724 1.897878 1.895392
2002Q4 1204.7 181.300 181.0876 6.652583 1.895005 1.898369
2003Q1 1227.1 181.700 182.1741 6.735863 1.907446 1.901336
2003Q2 1250.3 183.800 183.6903 6.806566 1.917888 1.904195
2003Q3 1288.3 183.900 183.6280 7.015816 1.948167 1.906854
2003Q4 1297.3 185.000 184.7832 7.020659 1.948857 1.909229
2004Q1 1306.0 185.200 185.6833 7.033482 1.950682 1.911261
2004Q2 1333.2 188.000 187.8878 7.095726 1.959493 1.912916
2004Q3 1340.6 189.400 189.1198 7.088628 1.958492 1.914185
2004Q4 1360.7 190.900 190.6763 7.136177 1.965177 1.915088
2005Q1 1366.4 190.700 191.1976 7.146532 1.966627 1.915672
2005Q2 1358.2 194.600 194.4838 6.983614 1.943567 1.916017
2005Q3 1366.9 195.400 195.1109 7.005758 1.946732 1.916233
2005Q4 1375.4 199.200 198.9666 6.912718 1.933363 1.916448
2006Q1 1379.6 198.300 198.8175 6.939028 1.937162 1.916809
2006Q2 1380.9 201.500 201.3797 6.857196 1.925299 1.917474
2006Q3 1369.8 203.500 203.1990 6.741176 1.908234 1.918612
2006Q4 1370.2 201.800 201.5635 6.797856 1.916607 1.920401
2007Q1 1372.6 202.416 202.9442 6.763435 1.911531 1.923007
2007Q2 1378.1 206.686 206.5626 6.671585 1.897857 1.926597
2007Q3 1368.8 208.299 207.9909 6.581058 1.884196 1.931331
2007Q4 1379.7 208.936 208.6912 6.611204 1.888766 1.937350
2008Q1 1379.2 211.080 211.6308 6.517010 1.874416 1.944766
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS).
NOTES: Nominal seasonally adjusted end-of-quarter base money (M1) is obtained from the Fed. The
all-items all-urban-consumers US city average CPI (1982-84 = 100) is obtained from the BLS. The CPI is
seasonally adjusted by the multiplicative moving average method. M1 is deflated by the seasonally adjusted
CPI (CPI s.a.) to obtain real M1. The natural logarithm of real M1 is detrended by the HP filter.
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Table 4.8: UK taxpayers’ earnings and tax liabilities
Tax year
Earnings (£m) Tax liabilities (£m)
Tax liabilities
Earnings
Wages Dividends Wages Dividends Wages Dividends
1999-00 382,000 18,300 87,650 3,670 0.229 0.201
2000-01 431,500 20,800 98,580 3,900 0.228 0.188
2001-02 444,900 19,400 102,030 4,053 0.229 0.209
2002-03 451,600 20,800 103,900 4,330 0.230 0.208
2003-04 449,000 25,400 103,100 5,290 0.230 0.208
2004-05 496,000 32,600 113,860 6,070 0.230 0.186
2005-06 539,000 37,100 125,640 7,790 0.233 0.210
2006-07 573,000 41,500 135,370 9,000 0.236 0.217
2007-08 611,000 45,700 145,720 9,950 0.238 0.218
2008-09 n.a. n.a. 142,000 9,380 n.a. n.a.
2009-10 614,000 50,000 139,100 10,910 0.227 0.218
2010-11 616,000 36,100 138,600 7,700 0.225 0.213
Average 0.231 0.207
Standard deviation 0.0040 0.0112
Source: HM Revenue and Customs. UK taxpayers’ earnings from employment and UK dividends are
obtained from Tables 3.6 and 3.7, respectively in HM Revenue and Customs (2012b). Data for the tax
year 2008-09 is not available. Income tax liabilities on earnings and dividends are obtained from Ta-






Balanced budget tax cuts
5.1 Introduction
This chapter simulates unexpected temporary cuts in tax rates. The model is adapted for
this chapter by assuming Ωt = {Ngt+1,Mt+1, τ rnt , τwlt } is the set of exogenously determined
policy variables. Assumption 4 is made which, together with exogeneity of the money
supply, implies that the government balances its fiscal budget in every period by varying its
spending to exactly match changes in tax revenue. Within this environment, the objectives
of the chapter are to examine (i) the macroeconomic effects of tax cuts and (ii) a policy of
tax cuts against a negative liquidity shock.
The chapter is partly motivated by the following.1 In the basic Kiyotaki and Moore
(2012) model, aggregate investment is given by
It =
(rt + φtδqt)piNt + piptMt − Cit
1− θqt
which declines after a negative liquidity shock, that is, a fall in φt. KM propose a government
purchase of equity, which reduces the asset’s supply on the market, raises its price, qt, and
thereby combats its loss in re-saleability. The effects of such policy are amplified by a
portfolio balance effect which increases the price of money, pt. There is no role for fiscal
policy in the basic KM model. The thesis aims to develop such a role by introducing
1The current state of the literature also motivates this chapter; see Chapter 2.
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distortionary taxes to the model. Here, aggregate investment is given by Equation (3.59),
It =
([1− τ rnt ]rt + φtδqt)piNt + piptMt − Cit
1− θqt
Then a cut in the rate of tax on dividends, τ rnt , offsets the effect that a liquidity shock has
on investment. This chapter quantitatively examines this hypothesis. KM’s equity purchase
programme can be thought of as a direct approach to policy against a liquidity shock – the
loss in equity’s re-saleability is offset by an increase in the asset’s price. Taxation policy can
then be though of as an indirect approach – the loss in liquidity is offset by an increase in
net income.
The chapter makes three contributions to the macroeconomics literature. First, it con-
tributes to the KM-related literature by proposing a new variant of the basic KM model
– one with distortionary taxes. Second, it contributes to the KM-related literature by
proposing tax cuts to counteract a liquidity shock. Third, it contributes to the fiscal policy
literature by proposing a novel framework – a variant of the KM model, or a neoclassical
DSGE model with liquidity constraints – with which to evaluate a balanced budget fiscal
stimulus programme via tax cuts. The novelties of the first two contributions are defined
in Chapter 2 by a review of the KM-related literature; the novelty of the third contribution
is implied by the first two.
The chapter achieves its objective in three stages. The first stage simulates an exogenous
across-the-board cut in tax rates (henceforth, a “tax-shock”), that is, simultaneous negative
stochastic shocks to τwlt and τ
rn
t . The cut in τ
wl
t is normalised (that is, a 1 percentage
point rate cut) and the cut in τ rnt is re-scaled according to the ratio of standard deviations
between both tax rates (that is, a 2.8 percentage point rate cut).2 The second stage in-
dividually simulates exogenous stochastic cuts in τwlt and τ
rn
t (henceforth, a “τ
wl-shock”
and a “τ rn-shock”, respectively). The τwl-shock is a 1 percentage point cut in τwlt and
the τ rn-shock is a 2.8 percentage point cut in τ rnt . The τ
wl-shock and the τ rn-shock are
therefore decompositions of the tax-shock. The third stage simulates a negative stochastic
liquidity shock in “without policy” and “with policy” counterfactual experiments. The liq-
uidity shock is in the tradition of KM, that is, a one-period fall in the value of φt followed
by an asymptotic return to steady state. The shock is normalised to be a 1 percentage
2Specifically, a variable uτt = (στwl/στrn)u
τrn
t is defined, which has a variance of σ
2
τwl. Then a 1 unit
shock to uτwlt is also a 1 unit shock u
τ
t and therefore a (στwl/στrn)
−1 = 2.8 unit shock to uτrnt .
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point decrease in φt. The policy intervention (henceforth, “tax policy”) is a contempora-
neous 0.1 percentage point cut in τ rnt . The reason for selecting a cut in τ
rn
t as the policy
measure follows from the results of discretionary tax cuts in normal times. The size of the
tax policy is chosen to partially offset the liquidity shock, instead of overturn and replace
it, and then the dynamic benefits of tax policy can be observed as the economy adjusts to
its pre-shock steady state.3 All shocks are one-period events, and from the second quarter
they are gradually phased out with a rate of decay of 5% each period. In all experiments,
the model is calibrated with structural parameters set to baseline values that are described
in Section 4.2 and summarised in Table 4.1.
The main results of the chapter are as follows. From the tax-shock, output increases
on impact and evolves with a hump-shaped trajectory. Decomposing the tax-shock reveals
that output’s immediate increase comes from the cut in τwlt and the hump-shaped trajec-
tory comes from the cut in τ rnt . More generally, the τ
wl-shock affects the supply-side of the
economy, that is, the labour market, workers’ consumption, output, and the rate of divi-
dends; whereas the τ rn-shock affects the demand-side of the economy, that is, asset markets,
investment (and therefore capital), and entrepreneurs’ consumption and saving. The liq-
uidity shock affects the same variables as the τ rn-shock. Counteracting the liquidity shock
without unnecessary distortions to unaffected variables is best achieved with a cut in τ rnt .
Economic stimulus at any time is best achieved with an across-the-board cut in tax rates,
as this brings together the benefits of the τwl-shock and the τ rn-shock, that is, immediate
and persistent increases in output, employment, asset prices, and aggregate demand.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. For ease of reference, Section 5.2 sum-
marises the model by its equilibrium conditions. Section 5.3 describes the responses to
the tax-shock. Section 5.4 decomposes the tax-shock into the τwl-shock and the τ rn-shock.
Section 5.5 examines a negative liquidity shock without and with tax policy. Section 5.6
examines the role that the borrowing constraint, θ, plays in the transmission of tax cuts;
this role is formalised and then quantitatively demonstrated by re-simulating the tax-shock
with a higher (that is, a more relaxed) value of θ, while all other parameters, including φ,
are controlled at their baseline values. Section 5.7 summarises the chapter. Figures and
tables appear at the end of the chapter.
3The same partially-offsetting approach is taken by KM and Driffill and Miller (2013) for the same reason.
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5.2 Model summary
This section summarises the unique variant of the model by the conditions which characterise
its dynamic equilibrium. This particular variant differs from those of Chapters 6 and 7 only









t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)
Mt+1 = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt + uMt (3.31)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (3.32)
τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (3.33)
Equity market:

























[1− τ rnt+1]rt+1N st+1 + qt+1δN st+1 + pt+1Mt+1
 (3.39)
φt = (1− ρφ)φ+ ρφφt−1 + uφt (3.4)



































Cit = pi(1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtNt + [φtqt + (1− φt)qRt ]δNt + ptMt) (3.56)
Cst = (1− pi)(1− β)([1− τ rnt ]rtNt + qtδNt + ptMt) (3.57)
Cwt = (1− τwlt )wtLt (3.58)






rtKt = Yt − wtLt (3.61)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (3.62)
5.3 A tax-shock
Impulse responses to the tax-shock are illustrated in Figure 5.2 and are given numerically in
Table 5.1. The tax-shock immediately reduces the government’s tax revenue by 3.3 units of
general output ceteris paribus (as measured by the variable T ∗t ) and by 3.1 units of general
output with endogenous changes in tax bases (as measured by Tt). By assumption, the
government maintains the money supply at its steady state level and continues to hold no
entrepreneur-issued equity. The fiscal (and overall) budget (Equation (3.28)) is balanced by
reducing spending in tandem with tax revenue. Because government spending does not enter
the utility of private agents, there are no consequences for output and private spending. Tax
cuts are a one-off event, and from the second quarter tax rates start rising asymptotically
towards their pre-shock levels.
The cut in the rate of tax on wages increases the supply of labour at each and every wage
rate. Entrepreneurs expand their demand for labour and the market clears with an uptake in
employment and a lower wage rate. Given that labour demand is wage-elastic, the tax-shock
brings more aggregate gross wages to workers. Workers increase their consumption, which is
the largest component of aggregate private consumption (accounting for approximately 80%
in steady state). The wage tax base endogenously increases and thereby partially offsets
the effect of the tax rate cut on the government’s fiscal revenue.
Because of more employment, and with its other determinants unchanged, output has
a small increase. This additional general output is matched by higher aggregate demand;
as the following paragraphs explain, the tax-shock stimulates private consumption and in-
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NOTES: Money’s demand comes from entrepreneurs and its supply is fully controlled by the government.
Equity’s demand comes from savers and its supply comes from investors; Assumption 4 takes the government
out of the equity market. Net worth improvements encourage savers to increase their demand for money and







worth improvements also encourage investors to issue new equity, and consequently shift the asset’s supply
from SN0 to S
N
1 . The tightly binding borrowing constraint means that the shift in equity’s supply is small,
which then guarantees a price increase.
vestment sufficiently enough to outweigh the fall in government spending that is required
to balance the fiscal budget.
The cut in the rate of tax on dividends directly increases entrepreneurs’ net worth. Those
without investment opportunities consume and save more, with the latter being translated
into an increase in demand for both assets. Those with investment opportunities marginally
increase their consumption, and instead feed most of their net worth gains into available
investment technologies.
To fulfil new investment plans, investors issue new equity. Because of the tightly binding
borrowing constraint, investors sell a small fraction of new issues, and the rest is retained
(or “purchased”) by liquidating re-saleable equity and stocks of money. The borrowing
constraint therefore ensures that the increase in equity’s supply is small, and the asset ends
up with a higher market price.4 With no further contemporaneous changes in its market,
money also ends up with a higher price. Figure 5.1 illustrates the asset markets and the
immediate effects of the shock.
Within the immediate period of the shock, a positive amplifying feedback mechanism,
4This hypothesis is formalised and tested in Section 5.6, where it is called the “θ-equity hypothesis”.
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akin to financial acceleration of Bernanke et al. (1999), is initiated from the changes in
the asset markets – higher asset prices improve entrepreneurs’ net worth; investment in-
creases; asset demands increase; equity’s supply increases to a lesser degree; asset prices rise
again; and so on. The effects wear off with each cycle, as only part of investors’ net worth
improvements are channeled into new investment and the rest is consumed.
The steady state level of investment creates new units of capital that exactly replace
depreciated units. Since the shock increases investment above its steady state, the capital
stock has a small increase by the end of the first quarter. Investment remains above steady
state while it asymptotically converges. This allows the capital stock to continue growing
for some time. Capital’s depreciation starts to outweigh investment in the 35th quarter and
then the stock starts to decline. Capital takes a very long time to converge to its pre-shock
level; after 200 quarters it still does not get close to steady state. Investment is much quicker
to converge; it gets close to steady state in the 94th quarter.
The labour market’s long-term adjustment reflects the net result of two simultaneous
forces. First, the rising rate of tax on wages reduces labour supply towards its pre-shock
position. Second, growth in the capital stock increases entrepreneurs’ demand for labour
at each and every wage. Initially, the supply changes are stronger, and the labour market
experiences falling employment and a rising wage rate. Eventually the capital stock starts
to fall, and the labour demand changes are reversed. When this happens, the real wage
starts to fall, while employment continues falling. The wage rate exhibits a hump-shaped
trajectory which overshoots its steady level in the 10th quarter and peaks in the 45th quarter,
while employment has an asymptotic decline.
Output is initially influenced more by capital than labour, and continues increasing for
27 quarters. Eventually, output is influenced more by falling employment, and begins a
gradual asymptotic decline that does not get close to steady state by the 200th quarter.
Asset prices fall asymptotically towards steady state and are relatively quick to converge;
the price of money gets close to its pre-shock level after 49 quarters, while the price of equity
is quicker, at 36 quarters.
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5.4 Individual tax cuts: decomposing the tax-shock
Impulse responses to the τwl-shock and the τ rn-shock are illustrated with the tax-shock’s
responses superimposed in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, and are given numerically in
Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.4 compares the τwl-shock, the τ rn-shock, and the tax-shock by
their immediate and largest responses.
The cut in τwlt affects the supply-side of the economy – the real wage, employment,
output, workers’ consumption, and rate of dividends – and accounts for the entire immediate
responses of wt, Lt, Yt, C
w
t , and rt in the tax-shock. The cut in τ
rn
t affects the demand-side
of the economy – asset markets, investment (and therefore capital), and entrepreneurs’
consumption and saving – by bringing net worth improvements to entrepreneurs. In the





N st+1, and Kt+1, as well as Tt. The rest of the responses come from the cut in τ
wl
t , which
is transmitted to the demand-side of the economy by a higher rate of dividends brining net
worth improvements (from Equation (3.61)). The cut in τ rnt does not immediately affect the
supply-side of the economy, but there is a delayed impact when the increase in the capital
stock at the end of the first period causes the demand for labour to increase in the second
period.
The cut in τwlt gives output its immediate increase. But by cutting τ
wl
t alone, output
loses its hump-shaped trajectory and long-term persistence. By increasing investment and
the capital stock, the cut in τ rnt is what sustains long-term economic growth and gives
output its hump-shaped trajectory. The same can be said about employment – the cut in
τwlt produces an immediate increase and the cut in τ
rn
t stimulates persistently high labour
demand. Given that workers’ consumption is by far the largest component of aggregate
private consumption, the cut in τwlt accounts for 76% of the immediate change in Ct in the
tax-shock.
The τwl-shock is not the same as a positive shock to aggregate productivity. They are
the same in their effects on the labour market (from Equations (3.53) and (3.54)). But the
τwl-shock gives workers’ consumption an added boost by reducing the agent’s tax obligation
(from Equation (3.58)), whereas the productivity shock directly gives output an added boost
(from Equation (3.60)). Nevertheless, asset prices, consumption, investment, capital, and
output all have the same initial responses and trajectory shapes between the τwl-shock and
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a productivity shock in the basic KM model (see Figure 1 in Kiyotaki and Moore (2012),
p. 29).
The tax-shock brings together the benefits of both tax cuts, that is, it produces imme-
diate and persistent responses to both the supply and demand sides of the economy. This
makes across-the-board tax cuts a superior policy than cutting one tax rate for discretionar-
ily stimulating the economy.
5.5 A liquidity shock and tax policy
5.5.1 Without policy
Impulse responses to the liquidity shock without tax policy are illustrated by the dashed
blue lines in Figure 5.5 and are given numerically in Table 5.5. These responses are the
same as those of KM’s liquidity shock (see Figure 2 in Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), p. 31).
The liquidity shock has no immediate impact on the labour market. Consequently, there
are no changes in output, workers’ consumption, the rate of dividends, and government tax
revenue and spending. The shock lowers investment by making it more difficult for investors
to sell their existing stocks of equity; equity’s supply falls and price rises. Consequently,
there is a positive portfolio balance effect on money’s demand. Asset price increases then
lead to net worth improvements for entrepreneurs.
There is a substitution effect of the liquidity shock which outweighs the income effect
from higher net worth. The shock ruins the appeal of equity and encourages savers to
substitute the asset with money in what KM call a “flight to liquidity”. The shock makes
new investment more difficult to realise, and encourages investors to consume rather than
invest. This accounts for the fall in saving and investment in the immediate period of the
shock.
Lower investment in the immediate period of the shock reduces the capital stock at
the end of that period. In the next period, employment and output initially decline, and




Impulse responses to the liquidity shock with tax policy are illustrated by the solid red
lines in Figure 5.5 and are given numerically in Table 5.6. Section 5.4 and the previous







t , pt, and qt. This makes a cut in τ
rn
t a suitable policy for counteracting
the negative liquidity shock without unnecessary impacts on unaffected variables. The
cut in τ rnt partially offsets the loss in asset re-saleability with an increase in net worth
(from Equation (3.59)), and thus dampens the decrease in investment brought on by the
liquidity shock. Figure 5.5 shows that all the consequences of the liquidity shock described
in the previous section are smaller. The only qualitative change that tax policy brings is a
contemporaneous decrease in the size of the government. The results of this section suggest
that if the cut in τ rnt is increased sufficiently in magnitude then it can completely offset the
liquidity shock.
If, instead, the policy response is a cut in τwlt alone then the net worth improvement is
small and the offsetting effects on the liquidity shock are weaker than cutting τ rnt , although
the economy will immediately enjoy more employment and output. Alternatively, if the
policy response is the tax-shock then not only will the liquidity shock be offset, but there
will be the added benefits of immediate increases in employment and output. The cut in
τ rnt precisely targets the liquidity shock, that is, it does not unnecessarily disturb (albeit
positively) unaffected variables from their steady states.
5.6 The role of θ in the transmission of tax cuts
This section formalises and quantitatively investigates a hypothesis about the borrowing
constraint that is suggested by the results of the tax-shock. From the cut in τ rnt , in particu-
lar, entrepreneurs’ net worth improves, investment rises, and the tightness of the borrowing
constraint ensures that an increase in equity’s supply is small, which thus guarantees a rise
in the price of the asset and further net worth improvements. The hypothesis suggests that
the tighter the borrowing constraint, the smaller the increase in equity’s supply, the higher
the increases in asset prices, and the greater the increase in entrepreneurs’ net worth; and
conversely. The hypothesis is henceforth called the “θ-equity hypothesis”. At the same
time, the tighter the borrowing constraint, the lower is the level of aggregate investment,
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because external financing is more difficult to obtain; and conversely. This second hypoth-
esis is henceforth called the “θ-investment hypothesis”. Both hypotheses presuppose that θ
is a variable and subject to exogenous stochastic shocks.
The hypotheses are compensating. Their policy implication is that if a stimulus pro-
gramme is underway and involves a cut in τ rnt then a shock to θ does not significantly
interfere with the transmission of the programme. A drop in θ, for instance, at first reduces
aggregate investment (the θ-investment hypothesis), but this is compensated by greater net
worth improvements from much higher asset prices (the θ-equity hypothesis).






([1− τ rnt ]rt + φtδqt)piNt + piptMt − Cit
]
(1− θqt)2





Both hypotheses are verified by re-simulating the tax-shock with a more relaxed bor-
rowing constraint, that is, a higher value of θ, viz. 0.5055. This is the largest possible value
that allows the model to converge to a unique stable equilibrium. Such a value is chosen
for an illustrative purpose, that is, to exaggerate the difference in responses from baseline.
The rest of the model’s calibration is controlled at the baseline, including φ, which remains
at 0.185 by de-coupling its value from θ.5 Impulse responses are illustrated graphically in
Figure 5.6 with original (or “baseline”) tax-shock responses superimposed, and are given
numerically in Table 5.7.
Results support the θ-investment hypothesis – the re-simulation produces a larger im-
mediate increase in investment, by 2.33 units of general output compared to 1.88 units in
the baseline scenario. The results also support the θ-equity hypothesis – the re-simulation
produces a smaller immediate increase in equity’s price, by 2.24 units of general output com-
pared to 3.25 in the baseline. Via a portfolio balance effect, a weaker equity price increase
produces a smaller increase in demand for money relative to the baseline scenario. Conse-
quently, money’s price has an insignificantly small increase compared to a large increase of
6.63 units of general output in the baseline.
5Section 8.2 relaxes both θ and φt simultaneously for a sensitivity analysis of the model’s calibration.
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5.7 Chapter summary
This chapter simulates temporary cuts to tax rates in a unique variant of the basic model of
Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). There is a government that levies distortionary taxes on wages
and dividends, keeps money supply constant, and always balances the fiscal budget by
varying spending to match taxes. Simultaneous tax cuts produce immediate and persistent
increases in employment, consumption, investment, and output. The cut in the rate of tax
on wages is wholly responsible for the immediate supply-side responses (that is, labour and
output) and the cut in the rate of tax on dividends is mostly responsible for demand-side
responses (most notably, investment) and the long-term persistence of output. The cut in
the rate of tax on dividends is the most suitable policy for counteracting a negative liquidity
shock; the policy and the shock affect the same variables in opposite ways, and there are
no disturbances to variables that are unaffected by the shock. Intuitively, the dividend tax
cut restores entrepreneurs’ net worth that has been lost to the liquidity shock. This policy
prescription is new to the KM-related literature that examines liquidity shocks, and this is
the chapter’s main contribution to the literature. In normal times, that is, when there is
no liquidity shock, the government can achieve long and sustained economic stimulus by
cutting both tax rates.
Two hypotheses are supported by a re-simulation of the model – the tighter the bor-
rowing constraint, (i) the smaller the increase in equity’s supply, the higher the increases
in asset prices, and the greater the increase in entrepreneurs’ net worth; and (ii) the lower
the level of aggregate investment; and conversely. The hypotheses imply that if a stimulus
programme is underway involving a cut in the dividend rate of tax, then an exogenous
change in the tightness of the borrowing constraint does not significantly interfere with the
transmission of the programme.
The thesis continues in Chapter 6 by examining expansionary fiscal policy via an increase
in government spending. Then Chapter 7 returns to KM’s policy prescription of an asset
purchase programme. And Chapter 8 examines the sensitivity of the results of the tax-shock
to the model’s calibration; the analysis finds that tax-shock responses in this chapter are
qualitatively robust, but quantitatively sensitive, to a wide variety of alternative structural
parameter values, and qualitatively and quantitatively sensitive to implausibly significant
variations in the persistence of tax cuts. The conclusion of the thesis evaluates this chapter
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and proposes extensions which can be pursued as future research.
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Figure 5.2: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: baseline scenario






















































































Notes: The tax-shock is a simultaneous 1 percentage point cut in τwlt and 2.8 percentage point cut in τ
rn
t .
Horizontal axes measure quarters after the shock, starting from quarter 1. Vertical axes measure deviations
from steady state in levels. Blue dots indicate immediate responses; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A
in Table 5.1 for their values.
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Figure 5.3: Impulse responses to a τwl-shock

























































































Notes: The τwl-shock is a 1 percentage point cut in τrlt . The tax-shock responses are those from Figure 5.2,
from which the same notes apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate responses of the
tax-shock and the τwl-shock, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2,
respectively, for their values.
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Figure 5.4: Impulse responses to a τ rn-shock
























































































Notes: The τrn-shock is a 2.8 percentage point cut in τrnt . The tax-shock responses are those from Figure 5.2,
from which the same notes apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate responses of the
tax-shock and the τrn-shock, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in Table 5.1 and Table 5.3,
respectively, for their values.
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Figure 5.5: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and tax policy
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Notes: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. Tax policy is a 0.1 percentage
point cut in τrlt . The notes in Figure 5.2 apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate
responses of the liquidity shock without and with tax policy, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of
Panel A in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, respectively, for their values.
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Figure 5.6: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: relaxed θ






































































Baseline θ (= 0.185) Higher θ (= 0.5055)











Notes: The baseline scenario is from Figure 5.2, from which the same notes apply. Hollow blue dots and solid
red dots indicate immediate responses of the baseline and higher θ scenarios, respectively; see the “quarter


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.4: Impulse responses to a tax-shock, τwl-shock, and τ rn-shock: a comparison
Quarter 1 Largest
in levels in % of tax-shock
tax τwl τ rn
Shock: tax τwl τ rn τwl τ rn
Yt 1.08 1.08 0.00 100 0 1.85 1.08 1.40
It 1.88 0.26 1.62 14 86 1.88 0.26 1.62
Ct 2.29 1.74 0.55 76 24 2.29 1.74 0.97
Cwt 1.65 1.66 0.00 100 0 1.65 1.66 0.65
Cit 0.01 0.00 0.01 14 86 0.01 0.00 0.01
Cst 0.63 0.09 0.54 14 86 0.63 0.09 0.54
Nst+1 0.35 0.05 0.30 14 86 22.16 3.01 19.16
Kt+1(= Nt+1) 1.88 0.26 1.62 14 86 23.58 3.20 20.38
rt 0.03 0.03 0.00 100 0 −0.03 0.03 −0.03
wt −0.91 −0.91 0.00 100 0 0.92 −0.91 0.89
Lt 0.44 0.44 0.00 100 0 0.44 0.44 0.17
pt 6.63 0.90 5.74 14 86 6.63 0.90 5.74
qt 3.25 0.44 2.81 14 86 3.25 0.44 2.81
qRt −0.74 −0.10 −0.64 14 86 −0.74 −0.10 −0.64
Tt(= Gt) −3.09 −0.92 −2.17 30 70 −3.09 −0.92 −2.17
NOTES: See Tables 5.1 to 5.3 for the full sets of responses, from which the same notes apply.
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Table 5.5: Responses to a liquidity shock




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.11 −0.21 −0.04 −0.24 36 201
It −0.28 −0.27 −0.25 −0.21 −0.14 −0.01 −0.28 1 93
Ct 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.13 −0.02 −0.02 0.28 1 184
Cwt 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.10 −0.02 −0.11 36 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 184
Cst 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.08 −0.01 0.28 1 31
Nst+1 −0.83 −1.05 −1.45 −2.10 −3.15 −0.50 −3.43 33 201
Kt+1(= Nt+1) −0.28 −0.54 −1.01 −1.79 −3.09 −0.53 −3.50 35 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 201
wt 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.13 −0.02 −0.15 36 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.00 −0.03 36 201
pt 4.09 3.88 3.50 2.85 1.54 0.00 4.09 1 46
qt 1.35 1.29 1.17 0.96 0.54 0.01 1.35 1 52
qRt −0.31 −0.29 −0.26 −0.22 −0.12 0.00 −0.31 1 52
Tt(= Gt) 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.01 −0.05 36 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without
tax policy. The notes in Table 5.1 apply.
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Table 5.6: Responses to a liquidity shock with tax policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.02 −0.04 −0.09 −0.17 −0.03 −0.19 36 201
It −0.22 −0.21 −0.20 −0.17 −0.11 0.00 −0.22 1 93
Ct 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.16 0.01 −0.02 0.30 1 161
Cwt 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.08 −0.01 −0.09 36 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 161
Cst 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.30 1 34
Nst+1 −0.82 −0.99 −1.29 −1.77 −2.56 −0.40 −2.75 32 201
Kt+1(= Nt+1) −0.22 −0.43 −0.80 −1.42 −2.45 −0.42 −2.78 35 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 201
wt 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.06 −0.11 −0.02 −0.12 36 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.02 36 201
pt 4.29 4.08 3.68 2.99 1.61 0.00 4.29 1 46
qt 1.45 1.38 1.25 1.03 0.57 0.00 1.45 1 50
qRt −0.33 −0.31 −0.28 −0.23 −0.13 0.00 −0.33 1 50
Tt(= Gt) −0.08 −0.08 −0.08 −0.07 −0.07 −0.01 −0.08 1 187
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. Tax policy is a 0.1 percentage

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































An increase in government
spending
6.1 Introduction
This chapter simulates an unexpected temporary increase in government spending. The sim-
ulation is performed repeatedly in adaptations of the model in which the government finances
its spending in different ways. Three methods of financing are studied – varying tax rates,
selling stocks of entrepreneur-issued equity, and issuing money (henceforth, “T -financing”,
“Ng-financing”, and “M -financing”, respectively). With each variant of the model, that
is, with each financing arrangement, the increase in government spending is simulated on
its own, to represent a discretionary stimulus programme in normal times (henceforth, a
“G-shock”), and then contemporaneously alongside a temporary negative liquidity shock,
to represent policy intervention (henceforth, “G-policy”). The objectives of this chapter are
to examine (i) the macroeconomic effects of a G-shock, and (ii) the effectiveness G-policy
against a liquidity shock, both under alternative financing arrangements.
The chapter achieves its objectives by first defining Ω in different ways. The various
definitions create alternative endogenous mechanisms by which government spending is fi-
nanced, and thus gives rise to the variants of the model within the chapter. For ease of
reference, each model variant is described as a modification the model in Chapter 5 (hence-
forth, the “benchmark model”). The variants in this chapter and Chapter 5 differ only by
the behaviour of the government. Within each variant, there are simulations of a G-shock,
a liquidity shock, and a liquidity shock with contemporaneous G-policy. The G-shock is
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normalised to be an increase in government spending, Gt, by 1 unit of general output. The
liquidity shock is normalised to be a 1 percentage point decrease (that is, tightening) in
the re-saleability constraint, φt. And G-policy is an increase in government spending by 0.1
units of general output. The size of the G-policy is chosen to partially offset the liquidity
shock, instead of overturn and replace it, and then the dynamic benefits of policy can be
observed as the economy adjusts to its pre-shock steady state. All shocks are one-period
events, and from the second quarter they are gradually phased out with a rate of decay of
5% each period. The model is calibrated throughout the chapter with structural parameters
set to baseline values (which are summarised in Table 4.1).
The chapter is motivated by Chapter 5 and Kara and Sin (2014) (henceforth, KS).
Chapter 5 is the first step towards developing fiscal policy in the basic KM model, and
it focuses on taxation policy. This chapter expands that research agenda. The thesis
is not the first study of fiscal policy in the KM-related literature, but it is the first to
do so within the branch of the literature that modifies the KM model. KS is the first
quantitative and dedicated study of fiscal policy in the KM-related literature. They modify
the model of Del Negro et al. (2011) and study a bond-financed increase in government
spending, both on its own and against a liquidity shock. Their bonds take on the same
role that money plays in this model. KS is therefore the New Keynesian equivalent of this
chapter’s M -financing experiment. This chapter complements and expands the work of KS
by, respectively, studying the same issues from the perspective of an alternative (neoclassical)
framework, and proposing alternative methods to finance government spending (that is, by
taxes and selling equity).
In this chapter, M -financing the G-shock and G-policy does not allow the model to
re-converge to equilibrium. However, the success of KS in simulating the same experiment
suggests that sticky prices may solve the problem. The T -financed G-shock causes con-
sumption and investment to fall, and (contrary to KS) causes employment and output to
fall, and all these response are persistent. The Ng-financed G-shock has similar impacts,
although employment and output fall from the second period and all the responses are oscil-
lating and highly persistent. A liquidity shock in the T -financing variant causes investment,
employment, and output to fall, but (contrary to KS) causes consumption to rise. In the
Ng-financing variant, the liquidity shock immediately reduces consumption and investment,
and reduces employment and output after a one-period delay. Finally (and contrary to KS),
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G-policy exacerbates the liquidity shock in the chapter’s successful simulations. Govern-
ment spending does not enter the utility of private agents, and more of it therefore has no
direct impact on private spending and output. Financing this spending, whether by taxes
or equity, is what brings these adverse consequences to G-shocks and G-policies. The results
of this chapter support the use of balanced budget tax cuts in this model for both economic
stimulus in normal times and counteracting liquidity shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Each of the next three sections simulates
a G-shock, a liquidity shock, and a liquidity shock with contemporaneous G-policy. The
government finances its increase in spending by varying tax rates in Section 6.2, by selling
its stocks of entrepreneur-issued equity in Section 6.3, and by issuing money in Section 6.4.
Section 6.5 summarises the chapter and relates the results with KS. Figures and tables
appear at the end of the chapter.
6.2 Financing with taxes
In this section, the government finances its increase in spending by endogenously varying
tax rates to raise more tax revenue, while its equity holdings and the money supply are
exogenously determined and unchanged. The benchmark model is modified by (i) including
the AR(1) process (3.29) for Gt, (ii) excluding the AR(1) processes (3.32) and (3.33) for
τ rnt and τ
wl
t , respectively, and (iii) including rule (3.34) which holds the ratio of the rate
of tax on wages to aggregate taxes constant to its steady state level. Accordingly, the set
of exogenously determined policy variables is Ωt = {Gt, Ngt+1,Mt+1}. The government’s
behaviour is summarised by the following equilibrium conditions.
Tt = τ
rn





t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)








The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised in
Section 5.2. Assumption 4 is made, and the government therefore balances its fiscal budget
(Tt−Gt) in steady state and in every period. This section therefore presents the converse of
the tax-shock in Chapter 5. However, the G-policy against a liquidity shock involves both
tax rates adjusting, and is therefore not the converse of tax policy in Chapter 5 in which only
τ rnt is cut. Impulse responses to the T -financed G-shock are illustrated in Figure 6.3 and are
given numerically in Table 6.1. Impulse responses to the liquidity shock without and with
T -financed G-policy, respectively, are illustrated in Figure 6.4 and are given numerically in
Tables 6.2 and 6.3.
6.2.1 A T -financed G-shock
The G-shock requires the government to increase tax revenues by 1 unit of general output
in order to balance its fiscal budget (Equation (3.28)). This requirement is first achieved by
raising the tax rate on wages. Workers respond by decreasing their labour supply at each
and every wage, and the labour market adjusts to a higher wage rate and lower employ-
ment. Since labour demand is wage-elastic (see Appendix 3.H) then workers earn a smaller
aggregate gross wage. Being non-Ricardian, they reduce their consumption. The erosion of
the tax base from wages is small, and does not overturn the effects of a higher tax rate. The
capital stock used in current production is determined before the G-shock hits, and so the
fall in employment achieves a reduction in output.
Rule (3.34) together with the fall in gross wages implies an increase in the tax rate
on dividends. As a direct result, entrepreneurs’ net worth deteriorates, which then causes
reductions in private consumption, saving, and investment. These changes have impacts
on the asset markets, which Figure 6.1 illustrates. The fall in saving reduces asset de-
mands while the fall in investment reduces equity’s supply. The tightly binding borrowing
constraint maintains that changes in equity’s supply are a small fraction of changes in in-
vestment, whether these changes are positive or negative. The equity market ends up with
a lower price, which, along with a lower price for money, further reduces entrepreneurs’ net
worth. Thus begins a financial accelerator feedback loop within the first quarter – net worth
deteriorations lead to declines in private spending and saving, then asset prices fall and en-
trepreneurs’ net worth to deteriorate, and so on. With each loop the effects get smaller,
since part of net worth deteriorations are passed on as reductions in consumption, which
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NOTES: Money’s demand comes from entrepreneurs and its supply is fully controlled by the government.
Equity’s demand comes from savers and its supply comes from investors. A fall in saving is represented by






1 , respectively. A
fall in investment is represented by a small leftward shift in equity’s supply from SN0 to S
N
1 . Money’s price
falls from p0 to p1, and equity’s price falls from q0 to q1.
has no direct impact on asset prices.
As the shock wares off, government spending falls asymptotically towards steady state.
Consequently, aggregate taxes and tax rates gradually decline and the responses seen in the
first quarter are reversed in the second quarter, many of them almost completely so. Output
converges very slowly towards steady state and exhibits a gentle hump-shaped trajectory.
This happens because employment and capital move in opposite directions for some time.
The gradual decline of the tax rate on wages makes employment rise asymptotically. Capital
initially falls because investment remains below steady state, and it eventually rises when
its depreciation is small enough to be covered by investment.
6.2.2 A liquidity shock and T -financed G-policy
Without policy
A negative liquidity shock produces the same immediate responses as in the baseline model.
The liquidity shock has no impact on the labour market, and therefore on output, the rate
of dividends, tax rates, and government tax revenue. The shock has an adverse effect on
investment by making it more difficult to internally finance. This decreases equity’s supply
and thereby raises the price of the asset. Money’s demand increases, via a portfolio balance
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effect, which raises its price. Entrepreneurs’ net worth then sufficiently improves, and they
increase their consumption rather than investment and saving, given the greater difficulty
in financing investment and a loss in appeal for equity as a saving instrument.
The effects of the liquidity shock are highly persistent. All variables except asset prices
return close to their steady states some time after 200 quarters; asset prices do so after
47 quarters. From the second quarter, the effects of lower investment start to be felt
economy-wide. Labour’s demand decreases, the capital stock suffers a net depreciation,
and output declines. The tax rate on dividends endogenously rises to compensate for the
declining equity stock, and this puts further downward pressure on entrepreneurs’ net worth.
With policy
The negative liquidity shock is exacerbated by T -financed G-policy intervention. While
the liquidity shock does not interfere with the labour market, the financing of G-policy
increases the rate of tax on wages and decreases labour’s supply at each and every wage.
Employment falls, the wage rate rises, aggregate gross wages fall, and workers reduce their
consumption. The liquidity shock on its own reduces entrepreneurs’ net worth. Financing
the G-policy also requires a hike in the dividend tax rate. This brings further reductions in
net worth. Consequently, entrepreneurs’ consumption, investment, and saving are all lower
with G-policy than without. On a somewhat positive note, for variables that are affected
by the liquidity shock, G-policy does not alter the shape of their trajectories.
6.3 Financing with equity
In this section, the government finances its increase in spending by selling some of its equity
holdings, while the money supply and tax rates are exogenously determined and unchanged.
The benchmark model is modified by (i) including the AR(1) process (3.29) for Gt, and (ii)
excluding the AR(1) process (3.30) for Ngt+1. Accordingly, the set of exogenously determined
policy variables is Ωt = {Gt,Mt+1, τ rnt , τwlt }. The government’s behaviour is summarised by
the following equilibrium conditions.
Tt = τ
rn





t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
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Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)
Mt+1 = (1− ρM )M + ρMMt + uMt (3.31)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (3.32)
τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (3.33)
The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised in
Section 5.2. Ngt+1 is endogenously determined, so Assumption 4 is not made. In steady state,
the fiscal balance is in deficit, but the government holds a large quantity of equity (16.8
units) which earns dividends that amount to the deficit and thus balances Equation (3.28).
The value of the re-saleable portion of government equity holdings is greater than the size
of the G-shock, so Assumption 3 is not made.
Impulse responses to the Ng-financed G-shock are illustrated in Figures 6.5 and 6.6
and are given numerically in Table 6.4. Impulse responses to the liquidity shock without
and with Ng-financed G-policy, respectively, are illustrated in Figure 6.7 and are given
numerically in Figure 6.7 and Table 6.5.
6.3.1 An N g-financed G-shock
The labour market is immediately unaffected by the G-shock. Consequently, there are no
immediate changes in output, workers’ consumption, the rate of dividends, and taxes. The
shock therefore expands the fiscal deficit, which the government finances by selling part of
its equity stock. Figure 6.2 illustrates the changes in the asset markets in the immediate
period of the G-shock. The government’s sale lowers the price of equity, and via a portfolio
balance effect, the demand and price of money both decrease. These asset price declines
are the source of the adverse effects of the Ng-financed G-shock. Entrepreneurs’ net worth
falls, and with it investment, saving, and private consumption. Then there are further
downward pressures on asset prices. The fall in saving represents a decrease in demand
for both assets. The fall in investment represents a decrease in equity’s supply, which the
borrowing constraint ensures is small and thus leaves the asset with a lower price.1
The capital stock decreases by the end of the first quarter after investment falls below
steady state. Entrepreneurs respond by optimally lowering their demand for labour, and
1This hypothesis about the borrowing constraint is formalised and tested in Section 5.6, where it is called
the “θ-equity hypothesis”.
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they produce a smaller quantity of general output. Workers earn lower aggregate gross
wages, and therefore reduce their consumption. These changes are very small, and they
generate a very small decline in government tax revenues, by 0.02 units of general output.
Meanwhile, by assumption, government spending falls by 0.05 units in its asymptotic decline
to steady state. The fiscal account records a small surplus, and given that tax rates and
money supply are exogenously determined and fixed, the government uses the surplus to
buy equity. The quantity of equity that the fiscal surplus can afford is not enough to replace
depreciation, and so the government’s equity stock falls at the end of the second quarter.
But the government’s purchase turns the asset markets’ responses around – equity’s supply
decreases, its price rises, and money’s demand and price both rise. Entrepreneurs enjoy net
worth improvements, which lead to more investment, saving, and consumption. And the
borrowing constraint ensures any investment-induced increase in equity’s supply is small
and thus preserves the price drop.
The second quarter’s increase in investment is not sufficient to replace all of capital’s
depreciation for that period, and the capital stock falls again in the third quarter. The
responses seen in the second quarter are repeated in the third and subsequent quarters, but
as time passes they get smaller. In the 24th quarter the government’s equity stock reaches
a level such that purchases funded by fiscal surplus start to outweigh depreciation, and the
stock then starts to grow. In the 44th quarter the aggregate capital stock starts to grow
as depreciation is outweighed by investment; this is when the economy’s responses turn
around. The impact is first felt in the labour market – entrepreneurs increase their demand
for labour and agree to a higher wage rate. Then, with more gross wages being paid out,
taxes increase. In the meantime, government spending is asymptotically falling. The fiscal
surplus, and hence government equity purchases, start to increase rapidly, and equity’s price
starts to fall. Eventually money’s price falls, and the economy returns to the same type of
trajectory seen just after the shock.
The economy oscillates like this for a very long time.2 Figure 6.6 gives impulse responses
over a very long time to illustrate these oscillations. The amplitude gets smaller with each
cycle, and eventually the economy converges to steady state. Oscillations are fuelled by
government fiscal imbalances which are used to buy equity and thus interfere with asset
2Oscillations happen because there are complex eigenvalues with negative real parts in the Blanchard and
Kahn (1980) canonical form of the model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)).
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NOTES: Money’s demand comes from entrepreneurs and its supply is fully controlled by the government.
Equity’s demand comes from savers and its supply comes from investors. The government’s equity sale shifts
supply rightwards from SN0 to S
N
0.5. The portfolio balance effect shifts money’s demand leftwards from D
M
0 ;
net worth deteriorations take it further leftwards to DM1 . Net worth deteriorations also produce leftwards
shifts in equity’s demand from DN0 to D
N




1 ; the borrowing constraint
guarantees the size of the supply shift is small. At the end of the first quarter, equity’s price falls from q0 to
q1 and money’s price falls from p0 to p1.
prices and financial acceleration in the model.3
6.3.2 A liquidity shock and N g-financed G-policy
Without policy
As with the Ng-financed G-shock, the liquidity shock produces a highly persistent and
oscillating adjustment to steady state. Attention here is given to immediate responses,
and long-term oscillating impulse responses are not graphically illustrated. The liquidity
shock has no immediate impact on the labour market, and therefore on output, workers’
consumption, the rate of dividends, and taxes. The shock reduces investment by making
financing more difficult. Equity’s supply falls, and money’s price increases by a portfolio
balance effect. Accordingly, entrepreneurs’ net worth improves.
So far, the effects of the liquidity shock in this variant of the model are the same as
in the T -financed G-shock and the tax-shock. However, the government in this framework
varies its equity holdings, and this causes the responses to be qualitatively different from
3Samuelson (1937) explains such oscillation by a multiplier-accelerator interaction in a simple Keynesian
framework.
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other liquidity shocks in the thesis so far. With higher asset prices, the government’s as-
set portfolio increases in value, and it sells part of its equity stock to balance its overall
budget constraint (Equation (3.28)). The sale is sufficient to leave the asset with a lower
price, which causes money’s price to fall and entrepreneurs’ net worth to deteriorate. Nev-
ertheless, entrepreneurs invest more; this is a residual effect from lowering consumption
(from Equation (3.59)) that is, a small amount of net worth is left over and channelled into
investment.
With policy
Ng-financed G-policy exacerbates the effects of the liquidity shock. The government con-
temporaneously increases its spending by 0.1 units of general output, which it finances by
selling 0.07 units of equity. The equity sale is what produces the undesired consequences
of G-policy. It adds to supply on the market and aggravates equity’s price decline due to
the liquidity shock. By a portfolio balance effect, money’s price falls below that of the
no-policy scenario. This is the source of divergence between the policy and no-policy sce-
narios. G-policy deepens entrepreneurs’ net worth deteriorations and causes a small drop
in investment, compared to a small increase with no intervention.
Besides investment, no other variable experiences a qualitative change with G-policy
in the immediate period of the liquidity shock. However, G-policy changes the short-term
direction in subsequent periods for output, workers’ and aggregate consumption, capital,
employment, the real wage, and the rate of dividends.
In the second period, the capital stock falls, leading to a short-term contraction in output
(as opposed to both variables increasing without policy). Investment remains below steady
state in the short-term while it recovers, and this leads to continued declines in the capital
stock and output. Meanwhile, workers face falling demand for their labour, on account of
the capital stock, and they experience lower levels of employment and wage rates. And
because of workers, aggregate private consumption falls.
6.4 Financing with money
In this section, the government finances its increase in spending by issuing money, while its
equity holdings and tax rates are exogenously determined and unchanged. The benchmark
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model is modified by (i) including the AR(1) process (3.29) for Gt, and (ii) excluding the
AR(1) process (3.31) for Mt+1. Accordingly, the set of exogenously determined policy









t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (3.32)
τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (3.33)
The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised in
Section 5.2. Assumption 4 is made and the government balances its fiscal budget (Tt −Gt)
in steady state.
Once disturbed by the M -financed G-shock, the model becomes unstable and does not
re-converge to steady state. This result is robust to the calibration of structural parameters.4
With tax rates assumed constant, the G-shock does not affect the labour market (from
Equations (3.53) and (3.54)). Consequently, output, dividends, and aggregate taxes are all
unchanged (from Equations (3.27), (3.60) and (3.61)). Money is then the only policy variable
that responds to the shock. General equilibrium cannot be achieved because Equation (3.28)
says that the government values its assets ex post to the shock, and it implies a collinear






whereM2 is the stock of money at the end of period 1, and 1/p1 is the quantity of money the
government must contemporaneously issue in order to consume 1 unit of general output. One
possible solution is to enforce an ex ante valuation of assets; this can be achieved by either
4Attempts to simulate the M -financed G-shock fails with 311,040 combinations of parameter values from
θ ∈ {0.185, 0.11, 0.2}, β ∈ {0.99, 0.95, 0.975, 0.98, 0.995}, γ ∈ {0.4, 0.3, 0.35, 0.375, 0.425, 0.45, 0.475}, δ ∈
{0.975, 0.925, 0.95, 0.98, 0.99}, pi ∈ {0.05, 0.03, 0.04, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08}, ν ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.9, 1.1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4}, and ω ∈
{4.01, 3, 3.5, 4.5, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The lack of convergence also holds if terms that have third and higher order effects
on the model’s solution are excluded (using the pruning algorithm of Kim et al. (2008)) and if the model is
approximated by a first order Taylor series expansion.
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fixing or pre-determining prices in the government’s budget constraint (Equation (3.28)).
An alternative solution is to elsewhere determine a target for money supply, perhaps by rule
(3.35) for money supply growth.
These solutions are not explored in this chapter. Chapter 7 has the same convergence
problem, and there the solution of a monetary rule is examined. KS already show that
fixing prices is s valid solution. Their work is the New Keynesian equivalent of this section,
with their government-issued bonds taking on the role of money. A G-shock in KS causes
consumption and investment to immediately fall, and employment and output to immedi-
ately rise. However, because asset prices are not available to transmit the shock into net
worth improvements and thereby fuel financial acceleration, the KS model quickly returns
to steady state. KS also simulate G-policy, and they find that it ameliorates the effects
of a negative liquidity shock, which are immediate declines in consumption, investment,
employment, and output.
6.5 Chapter summary
This chapter successfully simulates an exogenous increase in government spending in two
variants of the model which differ by the way such spending is financed. In both variants,
the spending increase is first simulated on its own, and then contemporaneously alongside
an exogenous tightening of private liquidity.
In the first model variant, the government raises tax rates to balance its fiscal budget.
A G-shock lowers consumption, investment, employment, and output, and the effects are
persistent. This experiment and its results are the converse of the tax-shock in Chapter 5.
A liquidity shock causes consumption to increase, investment to fall, and employment and
output to decline from the second period. G-policy exacerbates the liquidity shock – the
increase in consumption is smaller, the fall in investment is greater, and employment and
output now decline on impact. Since G-policy changes both tax rates then it is not the
converse of tax policy in Chapter 5 which changes only τ rnt .
In the second model variant, the government sells part of its equity stock to finance the
fiscal deficit. The G-shock causes consumption and investment to immediately fall, and em-
ployment and output to fall from the second period. But the economy oscillates over a very
long period of time as it converges towards steady state. Oscillations are fuelled by fiscal
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imbalances that require the government to buy and sell equity and thus interfere with asset
prices and the financial accelerator. A liquidity shock also produces oscillating responses;
consumption falls and investment rises in the immediate period – which are different re-
sponses to liquidity shocks seen in the thesis so far – and employment and output rise from
the second quarter. G-policy exacerbates the liquidity shock – the fall in consumption is
greater, investment now declines, and employment and output now fall in the second period.
The chapter tries, but fails, to simulate the government financing its spending by mon-
etary expansion. With sticky prices, Kara and Sin (2014) successfully perform such an
experiment in a New Keynesian DSGE model. Their G-shock reduces consumption and
investment and increases employment and output, and their G-policy ameliorates a liq-
uidity shock. Their responses, however, are short-lived, because sticky prices stifle private
net worth improvements which can lead to more investment, consumption, and future out-
put. The results of KS and this chapter together suggest that asset price fluctuations are
important for the transmission, amplification, and persistence of shocks.
In summary, because an increase in government spending does not alter private agents
utility, then the financing side of G-shocks and G-policies bring harmful effects to the model.
The conclusion of the thesis evaluates this chapter and proposes worthwhile extensions for
future research. Most notably, the conclusion recommends modifying the role of government
spending so that it has direct impacts on private agents’ behaviour. The next chapter takes
a different approach to policy by studying a government purchase of equity, much like the
unconventional types of monetary policies that were implemented (in the US and UK, for
example) during the 2008 financial crisis.
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Figure 6.3: Impulse responses to a T -financed G-shock
































































































NOTES: Horizontal axes measure quarters after the shock, starting from quarter 1. Vertical axes measure
deviations from steady state. Blue dots indicate immediate responses; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel
A in Table 6.1 for their values.
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Figure 6.4: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and T -financed G-policy
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Notes: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. G-policy is a 0.1 unit increase
in Gt. The notes in Figure 6.3 apply. See the “quarter 1” column of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for the values of
immediate responses without and with G-policy, respectively.
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Figure 6.5: Impulse responses to an Ng-financed G-shock



























































































NOTES: The notes in Figure 6.3 apply. See the “quarter 1” column of Table 6.4 for the values of immediate
responses.
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NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 6.5 to 2000 quarters after the G-shock. The same notes apply.
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Figure 6.7: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and Ng-financed G-policy
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Notes: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. G-policy is a 0.1 unit increase
in Gt. The notes in Figure 6.3 apply. See the “quarter 1” column of Tables 6.5 and 6.6 for the values of
immediate responses without and with G-policy, respectively.
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Table 6.1: Impulse responses to a T -financed G-shock




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt −0.58 −0.59 −0.60 −0.62 −0.66 −0.62 −0.69 51 201
It −0.52 −0.51 −0.48 −0.44 −0.35 −0.22 −0.52 1 201
Ct −1.06 −1.03 −0.97 −0.88 −0.69 −0.40 −1.06 1 201
Cwt −0.89 −0.86 −0.81 −0.72 −0.54 −0.28 −0.89 1 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 72 201
Cst −0.16 −0.16 −0.16 −0.15 −0.14 −0.11 −0.16 1 201
Nst+1 −0.10 −0.19 −0.39 −0.76 −1.81 −4.94 −5.04 148 201
Nt+1 −0.52 −1.02 −1.94 −3.51 −6.65 −8.93 −9.75 81 201
Kt+1 −0.52 −1.02 −1.94 −3.51 −6.65 −8.93 −9.75 81 201
rt −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01 1 201
wt 0.49 0.44 0.36 0.21 −0.10 −0.39 0.49 1 201
Lt −0.24 −0.23 −0.21 −0.19 −0.14 −0.08 −0.24 1 201
pt −2.12 −2.05 −1.92 −1.71 −1.27 −0.65 −2.12 1 201
qt −0.79 −0.75 −0.68 −0.55 −0.30 0.00 −0.79 1 46
qRt 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.18 1 46
Tt 1.00 0.95 0.86 0.70 0.38 0.00 1.00 1 46
τwlt 0.54 0.51 0.46 0.38 0.20 0.00 0.54 1 46
τ rnt 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.52 0.38 0.18 0.66 1 201
NOTES: Panel A gives deviations from steady state in levels. Panel B gives the time at which the absolute
largest impulse response occurs, and the convergence indicator which is described in Section 4.4.2.
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Table 6.2: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock: T -financed model variant




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.02 −0.06 −0.12 −0.24 −0.33 −0.37 82 201
It −0.28 −0.28 −0.26 −0.24 −0.19 −0.12 −0.28 1 201
Ct 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.12 −0.05 −0.22 0.28 1 201
Cwt 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.11 −0.15 −0.17 82 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92 201
Cst 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.06 −0.06 0.28 1 201
Nst+1 −0.83 −1.60 −2.98 −5.17 −8.57 −2.87 −9.25 31 201
Nt+1 −0.28 −0.55 −1.05 −1.90 −3.60 −4.84 −5.29 81 201
Kt+1 −0.28 −0.55 −1.05 −1.90 −3.60 −4.84 −5.29 81 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 82 201
wt 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 −0.08 −0.15 −0.21 −0.23 82 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 82 201
pt 3.86 3.65 3.25 2.57 1.20 −0.35 3.86 1 34
qt 1.42 1.35 1.22 0.99 0.54 0.00 1.42 1 47
qRt −0.32 −0.31 −0.28 −0.23 −0.12 0.00 −0.32 1 47
Tt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 101 201
τwlt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 201
τ rnt 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.11 82 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without
G-policy. The notes in Table 6.1 apply.
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Table 6.3: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock with T -financed G-policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt −0.06 −0.08 −0.12 −0.18 −0.31 −0.40 −0.43 79 201
It −0.34 −0.33 −0.31 −0.28 −0.23 −0.14 −0.34 1 201
Ct 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.03 −0.12 −0.26 −0.28 91 201
Cwt −0.09 −0.10 −0.11 −0.13 −0.17 −0.18 −0.20 71 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89 201
Cst 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.05 −0.07 0.26 1 201
Nst+1 −0.84 −1.62 −3.02 −5.25 −8.75 −3.37 −9.52 32 201
Nt+1 −0.34 −0.65 −1.24 −2.25 −4.27 −5.73 −6.26 81 201
Kt+1 −0.34 −0.65 −1.24 −2.25 −4.27 −5.73 −6.26 81 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 85 201
wt 0.05 0.03 0.00 −0.05 −0.16 −0.25 −0.27 85 201
Lt −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.05 −0.05 71 201
pt 3.65 3.44 3.06 2.40 1.07 −0.42 3.65 1 201
qt 1.34 1.27 1.15 0.94 0.51 0.00 1.34 1 47
qRt −0.30 −0.29 −0.26 −0.21 −0.12 0.00 −0.30 1 47
Tt 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.10 1 46
τwlt 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.05 1 46
τ rnt 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.13 69 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. G-policy is a 0.1 unit
increase in Gt. The notes in Table 6.1 apply.
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Table 6.4: Impulse responses to an Ng-financed G-shock
Quarter: 1 2 4 8 20 200 largest
Yt 0.00 −0.05 −0.15 −0.31 −0.61 0.38 −0.77
It −0.90 −0.87 −0.82 −0.73 −0.54 0.29 −0.90
Ct −0.10 −0.13 −0.19 −0.27 −0.45 0.08 −0.55
Cwt 0.00 −0.03 −0.08 −0.17 −0.33 0.20 −0.42
Cit −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
Cst −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.11 −0.11 −0.15
Nst+1 0.51 0.29 −0.16 −1.03 −3.51 −19.52 −19.97
Nt+1 −0.21 −0.43 −0.85 −1.69 −4.10 −20.08 −20.61
Kt+1 −0.90 −1.74 −3.30 −5.91 −10.82 6.64 −13.35
rt 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 −0.02 0.04
wt 0.00 −0.04 −0.12 −0.25 −0.50 0.31 −0.64
Lt 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.08 0.05 −0.11
pt −7.54 −7.27 −6.77 −5.88 −3.89 4.64 −7.54
qt −0.56 −0.52 −0.44 −0.31 −0.06 −0.21 −0.56
qRt 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.13
Ngt+1 −0.68 −1.31 −2.44 −4.23 −6.72 26.72 26.72
Tt 0.00 −0.02 −0.04 −0.09 −0.19 −0.09 −0.29
NOTES: The notes in Table 6.1 apply.
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Table 6.5: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock: Ng-financed model variant




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.24 0.24 182 201
It 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.11 143 201
Ct −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0.14 0.14 200 201
Cwt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.13 182 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 201
Cst −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 0.01 −0.03 31 201
Nst+1 0.09 −0.19 −0.70 −1.59 −3.37 −0.94 −4.95 61 201
Nt+1 −0.28 −0.55 −1.05 −1.90 −3.62 −0.89 −5.11 60 201
Kt+1 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.24 0.64 4.16 4.21 181 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 182 201
wt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.20 182 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 182 201
pt −4.62 −4.33 −3.80 −2.89 −1.02 0.85 −4.62 1 201
qt −0.83 −0.79 −0.71 −0.59 −0.34 −0.07 −0.83 1 78
qRt 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.19 1 78
Ngt+1 0.31 0.61 1.16 2.14 4.26 5.05 7.73 99 201
Tt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.05 0.05 200 201
The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without G-policy.
The notes in Table 6.1 apply.
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Table 6.6: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock with Ng-financed G-policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 0.28 0.28 200 201
It −0.06 −0.06 −0.05 −0.04 0.00 0.13 0.13 182 201
Ct −0.04 −0.04 −0.05 −0.05 −0.06 0.15 0.15 200 201
Cwt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.15 0.15 200 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 201
Cst −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 0.00 −0.04 37 189
Nst+1 0.14 −0.16 −0.72 −1.69 −3.72 −2.89 −6.15 79 201
Nt+1 −0.30 −0.59 −1.13 −2.07 −4.03 −2.90 −6.35 77 201
Kt+1 −0.06 −0.12 −0.22 −0.35 −0.45 4.82 4.82 200 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 200 201
wt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.23 0.23 200 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 200 201
pt −5.37 −5.06 −4.48 −3.48 −1.41 1.32 −5.37 1 201
qt −0.88 −0.84 −0.76 −0.62 −0.35 −0.09 −0.88 1 201
qRt 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.20 1 201
Ngt+1 0.24 0.47 0.92 1.72 3.59 7.73 9.02 136 201
Tt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 0.04 −0.05 40 201
The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. G-policy is a 0.1 unit increase in Gt.
The notes in Table 6.1 apply.
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Table 6.7: Immediate impulse responses to G-shocks, liquidity shocks, and G-policies: a compari-









Yt −0.58 0.00 −0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
It −0.52 −0.28 −0.34 −0.90 0.03 −0.06
Ct −1.06 0.28 0.18 −0.10 −0.03 −0.04
Cwt −0.89 0.00 −0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00
Cst −0.16 0.28 0.26 −0.10 −0.02 −0.03
Nst+1 −0.10 −0.83 −0.84 0.51 0.09 0.14
Nt+1 −0.52 −0.28 −0.34 −0.21 −0.28 −0.30
Kt+1 −0.52 −0.28 −0.34 −0.90 0.03 −0.06
rt −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
wt 0.49 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lt −0.24 0.00 −0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
pt −2.12 3.86 3.65 −7.54 −4.62 −5.37
qt −0.79 1.42 1.34 −0.56 −0.83 −0.88
qRt 0.18 −0.32 −0.30 0.13 0.19 0.20
Ngt+1 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.68 0.31 0.24
Mt+1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gt 1.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 0.00 0.10
Tt 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
τwlt 0.54 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
τ rnt 0.66 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00






“. . . precisely because of its novelty and the fact that its creation was due to
a practical response to circumstances rather than driven by intellectual develop-
ments, we lack a clear agreed framework on how unconventional monetary policy
impacts the economy.”
– Joyce et al. (2012), p. F275.
“Recent research has focused on versions of the New Keynesian model that explic-
itly incorporate financial intermediation and could thus rationalise quantitative
measures taken by central banks since the beginning of the crisis. . . . [Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2011)] is an important step forward in terms of realism, but it is still
unsatisfactory . . . liquidity (“money”) still does not play a role in this model,
whereas the provision of liquidity by the central bank plays a crucial role in a
financial crisis. . . .A good starting point for the explicit modelling of liquidity –
surely a crucial element – in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model
of the business cycle is Kiyotaki and Moore (2012).”
– Zampolli (2012), p. 106.
This chapter simulates an unexpected temporary increase in government holdings of
entrepreneur-issued equity. The simulation is performed repeatedly in adaptations of the
model in which the government finances the equity purchase in different ways. Five such
financing arrangements are examined – issuing money (M -financing), cutting government
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Table 7.1: Large-scale asset purchase programmes: a comparison of concepts
Programme Assets bought Assets sold/issued
Change in size of
central bank bal-
ance sheet?
Operation Twist long-term short-term No
Qualitative Easing less liquid, more risky more liquid, less risky No
Quantitative Easing any money Yes
Credit Easing privately-issued money Yes
spending (G-financing), issuing money and cutting government spending (GM -financing),
raising taxes (T -financing), and issuing money and raising taxes (TM -financing). With
each variant of the model, that is, with each financing arrangement, the government’s eq-
uity purchase is simulated on its own, to represent discretionary policy in normal times
(henceforth, an “Ng-shock”), and then contemporaneously alongside a temporary negative
liquidity shock, to represent policy intervention (henceforth, “Ng-policy”). The objectives of
this chapter are to examine (i) the model’s responses to an Ng-shock, and (ii) the effective-
ness of Ng-policy against a liquidity shock, both under alternative financing arrangements.
The Ng-shock and Ng-policy are representative of large-scale asset purchase (LSAP)
programmes that were implemented by policymakers (in the US and UK, for example) in
response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Four types of LSAPs were performed during the
crisis – the Federal Reserve’s maturity extension programme or Operation Twist, quantita-
tive easing (QE), qualitative easing, and credit easing.1 What LSAPs have in common is
they involve the central bank buying financial assets from private agents in quantities large
enough to influence asset prices. LSAPs differ in terms of what asset is being purchased,
how the purchase is financed, and whether or not the central bank’s balance sheet changes
size. Table 7.1 compares LSAPs along their key attributes.2
1The economic histories of LSAPs are documented by Joyce et al. (2012) and Zampolli (2012), and by
Klyuev et al. (2009) and Lyonnet and Werner (2011) specifically on QE.
2The definitions in Table 7.1 have evolved in recent times and have only recently been settled in the
literature. In a not-too-distant paper, Klyuev et al. (2009) state that at the time of writing, the literature
had no consensus on what the term “quantitative easing” means. The term “quantitative easing” was coined
by Richard Werner in the mid-1990 to describe the Bank of Japan purchasing assets from the banking system
in exchange for reserves (Lyonnet and Werner (2011)). When first adopted by the Federal Reserve in 2008,
QE meant a purchase of privately-issued assets. Then in 2010 the Fed used the term to describe its purchase
of long-term government-issued securities from private agents; this is the Bernanke and Reinhart (2004)
definition. Buiter (2008) offers a definition which suggests a purchase of any type of asset from private
agents; Breedon et al. (2012), for example, use this definition. And a recent paper by Cu´rdia and Ferrero
(2013) defines QE as purchases of “long-term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities”.
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LSAPs can be thought of as having two stages of transmission. The first is the financial
market impact – a government’s purchase decreases the asset’s supply to private agents,
which bids up the asset’s price, or equivalently, lowers its yield. Tobin (1961, 1963, 1969),
Brunner and Meltzer (1973), and Friedman (1978) show that lowering the yield on an asset
increases the demand for, and therefore the price of, other imperfectly substitutable assets.
This is the “portfolio balance effect” or the “portfolio balance channel” through which
LSAPs are transmitted to higher asset prices.3 The second stage of transmission is the
macroeconomic impact of higher asset prices; one important channel is that higher prices
bring net worth improvements to private agents, which in turn stimulate private investment
and consumption.
The literature on LSAPs is divided by which side of the transmission mechanism is being
studied. There is a branch which focuses on the financial market impact, that is, whether
or not government purchases increase asset prices. There is almost unanimous agreement
that LSAPs increase asset prices through a portfolio balance channel.4 This branch of the
literature is burgeoning, and is recently and extensively surveyed by Breedon et al. (2012),
Joyce et al. (2012), and Martin and Milas (2012).5
The second branch of literature studies the macroeconomics of LSAPs. Joyce et al.
(2012) and Martin and Milas (2012) provide excellent and recent surveys. Empirical research
has its fair share of statistical models (Chung et al. (2011), Baumeister and Benati (2010),
Joyce et al. (2011a), and Kapetanios et al. (2012)) and structural models (Chen et al. (2011)
and Chung et al. (2011)). These works rely on observations from the recent 2008 financial
crisis, which then presents a great challenge of being able to separate the effects of LSAP
from those of other policies that were pursued at the same time.
The first quote at the beginning of the chapter by Joyce et al. (2012) suggests that
the theoretical literature should not be lagging in the LSAP research programme. The New
3Other channels exist besides portfolio balance. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) identify
seven. The consensus in the literature is that the portfolio balance channel is the most significant; see
Gagnon et al. (2011) and Joyce et al. (2011b), for example, for supporting evidence.
4Modigliani and Sutch (1966) is a classical paper in which significant effects on asset yields are not
found, but their result is overturned by another classical paper from Swanson (2011) who uses an alternative
methodology.
5Modigliani and Sutch (1966) and Swanson (2011) study asset prices after original Operation Twist in the
US in 1961. Bernanke et al. (2004) and Ugai (2007) study quantitative easing in pre-2008 Japan. The financial
market impact of QE during the 2008 financial crisis is studied by D’Amico and King (2013), Doh (2010),
Neely (2010), Gagnon et al. (2011), Hancock and Passmore (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2011), Wright (2011), and Hamilton and Wu (2012) on the US, by Meier (2009), Joyce et al. (2011b), Joyce
et al. (2011a), and Breedon et al. (2012) on the UK, and by Rogers et al. (2014) on the US, UK, Euro area,
and Japan.
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Keynesian DSGEmodel is currently the workhorse, with modifications of the standard model
being calibrated by Del Negro et al. (2011), Caglar et al. (2011), Kara and Sin (2013), and
Ellison and Tischbirek (2013). The standard version of the model is not suitable for studying
LSAPs because the portfolio balance channel is not present. Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003) show that open market operations do not alter private asset portfolios in the standard
framework, that is, the irrelevance proposition of Wallace (1981) is upheld. Cu´rdia and
Woodford (2011) extend the result to a model with heterogeneous agents. However, Andre´s
et al. (2004) show that LSAPs have significant macroeconomic impacts in a model that has
imperfectly substitutable assets. Caglar et al. (2011) suggest that the impacts of LSAPs
are inversely related to the degree of asset substitutability. The literature now agrees that
models need agent and asset heterogeneity in order to distribute the effects of LSAPS
unevenly among the population, and to reduce substitution or arbitrage opportunities among
assets. The model readily accommodates modifications, via frictions and assumptions, which
introduce asset and agent heterogeneity. This is perhaps why its use is so popular in LSAP
research.
Neoclassical DSGE models are less popular in the LSAP literature. The standard frame-
work is not able to produce portfolio balance effects. However, Kiyotaki and Moore (2012)
show one way in which this problem can be overcome. They introduce a pair of liquidity
constraints to an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle model, and thereby endogenously
create a demand for heterogeneous assets. As Zampolli (2012) says in the quote above,
the KM model is particularly useful for evaluating LSAPs. KM apply their full model to a
theoretical examination of an LSAP against a liquidity shock, in the tradition of Holmstro¨m
and Tirole (1998). Driffill and Miller (2013) study an LSAP as policy, but in a variant of
the KM model and against a liquidity shock that quantitatively matches the 2008 crisis.
This chapter expands the theoretical macroeconomics literature on LSAPs from a neo-
classical perspective. It first does this by presenting a unique environment that is based on
the basic KM model, as Chapter 2 explains. It then simulates LSAPs that are different to
the ones that have appeared in the related literature. The chapter is closely related to KM
and Driffill and Miller (2013) through model structure. Among the New Keynesian works,
the chapter is also related to Del Negro et al. (2011) and Kara and Sin (2013) through a
shared objective of developing policy against liquidity shocks, and to Ellison and Tischbirek
(2013) (henceforth, ET) through a shared proposal of conventional LSAPs.
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KM and Driffill and Miller (2013) simulate QE. There are no fiscal policy experiments in
those papers, although Driffill and Miller speculate about the future fiscal consequences of
QE. This chapter studies other types of LSAPs. Before proceeding, some interpretation of
the chapter’s experiments are required. The monetary authority side of the government is
the buyer/holder of equity. When the monetary authority buys equity, it issues an equity-
backed instrument which is sold exclusively to the fiscal authority. To buy this equity-backed
instrument, the fiscal authority lowers its spending or raises taxes. The fiscal authority can
buy all of the equity-backed instrument; this is G-financing and T -financing. The fiscal
authority can also buy a fraction of the equity-backed instrument; this is GM -financing and
TM -financing, in which case the monetary authority completes its equity purchase with
new issues of money. All the chapter’s successful Ng-shocks and Ng-policies are credit eas-
ing policies that are accompanied by fiscal austerity. Such a policy package is not seen in
the theoretical macroeconomics literature that is surveyed in the chapter. The relevance of
these experiments is underscored by austerity measures being implemented (in the UK and
Euro area, for example) to deal with significant fiscal deficits that were related to the 2008
crisis and its ongoing LSAP policies. With such experiments, the chapter is able to answer
two independent questions. When an LSAP is underway, what is the better approach to
austerity – cut spending or raise taxes? Should the monetary authority also expand the
money supply alongside an LSAP that is already accompanied by austerity?
ET propose making LSAPs a conventional policy tool. Their philosophy is shared by the
chapter’s Ng-shock, which represents discretionary policy to stimulate the economy, but not
in response to some negative shock. ET is different from the chapter in a number of ways.
First, ET’s model is New Keynesian. Second, ET’s LSAP is a central bank purchase of
long-term government bonds, which is different from this chapter’s privately-issued equity.
Third, ET’s LSAP is rule-based and depends on the level of output, whereas the programme
is discretionary in this chapter. There is another difference which is explained in the next
paragraph.
The chapter achieves its objectives by first defining Ω in different ways. This creates
different endogenous mechanisms by which the government finances its equity purchase,
and thus gives rise to the variants of the model in the chapter. For ease of reference,
each model variant is described as a modification the model in Chapter 5 (the benchmark
model). The variants in this chapter differ from the benchmark model only in terms of
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the government’s behaviour. Within each variant, there are simulations of an Ng-shock, a
liquidity shock, and a liquidity shock with contemporaneous Ng-policy. The Ng-shock and
Ng-policy are both normalised to be an increase in government equity holdings, Ngt+1, by 1
unit.6 The Ng-shock represents a reduction in the supply of equity to private agents (from
Equation (3.38)). The equity purchase is a one-off event, and from the second quarter the
programme is gradually phased out by the government selling 5% of its depreciated holdings
each period ad infinitum. The liquidity shock is normalised to be a 1 percentage point
decrease (that is, tightening) in the re-saleability constraint, φt. Throughout the chapter,
the model is calibrated with structural parameters set to baseline values. In all of the
chapter’s experiments, Ngt+1 is exogenously determined, and therefore Assumption 4 holds.
In steady state there are approximately 16 units of equity, of which saving entrepreneurs
hold 15 units and the government holds none. The government therefore balances its fiscal
budget in steady state.
The results of the chapter show that all the Ng-shocks immediately raise asset prices,
improve entrepreneurs’ net worth, increase private spending, and – via investment – in-
crease employment and output after a one-period delay. But these effects are short-lived
because investment creates new equity that almost replaces what the government buys. The
economy is better off if the government finances its equity purchases by austerity via a cut
in government spending rather than more taxes; employment and output are not affected
and the fall in government spending is replaced by growth in private demand. By con-
trast, tax increases immediately reduce employment and output, and dampen, but do not
offset, entrepreneurs’ net worth improvements. There is no decisive answer as to whether
or not an Ng-shock should be partly funded by monetary expansion. Monetary expansion
benefits aggregate supply – it reduces the extent to which distortionary taxes must rise;
but aggregate demand suffers – the Ng-shock’s asset price increases are smaller. Finally,
Ng-policy is generally successful at ameliorating a negative liquidity shock, but the benefits
are short-lived. This conclusion is supported by the rest of the theoretical macroeconomics
literature on LSAPs. The chapter’s results differ from ET for one reason – ET’s households
save, and when the LSAP raises asset prices, these households increase their labour supply
6Swanson (2011) computes that, in the original Operation Twist of 1961, the Federal Reserve’s purchased
long term Treasuries that amounted to 4.5% – 4.6% of the value of total stock of Treasuries outstanding.
Swanson argued against describing this transaction as “small”. The Ng-shock in this chapter is a purchase
of 6.25% of the market and thus earns the description of “large-scale” according to Swanson’s criteria.
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and the economy produces more output; here, workers are unaffected by higher asset prices
because they don’t save.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Each of the next five sections simulates
an Ng-shock, a liquidity shock, and a liquidity shock with contemporaneous Ng-policy.
The government finances its equity purchases by issuing money in Section 7.2, by reducing
government spending in Section 7.3, by a combination of reducing government spending and
issuing money in Section 7.4, by raising taxes in Section 7.5, and by a combination of raising
taxes and issuing money in Section 7.6. Section 7.7 summarises the chapter. Figures and
tables appear at the end.
7.2 Financing with money
In this section, the government finances its 1-unit purchase of equity by issuing money, while
its spending and tax rates are exogenously determined and unchanged. The benchmark
model is modified by (i) including the AR(1) process (3.29) for Gt and (ii) excluding the
AR(1) process (3.31) for Mt+1. Accordingly, the set of exogenously determined policy









t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (3.32)
τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (3.33)
The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised in
Section 5.2.
Without any exogenous shocks, the model converges to a steady state. But once dis-
turbed by the M -financed Ng-shock, the model becomes unstable and does not return to
steady state. This result is robust to the calibration of structural parameters.7
7Attempts to simulate theM -financed Ng-shock fails with 311,040 combinations of parameter values from
θ ∈ {0.185, 0.11, 0.2}, β ∈ {0.99, 0.95, 0.975, 0.98, 0.995}, γ ∈ {0.4, 0.3, 0.35, 0.375, 0.425, 0.45, 0.475}, δ ∈
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The problem is the same as what happens when trying to simulate the M -financed
G-shock in Chapter 6. General equilibrium cannot be achieved because Equation (3.28)
says that the government values its assets ex post to the shock, which implies a collinear







where M2 and N
g
2 are the stocks of money and government equity, respectively, at the end
of period 1, and q1/p1 is the quantity of money the government must contemporaneously
issue in order to purchase 1 unit of equity. One possible solution is to enforce an ex ante
valuation of assets. This can be achieved by either fixing or pre-determining prices in the
government’s budget constraint (Equation (3.28)). An alternative solution is to elsewhere
determine a target for money supply, perhaps by some policy rule. The GM -financed and
TM -financed experiments in Sections 7.4 and 7.6 take the latter approach and include rule
(3.35) for money supply growth, and in both these experiments the model converges to
steady state after the Ng-shock.
7.3 Financing with government spending
In this section, the government finances its 1-unit purchase of equity by reducing its spend-
ing, while tax rates and the money supply are exogenously determined and unchanged. The
model is exactly the same as the benchmark model in Chapter 5 and is summarised in
Section 5.2. Impulse responses to the G-financed Ng-shock are illustrated in Figures 7.1
and 7.2 and are given numerically in Table 7.2. Impulse responses to the liquidity shock
without and with G-financed Ng-policy, respectively, are illustrated in Figures 7.3 and 7.4
and are given numerically in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
7.3.1 A G-financed N g-shock
Because the steady state price of equity is greater than unity, the government reduces its
spending by more than 1 unit of general output in order to finance the Ng-shock. With
{0.975, 0.925, 0.95, 0.98, 0.99}, pi ∈ {0.05, 0.03, 0.04, 0.06, 0.07, 0.08}, ν ∈ {1, 0.5, 0.9, 1.1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4}, and ω ∈
{4.01, 3, 3.5, 4.5, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The lack of convergence also holds if terms that have third and higher order effects
on the model’s solution are excluded (using the pruning algorithm of Kim et al. (2008)) and if the model is
approximated by a first order Taylor series expansion.
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both tax rates unchanged, the labour market remains at steady state in the first quarter.
The real wage, employment, and therefore output, gross wages, dividends, and government
tax revenue do not change, and a fiscal surplus is therefore created.
The government’s equity purchase reduces the asset’s supply to private agents, which
raises its price and lowers its expected return. Via a portfolio balance effect, money’s demand
and price both increase. Higher asset prices improve entrepreneurs’ net worth, which lead
to more investment and private consumption. Because of the tightly binding borrowing
constraint, more investment leads to a sufficiently small quantity of new equity issues such
that the resulting increase in the asset’s supply only partially offsets the shock-induced
decrease in supply, and the asset remains with a higher price.
After investment rises above steady state in the first quarter, the capital stock grows by
the end of the period. This leads to small delayed increases in output, labour demand, and
consequently employment and the real wage in the second quarter. With more gross wages
being paid, the rate of return on capital falls, and workers’ consumption and aggregate taxes
both increase.
The first quarter increase in investment also adds to the equity stock at the end of the
period. This addition almost replaces the quantity purchased by government, and in the
second quarter equity’s price falls. This causes the immediate effects of the shock to almost
disappear. By a portfolio balance effect, money’s price falls, then entrepreneur’s net worth
falls, and with it investment.
7.3.2 A liquidity shock and G-financed N g-policy
Without policy
Immediate and long-term responses to the liquidity shock in this variant of the model are
qualitatively the same as in the benchmark model. There are no immediate impacts on
labour, and therefore output, as well as workers’ consumption, the rate of dividends, and
government spending and tax revenue. The shock reduces the supply of equity by making
investment financing more difficult, and leaves the asset with a higher price. Money’s price
then increases, by a portfolio balance effect, and entrepreneurs enjoy higher net worth.
There is a substitution effect of the shock that affects both types of entrepreneurs and
outweighs the income effect from higher net worth. First, the shock ruins the appeal of
equity and encourages savers to substitute the asset with money, in what KM call a “flight to
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liquidity”. Second, the shock makes new investment more difficult to realise, and encourages
investors to consume rather than invest. Accordingly, saving and investment fall in the
immediate period of the shock. Lower investment reduces the capital stock at the end of
the period. Weak demand for labour propels the economy into a long recession from the
second period, which lasts until the capital stock rebounds when its depreciation is overcome
by investment.
With policy
G-financed Ng-policy makes noticeable, but short-lived, improvements to the effects of a
liquidity shock. The government’s equity purchase helps raise the asset’s price above that
of the no-policy scenario. By a portfolio balance effect, money’s price also enjoys a greater
increase with policy. Entrepreneurs enjoy improved net worth, and they invest and con-
sume more. However, higher investment increases equity’s supply on the market in the
second period, and the effects of the government’s purchase are almost offset. Asset prices
quickly converge to their no-policy trajectories in the second period. Ng-policy improves
entrepreneurs’ net worth which lead to more investment and consumption. By comparison,
without policy there is a fall in investment and a smaller increase in consumption. Both
variables then almost converge to their no-policy trajectories in the second quarter.
With Ng-policy, output remains unchanged in the first period, but it has a very small
increase in the second period, and remains above steady state for the first year after the
liquidity shock. The increase in output is due to the first quarter increase in investment
causing the capital stock to expand at the end of the period. As output declines, it is closer
to steady state with policy than without policy. But after its trough, output gets further
away from steady state than it does in its no-policy scenario. The differences in output’s
impulse responses between policy and no-policy are very small. Employment, the real wage,
and workers’ consumption all follow the same pattern as output.
7.4 Financing with government spending and money
In this section, the government finances its 1-unit purchase of equity by a combination of
spending reduction and monetary expansion, while tax rates are exogenously determined and
unchanged. The benchmark model in Chapter 5 is modified by replacing the AR(1) process
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(3.31) for Mt+1 with the policy rule (3.35) for money supply growth. Accordingly, the set
of exogenously determined policy variables is Ω = {Gt, Ngt+1, τwlt , τ rnt }. The government’s
behaviour is summarised by the following equilibrium conditions.
Tt = τ
rn





t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)
τ rnt = (1− ρτrn)τ rn + ρτrnτ rnt−1 + uτrnt (3.32)
τwlt = (1− ρτwl)τwl + ρτwlτwlt−1 + uτwlt (3.33)





1 if the government buys equity in period t
0 if the government sells equity in period t
(3.36)
The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised in
Section 5.2. Once output is supply-determined by Equation (3.60), the rate of monetary
growth is established by rule (3.35). Rule (3.35) restrains money supply from unnecessarily
financing most of the government’s equity purchase. Impulse responses to the GM -financed
Ng-shock are illustrated in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 and are given numerically in Table 7.5.
Impulse responses to the liquidity shock without and with GM -financed Ng-policy, respec-
tively, are illustrated in Figures 7.7 and 7.8 and are given numerically in Tables 7.6 and 7.7.
7.4.1 A GM-financed N g-shock
Responses to the GM -financed Ng-shock are almost identical, although marginally smaller,
to those of the G-financed Ng-shock. The only difference is that money supply is fixed with
G-financing, but it varies as a function of output (from rule (3.35)) with GM -financing.
In this experiment, the government lowers its spending to help finance the Ng-shock.
Tax rates are unchanged and the labour market and output therefore remain at their steady
states. Then by rule (3.35), money supply remains unchanged and thus leaves the fiscal ac-
count to completely finance the shock. Because equity’s price is above unity, the government
cuts its spending by more than 1 unit of general output.
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The government’s equity purchase causes asset prices to increase. Because of the dif-
ferences in elasticity of supply, the increase in money’s price is smaller with GM -financing
than G-financing, and consequently, so too are the size of responses from the rest of the
economy. Entrepreneurs’ net worth improvements are smaller in this experiment, resulting
in smaller increases in investment and savers’ consumption; and the difference in investors’
consumption is insignificant. Money’s subdued price increase makes the equity purchase
program less expensive, and therefore the cut in government spending is smaller.
Because the increase in investment is smaller with GM -financing than G-financing, there
are smaller delayed increases in output, labour demand, employment, and the real wage.
The increase in output activates monetary expansion via the policy rule (3.35), and this
helps drive asset prices further below steady states than in the G-financing experiment.
7.4.2 A liquidity shock and GM-financed N g-policy
Responses to the liquidity shock, both without and with policy, are almost identical be-
tween the GM -financed and G-financed Ng-policies. The only difference is there is a
slightly larger increase in money’s price and a slightly smaller increase in equity’s price
with GM -financing. The overall conclusion is the same as that of the G-financed Ng-policy,
that is, the GM -financed Ng-policy makes noticeable, but short-lived, improvements to the
consequences of the liquidity shock.
7.5 Financing with taxes
In this section, the government finances its 1-unit purchase of equity by raising tax rates,
while its spending and the money supply are exogenously determined and unchanged. The
benchmark model is modified by (i) including the AR(1) process (3.29) for Gt, (ii) exclud-
ing the AR(1) processes (3.32) and (3.33) for τ rnt and τ
wl
t , respectively, and (iii) including
the policy rule (3.34) for the rate of tax on wage income. Accordingly, the set of exoge-
nously determined policy variables is Ω = {Gt, Ngt+1,Mt+1}. The government’s behaviour
is summarised by the following equilibrium conditions.
Tt = τ
rn





t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
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Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)
Ngt+1 = (1− ρNg)Ng + ρNgNgt + uNgt (3.30)







The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised in
Section 5.2. Impulse responses to the T -financed Ng-shock are illustrated in Figures 7.9
and 7.10 and are given numerically in Table 7.8. Impulse responses to the liquidity shock
without and with T -financed Ng-policy, respectively, are illustrated in Figures 7.11 and 7.12
and are given numerically in Tables 7.9 and 7.10.
7.5.1 A T -financed N g-shock
The T -financed Ng-shock begins the same way as the the G-financed and GM -financed
experiments – asset prices increase and entrepreneurs invest more. From Equation (3.34),
the requirement for more taxes is first achieved by an increase in the rate of tax on wages.
This leads to a decrease in labour’s aggregate supply and therefore a fall in employment,
a rise in the real wage rate, and (because labour demand is wage-elastic) a fall in gross
aggregate wages. In aggregate, workers pay more tax to the government, take home a
smaller wage, and reduce their consumption. And because workers account for its largest
share (approximately 80% in steady state), aggregate consumption falls. With aggregate
productivity unchanged and the capital stock being pre-determined, the fall in employment
leads to lower production. Furthermore, with a larger share of output going to workers, the
returns to capital fall, but only marginally so.
As discussed in Section 3.5, the policy rule (3.34) and the fall in gross wages together
imply that the rate of tax on dividends must increase if the tax rate on wages rises. This
provides a second channel through which government tax revenue increases. However, the
higher dividend tax rate dampens, but does not overturn, entrepreneurs’ net worth improve-
ments that are caused by higher asset prices. This is why asset price increases are smaller
than in the G-financed experiment where there is no such negative effect.
The rise in investment increases the equity stock at the end of the period, and in the next
period the added supply depresses the asset’s price. Money’s price then falls, entrepreneurs’
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net worth decline, and the immediate effects of the shock are almost completely reversed.
Output receives a boost in the second quarter from an increase in capital. Output does not
return to steady state, but it increases and marginally overshoots its steady state in the
second quarter. The labour market is likewise affected by the additional capital through
aggregate labour demand (Equation (3.49)).
7.5.2 A liquidity shock and T -financed N g-policy
Without policy
Immediate and long-term responses to the liquidity shock are qualitatively the same as in
the benchmark model and in the G-financed and GM -financed experiments. The description
that is given to the liquidity shock without policy in theG-financed experiment in Section 7.3
can also be given here. The only difference is that tax rates are endogenously determined
in this variant of the model. The tax base from wages does not change, and so the rate of
tax on wages does not change. However, when the capital stock falls then the dividends tax
base also falls and the rate of tax on dividends rises to keep total tax revenue constant. In
contrast, tax revenue falls in the G-financed experiment from the second quarter due to tax
bases endogenously adjusting.
With policy
Responses to the liquidity shock with T -financed Ng-policy are not the same as in previ-
ous experiments. The differences are due to T -financing distorting the supply-side of the
economy, whereas financing with government spending does not. Specifically, T -financing
decreases the supply of labour, and then the real wage rises and employment and output
fall. Workers’ consumption falls, then aggregate private consumption falls (which represents
the only qualitative change in responses from the no-policy scenario).
By raising the rate of tax on dividends, T -financing aggravates the reduction in en-
trepreneurs’ net worth that is caused by the liquidity shock. This aggravation at first leads
to a sharper fall in investment compared to the no-policy scenario. However, there is now
a larger reduction in equity’ supply, which implies a larger increase in equity’s price and
a larger increase in money’s price. The resulting improvement in entrepreneurs’ net worth
helps partially offset the initial fall in investment that is caused by the tax hike. Conse-
quently, the fall in investment with policy is smaller than without policy.
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At the end of the immediate period, capital enjoys a smaller decline with policy. In the
next period, output recovers quickly and gets close to its no-policy position. The model’s
other variables also converge to their no-policy responses in the second quarter.
The overall conclusion is that T -financed Ng-policy ameliorates some of the effects of a
liquidity shock, and worsens other effects. But the impacts of policy are short-lived, for the
same reasons why the T -financed Ng-shock is short-lived, that is, the policy’s improvement
to investment helps replace the quantity of equity that the government takes out of the
market.
7.6 Financing with taxes and money
In this section, the government finances its 1-unit purchase of equity by a combination
of raising taxes and issuing money, while its spending is exogenously determined and un-
changed. The benchmark model is modified by (i) including the AR(1) process (3.29) for
Gt, (ii) excluding the AR(1) processes (3.31), (3.32) and (3.33) for Mt+1, τ
rn
t , and τ
wl
t ,
respectively, (iii) including the policy rule (3.34) for the rate of tax on wage income, and
(iv) including the policy rule (3.35) for money supply growth. Accordingly, the set of ex-
ogenously determined policy variables is Ω = {Gt, Ngt+1}. The government’s behaviour is
summarised by the following equilibrium conditions.
Tt = τ
rn





t+1 − δNgt ) = Tt + rtNgt + pt(Mt+1 −Mt) (3.28)
Gt = (1− ρG)G+ ρGGt−1 + uGt (3.29)












1 if the government buys equity in period t
0 if the government sells equity in period t
(3.36)
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The rest of the model remains the same as in the benchmark model and is summarised
in Section 5.2. Impulse responses to the TM -financed Ng-shock are illustrated in Fig-
ures 7.13 and 7.14 and are given numerically in Table 7.11. Impulse responses to the
liquidity shock without and with TM -financed Ng-policy, respectively, are illustrated in
Figures 7.15 and 7.16 and are given numerically in Tables 7.12 and 7.13.
7.6.1 A TM-financed N g-shock
Responses are qualitatively the same as those of the T -financing experiment. While money
supply is fixed with T -financing, here it varies with output according to rule (3.35). This is
the source of all quantitative deviations between the two experiments.
The government’s equity purchase increases asset prices, entrepreneurs’ net worth, in-
vestment, consumption, and saving. The borrowing constraint ensures that the rise in
investment does not feed back to a reduction in equity’s price.
The higher rate of tax on dividends reduces the demand for assets. However, the effect
is small relative to the increase in demand that is brought on by net worth improvements.
Assets are therefore left with net increases in demand. The higher rate of tax on wages
lowers employment and output. Rule (3.35) then endogenously expands money supply; this
allows the money market to clear after its net increase in demand, and the asset is left with
a higher price.
Compared to the T -financing experiment, monetary expansion relieves some of the pres-
sure on tax rates to increase, and thereby dampens the responses to the shock, starting from
the changes in asset prices. The smaller increase in investment here means that the capital
stock grows by fewer units by the end of the first quarter, and output in the second quarter
gets a smaller boost. In fact, while output increases enough to overshoot its steady state in
the T -financing experiment, it remains below steady state in this experiment. The labour
market is similarly affected by subdued investment.
Response turnarounds in the second quarter are much softer than the sharp changes
seen in the T -financing experiment. Trajectories of long-term adjustment are more gradual,
and have more pronounced humps. Capital now has a hump-shaped trajectory, because
investment slowly declines towards steady state (compared to a sharp drop in the second
quarter in the T -financing experiment). In other words, investment is elevated for a longer
period of time; it takes 4 quarters to get close to steady state, as opposed to 2 quarters
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in the T -financing experiment. While investment remains above steady state, the capital
stock is able to expand after depreciation. Investment drops below steady state in quarter
5, and capital starts to fall from then. Capital still overshoots its steady state, as it also
does in the T -financing experiment, because investment remains below steady state while
slowly converging.
7.6.2 A liquidity shock and TM-financed N g-policy
Without policy
Responses to the liquidity shock are almost identical to those of the T -financed variant of
the model in Section 7.5. The only difference is that there is a slightly smaller increase in
money’s price and a slightly larger increase in equity’s price in this experiment.
With policy
Monetary expansion is made possible by rule (3.35) together with an increase in output in
the immediate period. Comparing T -financing with TM -financing, the inclusion of money
to help finance Ng-policy alleviates the extent to which tax rates increase and thus soft-
ens the related consequences. All these consequences are qualitatively the same as the
T -financed Ng-policy in Section 7.5. Furthermore, the addition of monetary expansion
dampens the increase in money’s price. The overall conclusion is the same as that of the
T -financed Ng-policy, that is, TM -financed Ng-policy brings both positive and negative,
but short-lived, differences to the effects of the liquidity shock. On the positive side, the
immediate increases in asset prices, the real wage, and investment are greater. On the
negative side, consumption changes direction and immediately falls, and employment and
output immediately decline.
7.7 Chapter summary
This chapter successfully simulates a government purchase of equity in four experiments
which differ by the way these purchases are financed. The equity purchase programme is
simulated in two scenarios, first on its own (an Ng-shock), and then contemporaneously
alongside a negative liquidity shock (Ng-policy).
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In all experiments, the Ng-shock immediately raises asset prices, which leads to im-
provements in entrepreneurs’ net worth and increases in investment and consumption. The
immediate increases in investment are sufficient to create enough new equity that, in the
second period after the shock, the additions almost compensate for the stocks taken out by
the government. Equity’s price falls in the second period, and with it the price of money and
entrepreneurs’ net worth, investment, and consumption. The direct effects of the Ng-shock
are therefore short-lived.
The method of financing compounds the effects of the Ng-shock. All methods of fi-
nancing involve an austerity measure, either by a reduction in government spending or an
increase in taxes. When the government cuts spending, there is no immediate change in out-
put and therefore aggregate demand is re-distributed to private agents who now have more
net worth. When taxes are increased, output falls (from the wage tax) and entrepreneurs’
net worth falls (from the dividends tax); the latter only partially offsets the initial improve-
ment and thereby dampens the effects of the Ng-shock. The conclusion is that austerity
in this model is better (that is, less distortionary) with spending cuts. There is a possi-
bility for the government to additionally finance the Ng-shock with monetary expansion.
It is uncertain whether this improves the Ng-shock’s response; aggregate supply benefits
from monetary expansion, but aggregate demand suffers. First, consider the supply-side
of the economy. G-financing vs. GM -financing experiments are not relevant for compari-
son because the labour market and output do not immediately change. T -financing reduces
employment and output, with magnitudes that are smaller with TM -financing because mon-
etary expansion reduces the extent to which tax rates must rise to finance the Ng-shock;
a smaller hike in the rate of tax on wages means a smaller decrease in employment. Next,
consider the demand-side of the economy. The fundamental difference between fiscal financ-
ing alone and fiscal financing plus monetary financing is that money supply is fixed in the
former and positively responsive to its own price in the latter. The Ng-shock generates a
larger increase in the price of money with fiscal financing alone. Monetary expansion puts
additional units of the asset on the market and thus dampens its price increase. Net worth
improvements and related consequences are therefore larger with fiscal financing alone.
Ng-policy is generally successfully at ameliorating the effects of a negative liquidity
shock. However, for the same reasons given for the Ng-shocks, the benefits of Ng-policy are
short-lived and almost disappear after one year. This conclusion is shared by Kiyotaki and
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Moore (2012) and the sticky-price models of Del Negro et al. (2011), Kara and Sin (2013),
and Driffill and Miller (2013), although in the latter group the short-lived nature of policy
is due to the consequences of asset price variations being suppressed.
The chapter’s G-financed Ng-shock is the converse of the Ng-financed G-shock in Sec-
tion 6.3. In the former, the government sells equity and reduces it spending. In the latter,
the government spends more and sells equity, but then the economy oscillates as it converges
to steady state over a very long period. The difference in results suggests a useful lesson for
policy design. If the government allows its equity holdings to vary according to some rule
then the economy oscillates when the rule is activated. No such oscillation is experienced if
the government varies its spending according to a policy rule. In a related paper, Ellison and
Tischbirek (2013) install a Taylor rule for asset purchases in which they depend on the level
of output. Theirs is a New Keynesian DSGE model, and sticky prices may account for why
the economy does not oscillate. It may be useful to extend this chapter with a sticky-price
variant of the model, in the tradition of Driffill and Miller (2013) but with distortionary
taxes included. This and other extensions of the chapter are outlined in the conclusion of
the thesis.
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Figure 7.1: Impulse responses to a G-financed Ng-shock, 20 quarters



























































































NOTES: Horizontal axes measure quarters after the shock, starting from quarter 1. Vertical axes measure
deviations from steady state. Blue dots indicate immediate responses; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel
A in Table 7.2 for their values.
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Figure 7.2: Impulse responses to a G-financed Ng-shock, 200 quarters



























































































NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.1 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
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Figure 7.3: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and G-financed Ng-policy, 20 quarters
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NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase
in Ngt . The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate responses
of the liquidity shock without and with Ng-policy, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in
Table 7.3 and Table 7.4, respectively, for their values.
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Figure 7.4: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and G-financed Ng-policy, 200 quarters
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NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.3 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
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Figure 7.5: Impulse responses to a GM -financed Ng-shock, 20 quarters



































































































NOTES: The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. See the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in Table 7.5 for the values
of immediate responses.
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Figure 7.6: Impulse responses to a GM -financed Ng-shock



































































































NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.5 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
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Figure 7.7: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and GM -financed Ng-policy, 20 quarters
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NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase
in Ngt . The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate responses
of the liquidity shock without and with Ng-policy, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in
Table 7.6 and Table 7.7, respectively, for their values.
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Figure 7.8: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and GM -financed Ng-policy, 200 quarters























































































no policy with policy










NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.7 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
158
Figure 7.9: Impulse responses to a T -financed Ng-shock, 20 quarters





































































































NOTES: The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. See the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in Table 7.8 for the values
of immediate responses.
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Figure 7.10: Impulse responses to a T -financed Ng-shock, 200 quarters





































































































NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.9 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
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Figure 7.11: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and T -financed Ng-policy, 20 quarters


















































































no policy with policy













NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase
in Ngt . The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate responses
of the liquidity shock without and with Ng-policy, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in
Table 7.9 and Table 7.10, respectively, for their values.
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Figure 7.12: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and T -financed Ng-policy, 200 quarters
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NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.11 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
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Figure 7.13: Impulse responses to a TM -financed Ng-shock, 20 quarters









































































































NOTES: The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. See the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in Table 7.11 for the values
of immediate responses.
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Figure 7.14: Impulse responses to a TM -financed Ng-shock, 200 quarters








































































































NOTES: These graphs extend Figure 7.13 to 200 quarters. The same notes apply.
164
Figure 7.15: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and TM -financed Ng-policy, 20 quarters
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NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase
in Ngt . The notes in Figure 7.1 apply. Hollow blue dots and solid red dots indicate immediate responses
of the liquidity shock without and with Ng-policy, respectively; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in
Table 7.12 and Table 7.13, respectively, for their values.
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Figure 7.16: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock and TM -financed Ng-policy, 200 quarters
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Table 7.3: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock: G-financed model variant




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.11 −0.21 −0.04 −0.24 36 201
It −0.28 −0.27 −0.25 −0.21 −0.14 −0.01 −0.28 1 93
Ct 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.13 −0.02 −0.02 0.28 1 184
Cwt 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.10 −0.02 −0.11 36 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 184
Cst 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.08 −0.01 0.28 1 31
Nst+1 −0.83 −1.05 −1.45 −2.10 −3.15 −0.50 −3.43 33 201
Nt+1 −0.28 −0.54 −1.01 −1.79 −3.09 −0.53 −3.50 35 201
Kt+1 −0.28 −0.54 −1.01 −1.79 −3.09 −0.53 −3.50 35 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36 201
wt 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.13 −0.02 −0.15 36 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.00 −0.03 36 201
pt 4.09 3.88 3.50 2.85 1.54 0.00 4.09 1 46
qt 1.35 1.29 1.17 0.96 0.54 0.01 1.35 1 52
qRt −0.31 −0.29 −0.26 −0.22 −0.12 0.00 −0.31 1 52
Gt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.01 −0.05 36 201
Tt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.01 −0.05 36 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without
Ng-policy. Panel A gives deviations from steady state in levels. Panel B gives the time at which the absolute
largest impulse response occurs, and the convergence indicator which is described in Section 4.4.2.
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Table 7.4: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock with G-financed Ng-policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 0.04 0.00 −0.07 −0.20 −0.04 −0.25 39 201
It 0.55 −0.30 −0.28 −0.24 −0.16 −0.01 0.55 1 60
Ct 0.62 0.27 0.22 0.13 −0.02 −0.02 0.62 1 127
Cwt 0.00 0.02 0.00 −0.03 −0.09 −0.02 −0.11 39 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 127
Cst 0.62 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.07 −0.01 0.62 1 22
Nst+1 −1.68 −1.20 −1.61 −2.28 −3.37 −0.53 −3.64 33 201
Nt+1 −0.45 −0.72 −1.21 −2.00 −3.33 −0.56 −3.73 35 201
Kt+1 0.55 0.23 −0.35 −1.30 −2.95 −0.56 −3.57 38 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 39 201
wt 0.00 0.02 0.00 −0.05 −0.13 −0.02 −0.16 39 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.03 39 201
pt 6.22 3.74 3.38 2.75 1.48 0.00 6.22 1 37
qt 3.37 1.23 1.12 0.92 0.52 0.01 3.37 1 30
qRt −0.76 −0.28 −0.25 −0.21 −0.12 0.00 −0.76 1 30
Gt −1.17 0.08 0.06 0.03 −0.02 −0.01 −1.17 1 2
Tt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.01 −0.06 37 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.6: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock: GM -financed model variant




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.10 −0.20 −0.04 −0.23 38 201
It −0.28 −0.25 −0.23 −0.20 −0.13 −0.01 −0.28 1 101
Ct 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.13 −0.01 −0.03 0.28 1 194
Cwt 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.05 −0.09 −0.02 −0.11 38 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 194
Cst 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.08 −0.01 0.27 1 32
Nst+1 −0.83 −1.05 −1.41 −2.00 −2.99 −0.58 −3.27 34 201
Nt+1 −0.28 −0.52 −0.96 −1.68 −2.92 −0.61 −3.34 37 201
Kt+1 −0.28 −0.52 −0.96 −1.68 −2.92 −0.61 −3.34 37 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 38 201
wt 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.12 −0.03 −0.15 38 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.03 38 201
pt 4.19 4.03 3.65 3.00 1.67 0.02 4.19 1 51
qt 1.32 1.29 1.17 0.97 0.55 0.01 1.32 1 54
qRt −0.30 −0.29 −0.27 −0.22 −0.12 0.00 −0.30 1 54
Mt+1 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.11 −0.20 −0.04 −0.23 38 201
Gt 0.00 −0.03 −0.03 −0.04 −0.05 −0.01 −0.05 30 201
Tt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.05 38 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without
Ng-policy. The notes in Table 7.3 apply.
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Table 7.7: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock with GM -financed Ng-policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 0.04 −0.01 −0.07 −0.19 −0.04 −0.23 41 201
It 0.55 −0.34 −0.26 −0.22 −0.15 −0.01 0.55 1 61
Ct 0.62 0.25 0.22 0.14 −0.01 −0.03 0.62 1 131
Cwt 0.00 0.02 0.00 −0.03 −0.09 −0.02 −0.11 41 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 131
Cst 0.61 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.07 −0.01 0.61 1 23
Nst+1 −1.68 −1.20 −1.61 −2.21 −3.20 −0.61 −3.47 34 201
Nt+1 −0.45 −0.75 −1.19 −1.91 −3.15 −0.64 −3.55 36 201
Kt+1 0.55 0.20 −0.33 −1.22 −2.77 −0.64 −3.40 40 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 41 201
wt 0.00 0.02 0.00 −0.04 −0.12 −0.03 −0.15 41 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.03 41 201
pt 6.31 3.76 3.52 2.90 1.62 0.02 6.31 1 41
qt 3.33 1.11 1.12 0.93 0.53 0.01 3.33 1 31
qRt −0.76 −0.25 −0.25 −0.21 −0.12 0.00 −0.76 1 31
Mt+1 0.00 0.04 −0.01 −0.07 −0.19 −0.04 −0.24 41 201
Gt −1.17 0.12 0.04 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −1.17 1 3
Tt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.01 −0.05 38 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.9: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock: T -financed model variant




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.02 −0.06 −0.12 −0.24 −0.33 −0.36 80 201
It −0.28 −0.28 −0.26 −0.24 −0.19 −0.11 −0.28 1 201
Ct 0.28 0.26 0.21 0.12 −0.05 −0.21 0.28 1 201
Cwt 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.11 −0.15 −0.17 80 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 90 201
Cst 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.18 0.06 −0.06 0.28 1 201
Nst+1 −0.84 −1.06 −1.48 −2.19 −3.61 −4.49 −4.97 76 201
Nt+1 −0.28 −0.55 −1.05 −1.91 −3.61 −4.77 −5.27 79 201
Kt+1 −0.28 −0.55 −1.05 −1.91 −3.61 −4.77 −5.27 79 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 80 201
wt 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 −0.07 −0.15 −0.21 −0.23 80 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 80 201
pt 3.92 3.70 3.30 2.61 1.23 −0.35 3.92 1 34
qt 1.41 1.34 1.21 0.98 0.53 0.00 1.41 1 46
qRt −0.32 −0.30 −0.27 −0.22 −0.12 0.00 −0.32 1 46
Tt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 198 201
τwlt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 171 201
τ rnt 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.10 80 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without
Ng-policy. The notes in Table 7.3 apply.
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Table 7.10: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock with T -financed Ng-policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt −0.68 0.04 0.00 −0.07 −0.22 −0.33 −0.68 1 201
It −0.04 −0.28 −0.27 −0.25 −0.20 −0.12 −0.28 2 201
Ct −0.64 0.33 0.27 0.17 −0.02 −0.22 −0.64 1 201
Cwt −1.04 0.07 0.04 0.00 −0.08 −0.15 −1.04 1 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 88 201
Cst 0.40 0.26 0.23 0.17 0.06 −0.06 0.40 1 201
Nst+1 −1.79 −1.74 −2.09 −2.70 −3.90 −4.52 −5.01 73 201
Nt+1 −1.04 −1.27 −1.70 −2.44 −3.91 −4.80 −5.32 76 201
Kt+1 −0.04 −0.32 −0.84 −1.74 −3.54 −4.80 −5.30 80 201
rt −0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 −0.02 1 201
wt 0.57 −0.04 −0.06 −0.10 −0.17 −0.21 0.57 1 201
Lt −0.28 0.02 0.01 0.00 −0.02 −0.04 −0.28 1 201
pt 4.69 3.68 3.28 2.60 1.22 −0.35 4.69 1 33
qt 2.14 1.35 1.22 0.99 0.54 0.00 2.14 1 38
qRt −0.49 −0.31 −0.28 −0.23 −0.12 0.00 −0.49 1 38
Tt 1.17 −0.08 −0.07 −0.06 −0.03 0.00 1.17 1 2
τwlt 0.63 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.02 0.00 0.63 1 2
τ rnt 0.76 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.76 1 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.12: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock: TM -financed model variant




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 −0.11 −0.24 −0.34 −0.37 79 201
It −0.29 −0.28 −0.27 −0.25 −0.20 −0.12 −0.29 1 201
Ct 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.14 −0.05 −0.22 0.29 1 201
Cwt 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 −0.11 −0.16 −0.17 81 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 88 201
Cst 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.06 −0.06 0.29 1 201
Nst+1 −0.84 −1.07 −1.50 −2.24 −3.73 −4.60 −5.13 75 201
Nt+1 −0.29 −0.57 −1.08 −1.97 −3.74 −4.89 −5.45 77 201
Kt+1 −0.29 −0.57 −1.08 −1.97 −3.74 −4.89 −5.45 77 201
rt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 77 201
wt 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.09 −0.16 −0.21 −0.24 77 201
Lt 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.04 −0.05 81 201
pt 3.76 3.53 3.12 2.41 0.99 −0.57 3.76 1 201
qt 1.46 1.38 1.24 1.01 0.55 0.00 1.46 1 46
qRt −0.33 −0.31 −0.28 −0.23 −0.12 0.00 −0.33 1 46
Mt+1 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.34 0.38 79 201
Tt 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 −0.02 5 201
τwlt 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 5 201
τ rnt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.11 81 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. These responses are without
Ng-policy. The notes in Table 7.3 apply.
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Table 7.13: Impulse responses to a liquidity shock with TM -financed Ng-policy




1 2 4 8 20 200 largest converge
Yt −0.39 −0.15 −0.02 −0.06 −0.22 −0.34 −0.39 1 201
It −0.15 −0.22 −0.27 −0.26 −0.20 −0.12 −0.27 5 201
Ct −0.24 0.07 0.24 0.19 −0.02 −0.22 0.25 5 201
Cwt −0.60 −0.21 0.01 0.02 −0.07 −0.16 −0.60 1 201
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 86 201
Cst 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.17 0.06 −0.06 0.35 1 201
Nst+1 −1.81 −1.83 −2.11 −2.73 −4.01 −4.63 −5.19 72 201
Nt+1 −1.15 −1.31 −1.72 −2.48 −4.04 −4.92 −5.50 75 201
Kt+1 −0.15 −0.36 −0.86 −1.79 −3.66 −4.92 −5.48 78 201
rt −0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 −0.01 1 201
wt 0.33 0.11 −0.04 −0.11 −0.18 −0.22 0.33 1 201
Lt −0.16 −0.06 0.00 0.01 −0.02 −0.04 −0.16 1 201
pt 4.23 3.68 3.14 2.41 0.99 −0.57 4.23 1 201
qt 1.87 1.53 1.29 1.03 0.55 0.00 1.87 1 41
qRt −0.42 −0.35 −0.29 −0.23 −0.13 0.00 −0.42 1 41
Mt+1 0.39 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.34 0.39 1 201
Tt 0.67 0.23 −0.03 −0.08 −0.04 0.00 0.67 1 12
τwlt 0.36 0.13 −0.02 −0.04 −0.02 0.00 0.36 1 12
τ rnt 0.43 0.17 0.00 −0.01 0.05 0.10 0.43 1 201
NOTES: The liquidity shock is a 1 percentage point decrease (tightening) in φt. N
g-policy is a 1 unit increase
in Ngt . The notes in Table 7.3 apply.
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Table 7.14: Immediate responses to Ng-shocks: a comparison
Panel A: Impulse responses in levels Panel B: Immediate impact multipliers
Financing: G GM T TM Financing: G GM T TM
Yt 0.00 0.00 −0.76 −0.40 0.00 0.00 −0.66 −0.35
It 1.03 1.00 0.23 0.13 0.88 0.86 0.20 0.11
Ct 0.42 0.41 −0.99 −0.53 0.36 0.35 −0.85 −0.46
Cwt 0.00 0.00 −1.10 −0.59 0.00 0.00 −0.95 −0.51
Cit 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Cst 0.42 0.41 0.11 0.06 0.36 0.35 0.09 0.05
Nst+1 −0.81 −0.81 −0.96 −0.98 −0.81 −0.81 −0.96 −0.98
Nt+1 0.03 0.00 −0.77 −0.87 0.03 0.00 −0.77 −0.87
Kt+1 1.03 1.00 0.23 0.13 1.03 1.00 0.23 0.13
rt 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.66 −0.01
wt 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.30
Lt 0.00 0.00 −0.31 −0.16 0.00 0.86 −0.64 −0.34
pt 2.35 2.15 0.72 0.43 2.02 1.85 0.62 0.37
qt 2.15 2.08 0.69 0.38 1.84 0.00 0.59 0.33
qRt −0.49 −0.47 −0.16 −0.09 −0.42 −0.41 −0.13 −0.07
Mt+1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45
Gt −1.45 −1.41 0.00 0.00 −1.24 −0.81 0.00 0.00
Tt 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.68 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.58
τwlt 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.32
τ rnt 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.42
NOTES: This table gives the first quarter impulse responses in levels and immediate impact multipliers from





This chapter analyses the sensitivity of the model’s quantitative results to the calibration
of its parameters. Sensitivity is analysed using the tax-shock experiment of Chapter 5 and
is performed with respect to all of the model’s parameters. Throughout the chapter, the
results of the tax-shock in Section 5.3 are referred to as “baseline” responses.
The shortfall of the calibration technique is that it carries uncertainty over the model’s
parameters, which translates into uncertainty over the model’s quantitative results. Hansen
and Heckman (1996) recommend overcoming this problem with an explicit representation
of such uncertainty from a sensitivity analysis. Their recommendation is what motivates
this chapter.
A survey by Andronis et al. (2009) concludes that the literature lacks criteria by which
results of a sensitivity analysis are to be evaluated. This chapter evaluates sensitivity by
any qualitative changes or significant quantitative changes in impulse responses.
The chapter’s overall conclusion is that the responses of the tax-shock are (i) qualitatively
robust but quantitatively sensitive to the values of structural parameters; (ii) qualitatively
and quantitatively robust to small (and plausible) variations in the persistence of shocks
to tax rates; and (iii) qualitatively and quantitatively sensitive only to significant (and
sometimes implausible) variations in the persistence of shocks to tax rates.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 systematically analyses the
sensitivity to structural parameters using three local methods which all involve repeated
simulations of the tax-shock with the parameters’ “sensitivity settings” that are listed in
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Table 4.1. Section 8.2.1 is the first method, which changes one structural parameter at a
time; Section 8.2.2 delivers the second and third methods, which change combinations of two
or more structural parameters. Section 8.3 analyses sensitivity to the persistence of shocks
to tax rates by repeatedly simulating the tax-shock with values of ρτrn and ρτwl that are
above and below their calibrated (and fairly standard) settings. Section 8.4 summarises the
chapter. Some additional algebra is given in Appendix 3.A. And figures and tables appear
at the end of the chapter.
8.2 Sensitivity to structural parameters
8.2.1 One-at-a-time changes
The first approach to structural parameter sensitivity is a one-at-a-time (OAT) method –
one parameter is changed to one of its sensitivity settings, and all other parameters remain
at their baseline values; this is done for each and every parameter and for each and every
sensitivity setting listed in Table 4.1.1 The OAT method comprises 12 sets of results, which
are graphically illustrated by impulse responses in Figures 8.1 to 8.7. The magnitude of
immediate impulse responses from all 12 sensitivity simulations, as well as those from the
baseline tax-shock, are listed in Table 8.1. Since their differences are due to non-uniform
changes in parameter values, impulse responses on their own are unsuitable for comparing
different scenarios or for establishing a common criteria to assess sensitivity. Parameter
elasticities of impulse responses are computed according to Section 4.4.3 for these purposes.
Elasticities from all 12 repeated simulations are given in Table 8.2.
Liquidity constraints
Simultaneously higher and lower calibrations of θ and φ are examined.2 Figure 8.1 shows
little variation in impulse responses from the baseline scenario. Moreover, the absolute value
of parameter elasticities are less than unity for all variables except Cit , N
s
t+1, and pt. The
model is therefore not sensitive to the calibration of liquidity constraint parameters.
Varying the value of θ inversely influences the replacement cost of equity (see Appendix
3.A). Either directly or indirectly through qRt , the liquidity constraints enter negatively into
1The OAT method is similar to the “one-factor-at-a-time” method of Morris (1991), but is different in
that is does not randomly select parameter values.
2This is unlike the experiment in Section 5.6 in which θ and φ are de-linked and only variations in θ are
examined.
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investors’ consumption (Equation (3.56)) and positively into investment and equity’s supply
(Equations (3.38) and (3.59), respectively). Following a tax-shock, the tighter the liquidity
constraints (that is, the lower the values of θ and φ), the higher the increase in investors’
consumption and the lower the increases in equity’s supply and investment; and conversely.
This explains why It and C
i
t have positive and negative parameter elasticities, respectively.
It also explains why money’s price is the most sensitive variable to this parameter – from a
tax-shock, the tighter the liquidity constraints, the smaller the increase in equity’s supply
and the greater the increase in equity’s price (as if SN1 is positioned more to the left than it
appears in Figure 5.1A); then by a portfolio balance effect, the greater are the increases in
money’s demand and price. KM observe this movement from equity to money when liquidity
constraints tighten, and they call it a “flight to liquidity”. Ceteris paribus, tightening the
liquidity constraints worsens the appeal of the partially liquid asset (equity) and encourages
agents to substitute towards the more liquid asset (money), and the price of the liquid asset
therefore increases; and conversely.
Subjective discount factor
Parameter elasticities indicate that tax-shock responses of all variables are very sensitive
to changes in β; Figure 8.2 illustrates this. All of the parameter elasticities in Table 8.2
indicate that varying β produces the greatest amount of sensitivity among all of the OAT
simulations. Elasticities for β are asymmetric, that is, the model is more sensitive to raising
the parameter’s value than lowering it.
β enters negatively into entrepreneurs’ consumption (Equations (3.56) and (3.57)). Ce-
teris paribus, increasing β means entrepreneurs are more willing to delay consumption and
spend their net worth more evenly over time.3 As their patience increase, they consume
less in the present. This explains the negative parameter elasticities for Cit and C
s
t with
higher β. The consequences are higher levels of current saving and investment. Higher β
then amplifies the increases in asset demands that are caused by the tax-shock. For money,
this means a larger price increase compared to the baseline scenario, hence the positive
parameter elasticity for pt. For equity, there is also a greater supply response; the market
adjusts to the shock with a smaller price increase than in the baseline scenario, hence the
3Given that workers’ optimal behaviour involves them not saving for the future (from Equation (3.58))
then such changes are confined to entrepreneurs.
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positive parameter elasticity for pt. These variations in asset price impulse responses then
propagate throughout the economy.
Conversely, ceteris paribus, lowering β means entrepreneurs become more impatient and
consume more of their net worth in the present; this implies less saving and investment, and
lower asset demands and equity supply. Lower β dampens the increase in pt and amplifies
the increase in qt that are both caused by the tax-shock. Asset price increases feed back
into improvements in entrepreneurs’ net worth, and investors therefore consume more. This
is why Cit has a positive parameter elasticity with a lowering of β. In other words, investors
increase their consumption because of the net worth improvements they enjoy from the
tax-shock’s increase in asset prices; varying β up or down does not interfere with this, hence
the difference in the sign of parameter elasticities for Cit . Net worth improvements also
increase saving and investment. However, lowering β only partially offsets the increase in
savings but completely offsets the increase in investment, hence the negative and positive
parameter elasticities for Cst and It, respectively.
Capital’s share in output
Figure 8.3 suggests that the model is sensitive to γ. Furthermore, elasticities are greater
than 1 in absolute value for all variables except Lt and qt. The only variables with negative
elasticities are qt and rt. In other words, impulse responses of variables besides qt and rt are
smaller when γ is lowered. γ enters the aggregate labour demand function and production
function (Equations (3.51) and (3.60), respectively). Ceteris paribus, lowering γ positions
the inverse aggregate labour demand function leftwards from its baseline calibration; this is
illustrated in the first graph of Figure 8.12. Lowering γ therefore dampens the shock-induced
increases in the real wage and employment, and hence output. This explains why the
parameter elasticities of wt, Lt, and Yt are all positive. Changes in the goods market then
propagate throughout the economy.
Survival rate after depreciation
Figure 8.4 shows small differences in impulse responses between baseline and higher settings
for δ. But the change in δ is very small, and parameter elasticities reveal that the change
in immediate impulse responses are relatively large. Elasticities are all above 20 in absolute
value, making the model very sensitive to the parameter’s value. In fact, this parameter
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is second to β in generating model sensitivity. Ceteris paribus, a higher δ means capital
and equity stocks retain more of their value after depreciation each period. This effectively
provides net worth improvements to entrepreneurs, which amplifies those already brought
on by the tax-shock. However, increasing δ raises the appeal of equity. The shock-induced
increase in demand for equity is thus amplified and creates a larger fall in qt (as if D
N
1 is
further to the right than it appears in Figure 5.1A). This explains the negative parameter
elasticity for pt. Moreover, investors are able to invest more, given their net worth im-
provements, and they issue more equity, given its greater appeal. Investors also sacrifice
consumption for much more investment, hence the negative parameter elasticity for Cit .
Probability of investment opportunity
Figure 8.5 suggests that changing the value of pi does not significantly alter impulse re-
sponses, except for those of pt. The parameter’s elasticities are fairly similar between low-
ering and raising its value relative to the baseline setting. pi enters positively into investors’
consumption (Equation (3.56)), investment (Equation (3.59)), and the supply of equity
(Equation (3.38)), and enters negatively into savers’ consumption (Equation (3.57)). Ce-
teris paribus, raising the value of pi increases the population of investors relative to savers;
and conversely. Changing the parameter’s value therefore shifts aggregate activity from sav-
ing to investment. Changing the value of pi brings significant changes to the asset markets,
but these are outweighed by the effects of the tax-shock. The economy is therefore hardly
affected by variations in the parameter’s value, hence the very small elasticities for most
variables.
Inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply
Figure 8.6 shows some variation in impulse responses from changes in ν. Parameter elas-
ticities indicate that a minority of variables are sensitive to the parameter, although these
elasticities are marginally above 1 and therefore the degree of sensitivity is mild. Elastici-
ties also suggest that the model is more sensitive to lowering the parameter than raising it.
Overall, the model is not sensitive to the calibration of ν. Changing the parameter’s value
affects the economy through the aggregate labour supply function. The baseline setting
ν = 1 makes the inverse function (Equation (3.52)) linear in wt. The inverse function is
convex if ν < 1 and concave if ν > 1. These variations in the shape of labour market
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functions are illustrated in the second graph of Figure 8.12 and they are largely responsible
for any deviations of impulse responses from the baseline scenario.
Relative utility weight on labour
Although large deviations in impulse responses are shown in Figure 8.7, these are brought on
by large changes in the value of ω. Parameter elasticities provide a more reliable assessment
of sensitivity. Since no variable has an elasticity above 1 in absolute value, then the model
is not sensitive to raising the parameter’s value. However, lowering the parameter produces
large elasticities for most variables. Changes in ω in both directions have no effect on wt,
rt, and qt and produces the same parameter elasticity with other variables. The overall
conclusion is that the model is sensitive to lowering the parameter’s value, but not to
raising it. ω positively determines the slope of the inverse aggregate labour supply function
(Equation (3.52)). The last graph of Figure 8.12 illustrates how varying ω, ceteris paribus,
affects the labour market, and the remarks said above about changes in ν can also be said
about ω.
8.2.2 Combinations of sensitivity settings
The second and third approaches to structural parameter sensitivity both change combina-
tions of two or more parameters to their sensitivity settings. These approaches are called
the “Sensitive Combinations” (henceforth, SC) and “All Combinations” (henceforth, AC)
methods.
The SC uses combinations of two or more sensitivity settings for only those structural
parameters which the OAT method determines the model is sensitive to, that is, β, γ, and δ.
There are 10 working combinations of parameter values in this method.4 The SC builds
upon the screening that the OAT method performs, and attempts to capture two or more
sensitivity settings from β, γ, and δ which, when combined, produce tax-shock responses
that deviate significantly from the baseline. Impulse responses for the SC are illustrated
in Figure 8.8. These graphs show that impulse responses to the tax-shock vary only in
magnitude, not in direction or trajectory, to the calibration of the model.
The AC uses combinations of two or more sensitivity settings from all structural pa-
4An 11th combination with β = 0.999, γ = 0.4, and δ = 0.98 does not allow the model to converge to a
unique equilibrium.
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rameters. There are 754 working combinations of parameter values in this method, within
which the 10 combinations in the SC are included.5 The objective of performing the AC is
to capture any combination of two or more parameter values that are outside of those con-
sidered by the SC. The AC also avoids any selection bias that the SC may have, despite the
OAT method identifying which parameters are key drivers of sensitivity. Impulse responses
of the AC resemble those in Figure 8.8, but are more densely populated, and are therefore
not reported to avoid repetition. The conclusion of the AC is therefore the same as that of
the SC.
Box plots of immediate impulse responses from both SC and AC are presented in Fig-
ure 8.9 in which the immediate baseline responses of Section 5.3 are indicated by red crosses.
Two conclusions are drawn from inspecting these plots. First, with the exception of Cit , base-
line responses are not extreme. From Equation (3.56), Cit depends on many parameters –
pi, β, φ, θ, and δ. One hypothesis is that combinations of parameter values bring multiple
sources of deviation in Cit ’s impulse responses from the baseline, such that the baseline
responses appear extreme. Besides Cit , other baseline responses fall within the interquartile
range of immediate responses from both the SC and AC methods. Second, the AC delivers
more extreme immediate impulse responses than the SC. The whiskers of the box plots are
much longer from the AC. However, the 25th and 75th percentiles of both methods are very
similar. The differences in extreme responses suggest that the model is not only sensitive to
the structural parameters that are identified by the OAT method, but also to combinations
of any of the parameters.
8.3 Sensitivity to the persistence of shocks to tax rates
Sensitivity to ρτwl and ρτrn is examined by assuming ρτrn = ρτwl and by repeatedly simu-
lating the tax-shock with two values that are above (0.99 and 0.96) and three values that
are below (0.94, 0.88, and 0.10) the baseline setting (0.95) of the parameters. Baseline
values of structural parameters are maintained. Results are illustrated graphically by im-
pulse responses in two ways – Figure 8.10 gives the usual 200-quarter graphs and shows the
variation in long-term trajectories, and Figure 8.11 gives a close-up of the first 20 quarters
and shows the divergence of trajectories after the shock’s initial impact. Table 8.3 reports
5There are 217 additional combinations of parameter values that do not allow the model to converge to
a unique stable equilibrium.
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convergence indicators that are computed according to Section 4.4.2.
Very small changes (by ±1 basis point) in ρτwl and ρτrn from the baseline do not sig-
nificantly alter the responses of any variable in the model. When ρτwl and ρτrn are both
increased and decreased to 0.96 and 0.94, respectively, Figure 8.10 shows that the shape and
speed of adjustment paths hardly change. Figure 8.10 also shows that an increase by 4 basis
points (which brings the parameters close to unity) significantly amplifies adjustment paths.
All variables except aggregate taxes and asset prices then exhibit hump-shaped trajectories
and very long shock persistence, and those variables that have hump-shapes in the baseline
now have exaggerated humps. For any setting below 0.88, output loses its hump-shaped
trajectory. At this range of persistence, investment falls rapidly towards steady state and
is quickly outpaced by rising depreciation.
Reducing the persistence parameters down to very low levels reveals those variables
whose shock propagations are driven by intrinsic features of the model. At a persistence
calibration of 0.10, the slowest variables to adjust are N st+1, Kt+1, C
i
t , and Yt in that order.
It and Kt+1 take more than 200 quarters to converge and Yt takes more than 5 years.
This result suggests that the tax-shock’s financial acceleration is the reason why these
variables’ responses are persistent. Recall, the shock leads to higher asset prices, which
support entrepreneurs’ net worth improvements, investment, saving, and further asset price
increases, and output expands via the capital stock.
8.4 Chapter summary
This chapter analyses the sensitivity of tax-shock responses to the calibration of structural
parameters and the persistence of shocks to tax rates.
Structural parameter sensitivity analysis is performed systematically by three local meth-
ods, all involving repeated simulations of the tax-shock with “sensitivity settings” for the
parameters. The first method changes one structural parameter at a time; the second and
third methods change combinations of two or more structural parameters. Results indicate
that responses to the tax-shock (that are described in Chapter 5) are quantitatively sensitive
to one-at-a-time variation of three structural parameters – the subjective discount factor
(β), capital’s share in output (γ), and the survival rate of capital after depreciation (δ).
Tax-shock responses are also sensitive to combinations of alternative parameter settings,
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more so when these settings go beyond those of β, γ, and δ. Nevertheless, from changing
parameter values either one-at-a-time or in combinations, tax-shock responses vary only in
magnitude, and not in direction or adjustment trajectories. The analysis also shows that,
with the exception of investors’ consumption (Cit), baseline responses are not extreme when
compared against the alternative calibrations. Cit depends on five parameters, and combi-
nations of parameter values bring significant variations in impulse responses from baseline
that make the baseline responses appear extreme.
The tax-shock results of Chapter 5 are quantitatively and qualitatively sensitive to the
calibration of persistence parameters. Very small (and plausible) changes in parameter val-
ues do very little to alter responses. But with larger (and sometimes implausible) parameter
variations, there are significant changes in trajectory and convergence. Lowering the level
of persistence reveals that savers’ equity, capital, investors’ consumption, and output are
still slow to converge to steady state. This suggests that financial acceleration in the model
is the cause of these variables’ persistence.
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Figure 8.1: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to θ










































































Baseline (θ = 0.185) Lower θ (= 0.1665) Higher θ (= 0.2035)










NOTES: Horizontal axes measure quarters after the shock, starting from quarter 1. Vertical axes measure
deviations from steady state in levels.
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Figure 8.2: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to β










































































Baseline (β = 0.99) Lower β (= 0.98) Higher β (= 0.999)










NOTES: The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
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Figure 8.3: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to γ











































































Baseline (γ = 0.4) Lower γ (= 0.36)













NOTES: The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
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Figure 8.4: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to δ









































































Baseline (δ = 0.975) Higher δ (= 0.98)












NOTES: The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
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Figure 8.5: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to pi








































































Baseline (pi = 0.05) Lower pi (= 0.037) Higher pi (= 0.069)













NOTES: The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
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Figure 8.6: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to ν








































































Baseline (ν = 1) Lower ν (= 0.5) Higher ν (= 2)












NOTES: The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
194
Figure 8.7: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to ω










































































Baseline (ω = 4.01) Lower ω (= 3.409) Higher ω (= 8.15)












NOTES: The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
195
Figure 8.8: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to combinations of β, γ, and δ





















































































NOTES: These graphs show impulse responses to the tax-shock from 10 repeated simulations with combina-
tions of sensitivity settings for β, γ and δ that are listed in Table 4.1. An 11th combination with β = 0.999,
γ = 0.4, and δ = 0.98 does not allow the model to converge to a unique equilibrium. The notes in Figure 8.1
apply.
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NOTES: These box plots show the 25th and 75th percentiles, median, largest, and smallest immediate
impulse responses from the Sensitive Combinations (labelled “SC”) and All Combinations (labelled “AC”)
approaches to structural parameter sensitivity. Red crosses indicate immediate impulse responses in the
baseline scenario; see the “quarter 1” column of Panel A in Table 5.1 for their values.
197
Figure 8.10: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to ρτwl and ρτrn, 200 quarters










































































Baseline (ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.95) ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.10
ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.88 ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.94
ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.96 ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.99










NOTES: These graphs show impulse responses to the tax-shock from repeated simulations with lower-than-
baseline settings for persistence parameters, ρτwl and ρτrn. The notes in Figure 8.1 apply.
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Figure 8.11: Impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to ρτwl and ρτrn, 20 quarters









































































Baseline (ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.95) ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.10
ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.88 ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.94
ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.96 ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.99










NOTES: These graphs show the first 20 quarters of Figure 8.10. The same notes apply.
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Aggregate labour demand: baseline













Aggregate labour supply: baseline
Aggregate labour supply: lower ν











Aggregate labour supply: baseline
Aggregate labour supply: lower ω
Aggregate labour supply: higher ω
NOTES: These graphs plot Equations (3.51) and (3.52) using steady state levels of the capital stock and














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8.3: Convergence of impulse responses to a tax-shock: sensitivity to ρτwl and ρτrn
(B)
ρτwl = ρτrn = 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.80 0.50 0.10
Yt 201 201 201 201 198 189 182 139 67 22
It 201 117 94 77 39 34 30 15 5 3
Ct 201 194 169 151 103 94 87 44 6 3
Cwt 201 197 173 155 107 99 92 49 6 3
Cit 201 201 201 201 201 201 195 157 91 47
Cst 201 181 156 136 87 78 70 28 6 3
Nst+1 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
Kt(= Nt+1) 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 182
rt 201 201 201 201 176 168 160 118 45 2
wt 201 201 201 201 176 168 160 118 45 2
Lt 201 197 173 154 107 99 91 49 6 3
pt 201 61 49 40 24 22 20 12 5 3
qt 100 42 36 31 20 19 17 11 5 2
qRt 100 42 36 31 20 19 17 11 5 2
T ∗t 201 58 46 39 23 21 20 12 5 3
Tt(= Gt) 91 37 31 28 19 17 16 10 5 2





Can discretionary policy relieve the effects of liquidity constraints that limit investment,
and thereby stimulate economic activity in normal times, that is, when there are no other
exogenous shocks? Can discretionary policy ameliorate the effects of an exogenous tighten-
ing of the liquidity constraints (a liquidity shock)? The thesis answers these questions by
cutting tax rates, increasing government spending, and increasing government holdings of
privately-issued equity in a calibrated version of the neoclassical DSGE model of Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012). These policies are exogenous and temporary, and carry various endoge-
nous and contemporaneous financing arrangements that do not involve debt, but rather
changes in the composition of the government’s flow of funds.
The basic KM model is modified by introducing a government which levies distor-
tionary taxes on wages and dividends, consumes general output, issues money, and holds
entrepreneur-issued equity. Including distortionary taxes is a unique modification within a
branch of a burgeoning literature that extends the work of KM and studies liquidity shocks.
One branch of this literature introduces KM’s simultaneously binding liquidity constraints
to fairly standard New Keynesian DSGE models (Del Negro et al. (2011), Ajello (2012),
Kara and Sin (2013, 2014), and Molteni (2014)). The thesis belongs to a second branch
of the literature which modifies KM’s basic model (Bigio (2010, 2012), Nezafat and Slav´ık
(2012), Shi (2012), and Driffill and Miller (2013)). None of the papers in the latter group
have distortionary taxes, and they do not examine fiscal policy in KM’s liquidity constrained
environment. The discretionary polices in this thesis are therefore new approaches to ame-
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liorating a liquidity shock in the KM model.
The relevance of the thesis is supported by the 2008 financial crisis, at the heart of which
is a negative liquidity shock. The KM model is particularly suited for studying liquidity
shocks, as its novel feature – a pair of liquidity constraints – endogenously creates a demand
for assets of varying liquidity and allows government asset purchases to avoid the irrelevance
proposition of Wallace (1981) which plagues standard models. In crisis-afflicted countries,
such as the US and UK, conventional monetary policy was immovable with the nominal
policy interest rate at or near 0%. Policy packages to combat the crisis were dominated by
unconventional purchases of partially liquid assets from private agents and by fiscal policy.
Asset purchase programmes have varied by the type of asset that the policymaker offered in
exchange, and whether or not the policymaker’s balance sheet changed size. Fiscal policies
have made complete U-turns as part of consolidation strategies; the UK government, for
example, attempted fiscal expansion in the early aftermath of the crisis, and then (albeit
with political change) switched to an “age of austerity” to deal with the debt overhang
caused by low aggregate demand and prior stimulatory measures.1 The crisis created new
debates on the effectiveness of asset purchase programmes, and reignited old debates about
the effectiveness and choice of fiscal policy. The thesis contributes to all these debates, from
a theoretical and neoclassical perspective.
The thesis does not make policy recommendations because its results are conditional on
a model that is highly simplified by assumptions that divorce its agents’ behaviour from
reality. For instance, government spending in the model does not affect private agents’
utility, but in reality such spending affects private utility, for example, by welfare payments.
The thesis merely begins a programme of work on fiscal policy in the KM model. This
conclusion outlines extensions of the thesis for a future work programme which will help
develop a comprehensive understanding of fiscal policy in the KM model, and from which
policy advice can be obtained.
1The “age of austerity” is a phrase used by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron at a pre-election
speech in 2009. See Cameron (2009).
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9.2 Summary of results
Can discretionary policy relieve the effects of liquidity constraints that limit
investment, and thereby stimulate economic activity in normal times?
If the government keeps money supply constant and varies its spending to match tax revenues
and thereby balance its fiscal budget in every period, then simultaneous cuts in both tax
rates successfully stimulate economic activity – consumption, investment, employment, and
output all immediately increase and remain above their steady states for a very long time. Of
all the simulations in the thesis, this is the most effective discretionary policy for economic
stimulus in normal times. These results vary only in magnitude, but not in direction or
trajectories, to alternative calibrations of structural parameters. The results, however, are
quantitatively and qualitatively sensitive to the calibration of the persistence of shocks to
tax rates; very small (and plausible) changes in persistence parameter values do very little to
alter responses, but with larger (an sometimes implausible) variations there are significant
changes in variables’ trajectories and speeds of convergence.
The worst set of discretionary policies involve an increase in government spending. Gov-
ernment spending does not create employment and output and does not enter the utility of
private agents. If the government finances its spending with more taxes then it balances its
fiscal budget, but there are immediate and persistent declines in consumption, investment,
employment, and output. If, instead, the government runs a fiscal deficit and finances its
spending by selling part of its equity stock then consumption and investment immediately
fall and employment and output fall after a one-period delay.
Intermediately, if the government (unconventionally) buys equity from entrepreneurs
and finances this purchase with austerity measures, and regardless of whether or not the
purchase is accompanied by monetary expansion, then the economy is stimulated for a brief
period of time. The accompanying austerity measure is better (that is, less distortionary)
when government spending is cut rather than when taxes are increased. With a cut in
government spending, the equity purchase programme does not immediately change output
and employment, but private consumption and investment both increase. With an increase
in taxes, the programme immediately reduces output and employment, as well as private
consumption, but investment increases. The increase in investment in both scenarios adds
new equity to the market which almost replaces the stock taken out by the government. This
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is why the programme has short-lived effects. Results are unable to conclude whether or
not adding monetary expansion to the policy mix improves the outcome of the programme
with austerity; aggregate supply benefits from monetary expansion, but aggregate demand
suffers.
Can discretionary policy ameliorate the effects of an exogenous liquidity shock?
Responses to a liquidity shock (without policy) are the same across most variants of the
model (the exception is the Ng-financed variant in Chapter 6) and in the KM model –
consumption immediately rises, investment immediately falls, and employment and output
do not immediately change, but from the second period the economy enters a long recession.
The most successful policy against the liquidity shock is cutting the rate of tax on
dividends and lowering government spending to balance the fiscal budget. The rate cut
and the liquidity shock both affect entrepreneurs’ liquidity in opposite ways, and variables
that are not affected by the liquidity shock are not disturbed by the tax cut. Intuitively,
the dividend tax drives a wedge between investors’ gross net worth and liquid funds. These
agents are already liquidity constrained and are therefore investing in sub-optimal quantities.
When the tax is cut, they do not save more or consume more, but instead channel their
gains into more investment, from which they enjoy more utility in the next period and the
economy benefits in the long-term from more capital.
By contrast, increasing government spending, financed either by an increase in taxes or
by selling some stocks of equity, exacerbates the liquidity shock.
Intermediately, an equity purchase programme is generally successful at ameliorating
the liquidity shock, regardless of how it is financed, but the benefits are short-lived and
almost disappear after one year. This result is shared by KM and the sticky-price models
of Del Negro et al. (2011), Kara and Sin (2013), and Driffill and Miller (2013).
9.3 Limitations and directions for future research
Policymakers cannot be advised by this thesis to undertake balanced budget tax and spend-
ing cuts. Notwithstanding that balanced budgets are very difficult to achieve in practice,
this model has simplifying assumptions that lead to results which may differ from reality.
The balanced budget policy is best for this model, and further research with replications
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of the policy in various environments is recommended before generalising an outcome and
adopting the measures in practice.
Government employment and welfare
One of the major digressions from reality concerns government spending. In reality, spending
cuts mean reductions in employment for those who work for the state, reductions in output
from state enterprises, and reductions in welfare and consumption by those who receive
transfers from the government. These effects imply a trade-off between spending cuts and
tax cuts, and this trade-off is absent in the model. The absence explains why the economy is
stimulated by policies in Chapters 5 and 7 that involve spending cuts, and why it contracts
from policies in Chapter 6 that involve more government spending. For future research, this
model should be modified to allow the government to employ labour and produce general
output and/or make transfers to workers and thereby positively influence their utility. Then
all the experiments in the thesis that involve variations in government spending should be
repeated, and the net effects after trade-offs should be analysed to formulate policy advice.
Alternative balanced budget tax cuts
One type experiment that is not performed in Chapter 5, but which would complete all
the possible policy combinations with a balanced fiscal budget, is a cut in one rate of tax
and a simultaneous increase in the other rate of tax, while government spending and other
policy variables are left unchanged. Such an experiment is useful for studying the relative
merits of one tax cut versus another, which is not the objective of the thesis, and is therefore
ommitted.
Ricardian workers
Because asset returns are sufficiently low, workers in this model prefer not to save, and
instead consume all their wages in each period. Then any policy which targets asset prices
has no direct impact on labour supply and output. This is why there is no trade-off between
the direct effects of equity purchases and the financing of these purchases in Chapter 7.
If, however, workers save (as they do in the related work of Kara and Sin (2014)) then
asset price policy has direct impacts on output. The model can therefore be extended,
either by exogenous assumptions or otherwise, to encourage workers to participate in asset
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markets. Such a model faces the challenge of overcoming Ricardian equivalence from tax
cuts, that is, expansionary policy may lead to workers adjusting their saving and leaving
(a large component of) aggregate demand unchanged. Another complication of such a
model, one that is already expressed by Driffill and Miller (2013), is understanding the
complex inter-temporal effects on workers’ saving and consumption due to expectations of
tax changes.
Storage technology
Responses to a liquidity shock in all the variants of the model match those of the basic KM
model. The thesis therefore suffers from the same flaw that plagues KM and is pointed
out by Shi (2012) – the liquidity shock lowers output and raises asset prices, but such a
countercyclical response by prices is not observed in actual recessions. KM construct a
“full” model to address this criticism by including a perfectly liquid storage technology, and
thereby achieve endogenous price stability for money. Driffill and Miller (2013) resolve the
problem by assuming sticky prices for both assets. KM and Driffill and Miller (2013) obtain
an added bonus of amplified investment responses to the liquidity shock. But Driffill and
Miller (2013) and the rest of the New Keynesian literature experience small and short-lived
responses to policy because sticky prices for both assets stifle financial acceleration. So
instead of assuming sticky prices, a useful extension of this thesis is to include KM’s storage
technology, or equivalently, introduce distortionary taxes to KM’s full model. The aim
would be to see whether simulated asset price movements can be replicated to match actual
observations in liquidity shocks (for example, in the 2008 crisis).
Quantitative easing
Once the storage technology makes money’s price sticky then the M -financed G-shock and
M -financed Ng-shock can be successfully simulated. The latter experiment represents quan-
titative easing, and is precisely the policy that KM, Del Negro et al. (2011), Kara and Sin
(2013), Driffill and Miller (2013), and Molteni (2014) perform against a liquidity shock.
Risky projects
KM and the rest of the related literature assume that investment technologies produce cap-
ital with certainty. A novel approach is to assume the technologies are heterogeneous with
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non-zero probabilities of default. Then equity becomes a risky asset and there are two nega-
tive implications of government equity purchases. First, the government introduces default
risk to its balance sheet, and losses sustained from private investment failures may eventu-
ally result in more taxes, spending cuts, or monetary expansion. Second, government policy
introduces moral hazard; entrepreneurs may be encouraged to undertake riskier investments
with higher payoffs while knowing that any losses to their liquid net worth will be refunded
by government policy.
New Keynesian and empirical versions
Finally, it may be worthwhile to replicate the experiments of this thesis in New Keynesian
DSGE models. The outcome may help identify whether any of the real or nominal rigidities
affect the transmission of fiscal shocks. Ajello (2012) already presents a New Keynesian
model with KM’s liquidity constraints and distortionary taxes, but he does not apply his
model to a study of fiscal policy. It may be worthwhile to use his model, instead of design a
new one from scratch. Alternatively, Del Negro et al. (2011) and Kara and Sin (2013, 2014)
already develop New Keynesian models with KM’s liquidity constraints, and it may not be
difficult to introduce distortionary taxes to their frameworks. Eventually, the ideas of this
thesis should be translated into empirical research by estimating these New Keynesian DSGE
models, and the results can contribute to debates on fiscal multipliers. Given its parameter
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